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Louise 
The papers jn this volume were for the 1985 annual conference on Papua New Guinea 
the of Political and Social in the Research School of Pacific 
The conference, entitled 'Law and order in Papua 
New Guinea', was held on October 1985 and was convened Ron of the 
Department of Political and Social The authors of two of the papers in this volume, 
ui�J.U.JJll)';.:o and Keris, were not able attend the conference submitted papers in absentia. The 
papers are in their on conference programme, with paper, written as 
oac�kgrmma to the conference discussions, at the end. 
The convenor had free hand in their papers, but a consistent 
theme in all of them. The theme is reflected in the title of this volume: the 
pe1:sp1ective that looks at the law and order situation in the context in the wider 
This society theme took several forms. First, many were concerned with 
unc1en;ta11ldrr1g law and order looking at the context of the wider rather than by 
looking only at the government institutions concerned with law and order matters. Second, 
several papers considered recent in Papua New Guinea society, looking particularly at 
changes between independence in 1 975 and the present. Third, a number of writers while looking 
at the direction of social change, also looked forward to what the future might hold for Papua New 
Guinea, at where current trends are to take us, and how far these trends may be reversible or 
susceptible to government influence. 
The context of the wider society 
The first element in the changing society theme can be seen in discussions of the economic 
environment, the political context, relations between people and the state, social inequality, and the 
international context within which Papua New Guinea is situated. 
Brunton describes how public demand for modernization and the nature of the economy produce 
unemployment problems and unfulfilled expectations for rural incomes. Brunton and Giddings both 
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underline the gap between what people want and what they can achieve, although Giddings' 
account is focused on conununities and families in one particular part of the country. 
Several writers consider the environment and the role of the state in modem New 
Guinea. Dinnen finds similarities between Guinea and the United Kingdom. He argues 
that when there is a crisis of hegemony (using Gramsci's phrase), when a government finds 
diminished support and acceptance among the people, then the government's approach to law and 
order is likely to usually in the direction of more use of force. 
Morauta describes a widespread lack of confidence in government, and in some areas 
open conflict between members of the and state This is also made by 
uu•vu.,ia when he looks on tribal finds that many see the 
police as an of in their territories, as enemies rather than as allies in times of 
trouble. 
While in some parts of the country there is conflict between state and in other parts there is 
more of a breakdown of conununications or contact between government and people. to 
Morauta most rural conununities conduct their affairs of government services or 
intervention. Brunton argues that the nation there is a low level of 
consciousness beyond the and little interest in or of gm1en1m1ental 
processes. Thus public opinion provides little check on or to 
discussion of the environment was, then, terms attitudes rather than in terms of 
institutions and their performance. 
The paper Hess presents an apparent contrast to such arguments. Hess describes the record of 
industrial relations in Guinea and relative between unions, em1nlcivers 
and government, especially the of Labour. He suggests that workers trust the 
Depaitm.ent of Labour and that this trust facilitates between employers and employees. 
Thus Hess describes a situation of while others talk of a lack of legitimacy for 
government. 
The contrast between Hess and other writers may be illuminated the discussions that took place 
on crime, social inequality and class. Dinnen, Morauta and Brunton all consider the conflict of 
interests on law and order questions between people in positions of power and economic .,,."'""t""'"' 
and the rest of the population. Dinnen particularly emphasizes the way law and order policies serve 
the rulers at the expense of the ruled. It may be that Hess' study provides an illustration either of the 
closing of ranks among those with certain advantages, or of the coopting of the workers, and a 
blurring of their conflict of interests with their employers, by a more sophisticated ruling class. 
Bayne, Dinnen and Brunton also look at the international context of the law and order situation in 
Papua New Guinea. Bayne considers some of the influences, by no means all of them either 
'colonial' or mindlessly adopted from overseas, on the present legal system. Dinnen and Brunton 
consider in broader terms than Bayne the impact of the international polity and economy, especially 
in relation to underdevelopment. 
The second element in the changing theme is ex1Jressea in various ways in the papers of 
Kituai, Morauta, Brunton and Dinnen. Several contrast the changes over the 
decade with the ideals 
Of course, many recent changes have grown out of that began to mctep1enc1ence. 
Kituai's paper takes us back as far as the before Second World War, and the Papua New 
Guinean who worked in that and the 1940s and 1950s. We see the times and 
the work of these their eyes. The old present a 
in difficult situations. But the end of Kituai's paper reminds us that it was an "·"'HJLJ.L<uu ... u 
that an essential for this kind of policing. By the time of md.ep€md,enc.e, 
of the past. 
One of the contributions of Kituai's paper is that us longer time perspective. the 
others it draws our attention patterns of in law and order over several decades. 
From authoritarian colonial there was move towards more democratic ideals in the 
1970s and the vision of the Constitution. But in the 1980s we see renewed interest in authoritarian 
measures in the face of what is seen as a crisis in law and order. 
Not surprisingly writers who describe trends in social change are also interested in what these 
trends mean for the future. What do the events of today tell us of tomorrow? One of the difficulties 
in answering this question is to disentangle social features that are transient, part of a move from 
one situation to another, from those that are permanent, likely to persist or become further 
established in the future. There is also the difficult question of how far government or other 
purposeful action can influence or alter the processes of social change. 
The main areas of agreement at the conference were that Papua New Guinean is moving 
towards greater and wealth, and that the state is to become increasmgly 
coercive in its relations with the people it governs. Class is particularly marked in towns 
according to Morauta, but Brunton and Dinnen that this should not obscure the position 
of the ruling class and the state in Papua New Guinean as a whole. Brunton looks at 
underlying changes in the economy, and sees the education system and urbanization as 
1nP•v1t�h1v to greater disillusionment and dissatisfaction. 
""·"'IJ ... "U' and Morauta, from observations of tribal 
situations in and lowlands as r11"·"'rn·inn 
argue that, as a result of different colonial ext>en.em;es, 
different roads in the between 
or continued of and clan in the hi�:hl�mds, 
and individual in the lowlands. HA••'"'"" ..... 
concludes that unless there is a 
police as an enemy 'to be driven out mass ms1urgenc:v 
New Guinea'. 
the future. 
the law and order situation is not an indicator of 
an11c11pate. Dinnen and Bayne agree that the 
them towards more coercive and 
less democratic government, the for such \..H1:u1�.c::11. 
as unwelcome, as 
inevitable? On this are Some, Brunton and Dinnen, see the trends 
as Brunton argues that the odds of direction are too 
there to be will The international economy, the un1cter·ae've1opJment 
domestic economy and the lack of local skills make the prospects for 
direction bleak. Dinnen draws on international to arrive at the same conclusion. 
On the other hand, several writers seem to think that there is room for 
step to them, and government a 
different the future. While and Morauta want to warn government 
and their also want pntcucai 
These three with Keris, and greater 
cooperation between law and order agencies citizens as the to a better future. 
Giddings argues for community involvement with young offenders and, more generally, 
community problems, based on experiences in the Eastern Province. Keris emphasizes 
the role of village courts in involving private citizens in law and order problems, and the 
need for more sensitive and community-oriented is critical of the use of 
police mobile squads to (literally) combat tribal fighting, and argues that the state should increase 
its role as mediator and negotiator and relinguish that of combatant. 
Overview 
In concluding this introduction, it is perhaps useful to consider why discussions at this conference 
developed in the way did, and focused on the theme of law and order in a changing society. 
The choice of contributors and the environment of the conference obviously had an influence. The 
conference was hosted by a research of a university, was aimed at members of that 
un:tvers11ty and drew on the wider academic community for many of its contributors. Of the nine 
papers, six were given people full-time academic positions, while three were given 
people who were at that time in the law and order field. However, of the six academic 
contributors several had had as advisers to government or as public servants in Papua 
New Guinea. While academics tend to consider abstractions and underlying causes, they 
could do so equally focusing on deviance, explanations of crime, or an examination of formal 
institutions. The conference focus thus seems to me to require some further explanation. 
We must also take account of the stage that had been reached in late 1985 in the debate on law and 
order within Papua New Guinea. Five of the nine were resident in Papua New Guinea 
at the time of the conference, and a different five were citizens. Most were affected by the climate 
of informed opinion in the country at that time. After many years of government reports and 
enc1u11aes (summarized in Morauta's paper), 1984 had seen the appearance of two major overview 
studies of law and order questions. Dated 1983 but available in mid-1984, the Morgan 
was the fruits of the work of the committee to review policy and administration on 
crime, law and order (Department of Provincial Affairs Another sponsored 
the Institute of National Affairs and the Institute of Applied Social and Economic Research, the 
INNIASER was also published in 1984 (Clifford et al. 1984). These two reports had rather 
exhausted the topic, at least temporarily, of what was wrong with the government's law and order 
institutions and its overall policy on law and order. 
However, at the end of 1984 the law and order situation had appeared to deteriorate even more 
rapidly, there was great public concern and in mid-1985 a state of emergency was declared in the 
national capital. The conference was held while the state of emergency was still in progress, at a 
time when police morale and public relations were at something of a high point, and when, as a 
result, many people were asking not what was wrong with the police, courts or prisons, but what 
was wrong with their society. Thus public attention itself had partly shifted to the issues of the 
social context of crime, law and order. 
Nevertheless, there are probably less temporary reasons for the theme that emerged in the 
conference. One such reason might be that questions about law and social order in any country are 
essentially questions about the nature of a society: its values, its institutions and its politics. In 
Papua New Guinea, this kind of question is both intriguing and hard to answer. The social science 
tradition in Papua New Guinea focused until the 1970s on small-scale societies. Neo-Marxist 
writers drew our attention to the structure of Papua New Guinea society as a whole, but there are 
still relatively few country-wide studies and almost none that address the nature of social change 
since independence. 
Finally, the papers in the conference seem to me to reflect the mood of many well-educated Papua 
New Guineans in the mid-1980s. Theirs is not the optimism of the 1970s. Rather it is a 
disillusionment with the processes of government, policy-making and administration. Many 
educated Papua New Guineans now want to find personal satisfaction or public commitment outside 
these processes, while others try to define the possibilities and capabilities of government and their 
own roles more narrowly than in the past. 
Their eyes, too, are turned to their changing society, and few like what they see. However, as was 
apparent in the conference, people respond different ways to what they observe. There are some 
who feel that the unwelcome trends are inevitable, while others, in their own spheres, want to 
challenge the direction of social and, if with more modest goals, to rekindle the optimism of 
the independence period. 
For the first type of person, this vo\ume will only serve to confirm his fears and pessimistic 
predictions about Papua New Guinea. For the second kind of reader, the restrained optimist, it may 
do more. It may�provide him with a little more understanding of the problems he perceives, and 
place him in a better position to make contribution he can to their solution. 
md.ePf�ndenc�e with banners, rm�wc)rks. 
District. Whatever else may 
law and order. 
New Guinea in :SeJJte1nb(�r 
between the law and order situation 
the national 
state, relations between state and 
certain features of contemporary social structure, and conclude with some comments on 
The situation 
Because of the limitations and deficiencies of official statistics, there no reliable evidence on 
trends in crime New Guinea. a of offences are to the police. For 
instance the 1983 Urban found only 27 per cent of victims in Lae 
household thefts to the was 33 per cent for the five towns in 1977 
(Bureau of Statistics The report from the the Institutes of National Affairs 
and Social and Economic Research (the lNNIASER that around half of 
... ..,�'"'"'"" .... to were lost before they could enter official crime records (Clifford et al. 
rural crime rates are less to be reflected official statistics 
than urban ones. So we have no reason to accept official police statistics which show a slowing rate 
of increase in crime in the 1980s. 
Public opinion, however, is that crime has been increasing and that particular types of offences, 
crimes of violence and rape, have been increasing faster than others. All over the country people in 
different walks of life feel that there is a law and order problem that has worsened during the years 
of independence. Rural and urban people alike see towns as the worst places for crime, and see 
crime spreading into the countryside along the roads and under the influence of urban models. 
Rural visitors to town probably see urban problems as more severe than urban residents themselves 
see them. Like any stranger or newcomer, the rural visitor has to make a safe adaptation to a new 
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environment, an adaptation based on the experience and information relayed to him by urban 
residents. Naturally enough he has a greater interest in identifying the maximum risks and in erring 
on the side of caution. 
As far as tribal fighting in the highlands goes, there seems little doubt that there has been an upsurge 
in recent years (see, for instance, Gordon and Kipalan 1982). Public opinion on tribal fighting is 
divided. Among people from the coastal and island provinces it is widely condemned, and seen as a 
major law and order problem. It is regarded as backward, foolish and destructive, and is prominent 
in ethnic stereotypes of highlanders. There is an impatient attitude that assumes highlanders could 
stop fighting any time they wished. Coastal people are quick to point out that their ancestors also 
engaged in tribal fighting but they have accepted the new ways of the government and left such 
foolishness behind. 
But within highlands provinces views are more varied. There is some public condemnation of tribal 
fighting, but also an appreciation of the factors that give rise to it. In particular it is regarded as a 
response or a solution to a law and order problem, for instance a dispute or longstanding grievance, 
rather than a law and order problem in itself. For highlanders tribal fighting is as much 
epiphenomenon as phenomenon, and their attention is focused on the problems that give rise to it. 
Government response 
The response of the governments of independent Papua New Guinea to law and order problems has 
been undistinguished. Although it is impossible to say what might have occurred without what 
government activity there has been, it is certain that successive governments have failed to contain 
the increase in crime or tribal fighting or to reassure citizens that they will shortly do so. Certainly 
the seeds of today's social and institutional problems were sown well before 1975. But if 
independence means anything, it must mean some opportunities to diverge from the colonial past 
and some responsibility for present circumstances. 
Over the past decade governments have set up a series of policy reviews, established various new 
mechanisms for coordination and attempted to improve the services of particular agencies. 
Government response to law and order problems has frequently been a response to crises in public 
opinion or particular events, and is marked by fluctuations of interest. It also reflects the dispersed 
nature of government efforts : with a considerable number of different agencies making rather 
independent contributions. There has also been uncertainty about appropriate coordinating 
mechanisms. These characteristics are illustrated in the following list of law-and-order-related 
actions: 
1977 task force on Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary; 
1979 state of emergency in five highlands provinces (in Enga until 1980); 
1980 National Planning Committee policy hearing on village courts; 
1981 Port Moresby committee for the promotion of law and order established; 
1981 committee of review on law and order appointed by the National Planning Committee 
(NPC); 
1982 review of Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary operations, management and 
administration for the NPC; 
1983 committee to review policy and administration on crime, law and order, the Morgan 
Committee, established (Department of Provincial Affairs 1983); 
1984 the INA/IASER study of law and order (Clifford et al. 1984); 
1984 appointment of a sectoral committee on law and order to assist with the drawing up of 
the Medium T erm Development Strategy; 
1984 National Executive Council Decision 176/84 'Measures to combat the breakdown in 
law and order', the forty-nine measures (Papua New Guinea 1984a); 
1984 implementation task force for measures amJoilrite1d: 
1985 law and order task force established; and 
1985 state of emergency in the National District. 
The report of the Morgan Committee and the INA/IASER study were first available in 1984 
(al1:ho1llgll the Morgan Report dated 1 983). The was to hand and the INA/IASER 
Report in its final stages of when the New Zealand woman and her 
oa11gl1tter in Port Moresby to a public outcry and demonstrations.  The National Executive 
Council met in Madang in October and a of measures 'to combat the 
breakdown of law and order' . It was a mixed with for everyone in cabinet, 
some measures dr awn from the and INA/IASER recommendations, and no clear overall 
theme. T he measures included changes to laws, law and order agencies, support for 
village courts and urban local government, in relations, and some 
measures such as cards, and a review of urban settlement 
Hard-line measures were with rape and 
violent crimes, reactivation of the raids, boom gates outside all 
towns of more than 10,000 a review of the Act, and reduction in 
the minimum penalties for less serious offences. Police and corrective services were to be 
strengthened. 
Measure n umber 49 established a small part-time implementation task force to report to the 
ministerial committee on law and order and to follow up on This group, chaired 
the secretary of the Prime Minister' s was replaced January 1985 by a small full-time 
law and order task force. the end of June 1985 this second group had prepared a cabinet 
submission reviewing implementation of the forty-nine measures and recommending funding 
pnon1ties and a package for commencement in 1985. This submission was not, however, 
considered by cabinet. 
Meanwhile public pressure on the government mounted as a result of violent crime, and state of 
emergency was declared in the National Capital District in June. At one level the state of 
emergency was popular with the general public in Port Moresby, providing what was commonly 
agreed to be a marked reduction in break-and-enter offences and violent crimes. A number of 
wanted persons and escaped criminals were arrested. The police have on the whole conducted 
themselves with discretion and sensitivity, and there has not been a backlash of community 
opposition. 
Port Moresby residents today are anxious about what will happen in November [1985] when the 
state of emergency comes to an end. Will it be business as usual for the gangs and other criminals? 
There are arguments for and against optimism. On the one hand, police may feel that they have 
captured a sufficiently large number of criminals during the state of emergency to improve the 
crime situation after that young on the fringes of crime 
and gangs have moved away from crime, because of increased risk of arrest, negative attitudes 
among relatives, or the clearest in the 




will soon be at 
cor1v1ctea because of inefficiencies in prc)se1::ut1on 
me�qua111ties of power and income : 
The view is not expressed 
criminals themselves to the papers, 
reports that gangs rob 
be no doubt either that 
or that many criminals come poor homes 
other hand, exact connection 
further examination. 
areas are involved 
be a necessary but not a sufficient condition for crime. 
the The 1977 Urban 
average suburban area. Thefts in are 
urban fieldwork 1982 and 1983 I found that victims 
One unfortunate member household 
in bag of rice that I gave him at the end of the survey 
taken from beside his bed the same night. It is neighbours who have the knowledge and '"'l-'1,,...,i ...... ..  J 
to commit such offences. 
The poor are in several ways more to crime than the affluent. It is who have to walk 
home after dark if they cannot find public transport, live in flimsy homes without security bars, and 
cannot afford private security services or telephones. They bear the brunt of violent crime in public 
places, and are not spared murder, rape or injury. Police figures for the six months to April 1985 
show that proportionately as many Papua New Guinean women as expatriates reported cases of rape 
in Port Moresby (Smith 1985). While there is no information on the economic status of Papua New 
Guinean victims, the figures at the least show that the wealthiest segment of the urban community, 
the expatriates, are not the only targets of violent crime. 
What can we make of reports that gangs steal from the rich to give to the poor? I suggest that these 
are primarily statements of ideology. Criminals have learned that academics, bureaucrats and 
politicians find poverty and unemployment partly acceptable excuses for crime. They are 
justifications which remove some of the guilt of antisocial behaviour, and may even attract 
government resources to fund employment schemes for ex-criminals. This was in fact one of the 
themes of a retreat sponsored by the law and order task force in 1985 to which many gang members 
came. Such justifications for crime are not, of course, likely to cut much ice with equally 
disadvantaged neighbours who have not themselves turned to crime. 
Gifts from criminals to the poor, apparently in the tradition of Robin Hood, may be designed to gain 
approval and support from those least likely to be impressed by the theoretical arguments about 
poverty and crime. For all its strengths, the gang may not be enough for its members, either in 
terms of tactical support or social and emotional rewards. Members still seek the and 
respect of kin and neighbours. So criminals give radios, food, clothing and money to family and 
friends, in the Papua New Guinean idiom of expressing and creating social solidarity with material 
transactions. 
This is, however, a very different kind of giving from the largesse of Sherwood Forest. It is not 
recorded that Robin Hood lavished his gifts on parents, aunt, sister-in-law and friend. He gave 
to the faceless poor, the poor as a class. But the Papua New Guinean criminal makes his gifts to 
particular individuals, strengthening and marking personal rather than class relationships. While he 
may be able to articulate the idea of 'giving to the poor', it is most that transactions are 
perceived or understood that way by the recipients or the communities in which the criminal lives. 
The personal networks and kinship groupings outweigh the class relationship. 
Alongside these benefits to individuals, we must look at the costs of criminals in one's 
community or locality. While the benefits of crime accrue to individuals, the costs accrue to 
individuals and to a neighbourhood as a whole. Law-abiding citizens complain that criminals living 
amongst them 'spoil the name of our community, ol i bagarapim nem bilong mipela' .  Their main 
concern is not with pride in neighbourhood but with more practical issues. Many of the urban 
communities who suffer most from the presence of young criminals are communities of migrants. 
They may have uncertain rights to the land on which they live, or feel that depend on the 
goodwill of groups to remain and prosper in town. Relations between urban migrants 
and the descendents of those who originally owned the land on which the town was built are 
commonly strained if not hostile. Provincial governments frequently appear to support the non­
migrants. · Anti-migrant moves have included eviction from customary land, relocation of 
settlements, escalating land rents, enforcement of the Vagrancy Act, and police raids and searches. 
Many public servants and politicians believe that migrant settlements are the main base for urban 
criminals. Accordingly the National Executive Council's forty-nine measures 
Approved the immediate review of Vagrancy Act and the National Constitution to 
permit its effective operation with regard to human criminals 
Directed imp1eme�nt<1tlc�n of Government Settlement 
De1Jartme1nt of Lands and to ll11lme<1latelv 
Laloki and inform National Executive Council in its 
has been identified and sub-divided to build Standard 
ffil:grants since um�mt>lo�rea pe1·matne11t 
area. Another aim is to break up 
from the national 
The area 
bureaucratic 
upper and the rernainrn1_g 
businessman or po11uc:1an 
1984a: 
among national and nrcwu11c1a1 pollltlc1ans 
from rural electorates. 
are 
to their incomes, social ties or inclinations. 
the and boom gates constructed 
servants do not aPJJre<::ia1:e 
certain or unc;ooper·awve 
of town, without 
removed from 
other undesirables out of 
bottom of urban 
between the criminal and the 
the label 
sus·p1c1.on. The 
unfortunate effect is that a crucial resource for im1orovm1!! 
iaV11-a1J10.mQ: citizen every street and cluster of homes in our towns. 
The same communication gap is much less apparent in the n1�manas in relation tribal fighting, or 
in any rural area in relation to crime more In the members of the upper class 
are commonly as involved as poorer neighbours in tribal Indeed often have more to 
gain than the ordinary man. The is based on tracliti1omll-t'fPe 
economic strata. In rural areas more generally the well-to-do and the live alongside 
peasant and subsistence farmers, and see themselves as having common interests in the face of 
criminal or gang activity. So rural politicians are much less to confuse the criminal with the 
law-abiding citizen in their own rural electorates. 
A Tenth Anniversary Report 13 
The state in modern Guinea 
Several observers have commented that the formal institutions of the state Papua New Guinea 
have less the man than many countries. Connell rP•nP,•11r10 
aPJJroac11es to the economy of Papua New Guinea writes: 'Indeed there is of a 
consensus about the of the political system, from the absence of mobilised 
support...' ( Connell 1982:517). 
a state? 




views about the state and law and order are more diverse. While members of the rural and 
urban elite from which and bureaucrats come think the lines indicated, the 
o f  people are more ambivalent. A t  one level many appear t o  think that i t  i s  u p  to 
the state to solve law and order problems : they ask for stronger laws, tougher and better 
police services. But in practice people may not place much faith in government interventions. They 
may be able to articulate what improvements want to see, without believing either that these 
will come about, or that the improvements will really help. 
The law and order issue highlights the current weaknesses of the state in Papua New Guinea. Many 
of the problems arise from the nature of the cabinet system as it has evolved. appears that 
courts 
system. 
the first steps have been taken towards the 
manual. 
over ten years after the Act was 
of instructions on courts for the 
Decentralization has probably made coordination between agencies more difficult, with some 
functions - police, courts and corrective institutions - remaining national, while others -
courts, welfare services and provincial affairs - are concurrent or provincial functions. Provincial 
law and order committees can only request the cooperation of national agencies. 
As a result of the separation between the parts of the law and order system, is 
allocated agency by agency. In the rough and tumble of the allocation process some small but 
crucial parts of the system have been starved of funds in way which has the whole system 
to its knees. An is the failure to the minor funds to relieve 
judges of the necessity to take their own long-hand records of court .,,_,,uu:•i:;.;:i. 
State versus 
The problems discussed so far have been features internal to the 
Papua New Guinea. But the and order also raises qm�su1ons 
between state and This issue has been considered 
tribal (Gordon 1983; Gordon and 
nu2:m::maers do not find the state's mechanisms 
the courts, and as a result 
the state's to 
Nevertheless is nrr''"'"'"'1" 
activities and with its other functions. If 
This theme runs every aspect of the law and order 1-1n.1u,.,,,,., not 
essential points of the argument as applied to tribal are: 
tribal 
- the people in some respects define crime and disorder differently from the state; 
- state activity does not meet the problems the cOinmlUilJttv; 
- the state does not support or approve non-state solutions to law and order problems; and 
The 
- the state is prepared to use force to impose its definitions of crime and in support of its own 
institutional arrangements. 
the came to the settlement, never 
minor offence. Thus state action works 
between law-abiding residents and the 
The underlying conflict between state and people is the main law and order problem in Papua New 
Guinea. In a democratic state the government cannot rule by force, it must rule by consent. If it 
does not rule with the cooperation and good will of the people, in many ways it does not rule at all. 
In Papua New Guinea there are the formal institutions of the state, but these are largely irrelevant to 
the internal workings of the 
If the state is not a integrating force in Papua New Guinea, how best can we characterize 
relations between people and groups within the society? We have to say that New Guinean 
society is still very fragmented. there are class across the 
country, the law and order directs our attention to the role of corporate groups in 
contemporary social structure. 
In lowlands societies tribal was in many endemic. It the way in 
which, as in the highlands relations between groups were The contrast with the 
highlands today is not so much of traditional culture as of colonial By the time of 
incllepi::nd.ern�e there was alive in the first-contacted coastal communities who had witnessed 
warfare first hand and remembered it. Even in the late 1960s in found it very difficult 
together accounts of wars all of which had taken before 1910. the 
n1gn1ands some pre-contact wars are still there is still alive a of 
men who can teach their sons the tactics of traditional warfare. I 
do not want to a crude and lowlands, but to emph:1si2ce 
that features of contemporary social structure are to be associated as much with colonial 
experience as precontact culture. 
In the absence of strong state institutions many highlands have 
in groups such as clans. In other parts of the country strong group and mter-1ffcmo 
have not been the response. have remained nominally in their traditional and quasi­
traditional residential groups, but have responded to disputes and offences in a more individualistic 
way. seek remedies, often of a traditional type, those .,."'"""'",.,."' 
group action. The balance between residential, and descent 
household, small family and networks of kin and affines, on the other has ..., .. ,:u,_.,..., ...... 
The contrast between an emphasis on the household and an on a wider corporate group is 
also apparent ·1rban social structure, although for different reasons. In 1980, 30 per cent of the 
urban population lived in census units classified as urban villages or migrant settlements (National 
Statistical Office n.d.) In these areas ties of neighbourhood and kinship link residents, and informal 
leadership and dispute-settlement mechanisms are relatively strong. Group boundaries are important 
to residents who would otherwise feel insecure in the town environment. fieldwork in the 
Nine Mile settlement in Port Moresby in 1982, I became very aware of the importance of the 
residential community for physical safety. Within the settlement people moved around after 
dark. Women and children could walk anywhere on their own with safety. While there was a 
certain amount of theft within the community, people were not afraid to sleep outside at night if the 
house was too crowded. One elderly widow told me how the settlement was 'her village', the place 
she regarded as home and security. The residents of Nine Mile are from the Malalaua District of the 
Gulf Province, but there is a smaller cluster of houses belonging to people from the Goilala District 
of the Central Province on the fringes of the settlement. During my stay members of this Goilala 
group got into a serious dispute over brideprice with some of their kinsmen. An attack was 
expected. The Goilala people moved into the main housing area, and slept in the open air or under 
the house of a United Church elder. As they explained to me, nobody would dream of attacking 
them in the middle of Nine Mile settlement. 
and assistance from the 
lack of 
on information 
t:A1:uu1111::, retiab.ilit:aticm programmes are often 
to assist the government in the war on crime and disorder. 
In the INNIASER we said that the government had three 
and order was concerned 
- a continuation or perhaps of present services; 
- increasing reliance on the coercive power of the state; or 
Ireqm�ntly exhorted the 
as far as an overall 
- what we called 'the non-state' an approach which placed community resources at 
the forefront and used state resources to complement these (Clifford et al. : 
The third option would certainly be an about-face. It would require strong and some 
hard decisions. It would be difficult and slow to implement. But it is the one option that recognizes 
and uses the strengths that the people can bring to bear on the problem of law and order, and it is the 
one option that is likely to overcome the problem of that underlies the indlectiveness of 
state efforts to date. 
Thus on the tenth anniversary of independence, disregarding the fireworks and the banners, it seems 
as if we in Papua New Guinea need to pause. The Constitution accepted immediately prior to 
independence sets out democratic ideals and the kind of state Papua New Guineans wanted to have. 
However, as we look back over the decade since 1975 we find parts of these ideals have 
not been realized. The Papua New Guinea state is not only ineffective and inefficient, which was 
perhaps to be expected, it is also out of touch with the and to rule without their 
support. In some senses it is their adversary. The are much more serious 
than the problems of efficiency. Perhaps, once will be seen as one of 
the main challenges of the second decade of Papua New Guinea's mclepern1e111ce. 
New 
who continued to serve until the 1960s and early 1970s. 
untorturtat1:!ly have without written records, we will never know much about their work. 
Of those who are still alive, a few are now in urban centres either with their 
sons and The however, have returned to live in 
maintain an avid interest in the within 
members. This is because, as one former member stated, 
be one' (interview, 9 1985). Their pe1�ce1mcm 
us to understand and tribulations that 
order to the 
The paper is based on interviews conducted over a seven month in 1985 with men who had 
served either as members of the Armed or the New 
Force between 1920 and 1952. The number of men interviewed at time was twelve. 
substantial part of my 
Guinean pol1Lcernan 1920 - 1952'. 
More interviews are and an of 
doctoral dissertation on 'The of the 
Most of the able-bodied men who were recruited into the then Armed Native Constabt1lai�v 
and the New Guinea Native Police Force came from those areas which had the longest contact with 
the colonial governmentl. A lesser number were recruited from areas which had only recently been 
1 The term 'Royal' was not used for the Anned Native Constabulary of Papua New Guinea until 1939 when King George VI 
'assented to the prefix "Royal" being granted to the force, which then became known as the Royal Papuan 
Constabulary' (Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary 1966). The combined police force of Papua and New Guinea 
was not known as the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary until 1955(Grimshaw1972:919). 
brought under control. A few were from areas not under complete government control (Townsend 
1933:424). In most cases the latter recruits were either exprisoners or men who had been convicted 
of some notorious acts against either colonial government officials or other tribal groups. 
Before final selection all recruits had to satisfy certain requirements as laid down in the police force 
regulations, the first of which had been enacted in 1890 in Papua and 1896 in New Guinea. A 
potential candidate therefore had to be: 
- of superior physique and intelligence; 
- of good character: before enlisting, prisoners and exprisoners had to make a commitment to 
be loyal to the government; 
- 5 feet 4 inches or more in height (reduced from an original minimum of 5 feet 6 inches) 
(Territory of New Guinea 1932-33:497); 
- with a chest measurement of 33 inches; 
- 17� to 40 years of age; 
- able to converse in any one, or a combination of three languages: English, Police Motu and 
tok pisin; and 
- knowledgeable about the work of the colonial government. 
Although the normal police squad on an outstation would often contain men from four or five 
administrative districts, some areas consistently provided more recruits for the police than others. 
The communities most favoured by government recruiters were probably the Binandere, Orokaiva 
and Waria. As a result, people who were closely related made up a high proportion of the 
police. 
Sir John Guise was born on 29 August 1914 and was recruited into the Royal Papuan Constabulary 
in 1946 at the = .:;e of thirty-two by Colonel Elliot Smith. Prior to his recruitment he had worked for 
the Burns Philp Company in Samarai for sixteen years. At the time of his recruitment he had been 
educated up to grade four. Of his physique he recalled in interview, 'I was thirty-two years; I was a 
sportsman. I am damned sure that I had a good physique because I was a very strong sportsman'. 
Among a number of sports, his favourite was cricket. In 1946 he considered himself a Papuan. 
None of the other ex-policemen had considered themselves as either Papuans or New Guineans. It 
possible that Guise identified himself as a because of his educational background. 
Joe Naguwien, a Sepik man, enlisted into either the New Guinea Native Police or the New Guinea 
Volunteer Rifles in Morobe in 1942 at the age of about twenty-two (interview, 14 March 1985). 
When news of the Second World War reached the goldfields in Bulolo and other areas, his 
employers left in a great hurry for Australia or elsewhere, leaving practically everything behind. 
Naguwien and his compatriots were left to fend for themselves. They walked to Lae with their 
meagre possessions and upon arrival were told to enlist and help fight the Japanese or walk back to 
the Sepik. The odds were againstNaguwien walking back to Dagua through unfamiliar territory, so 
he enlisted with a fellow villager and 580 other Sepik men. As he could neither read nor write he 
placed a mark beside his name on a white piece of paper as evidence of his enrolment. Whether or 
not he had first signed on to work for the NGVR he subsequently formally enlisted in the war time 
In 1942 did not consider himself to be a New Guinean but only a man from 
Dagua. This tends to confirm my suggestion about the influence of education on regional and 
national identities. 
Talasea to be a strange place for young Amero Bega when he was brought in from his 
on Nukakau Island in the southwest of West New Britain, to work as a kitchen hand in about 
1929 (interview, 20 March 1985). This was his first exposure to a settlement and he 
decided that he could not himself to a clock-orientated so he returned to 
Nukakau. 
In about 1934 a recruiting team from Rabaul came and, after much from both the 
government officer and the luluai and tultul of the village, he his 
mark on the enrolment paper. Two days later he travelled by canoe to Talasea station and the 
following boarded a ship for Rabaul with fifteen others from the Talasea Sub-district, for 
at the police depot 
Police 
So the police came from a wide geographic area and were recruited in very different circumstances. 
They were adventurous men. They were prepared to leave what was familiar to them. And they 
knew something about the work that they would be doing once they joined the police force, because 
they all had seen policemen at work in their villages. They were not like men going to unknown 
plantations and mining jobs. To them all policemen were men of prestige and authority. If the new 
recruits themselves were not warriors and men of authority within the villages, their fathers 
certainly were, and hence they were aspiring to inherit positions of prestige and authority when they 
grew older. Therefore, the recruits went into the police expecting to command; it was an 
expectation to influence behaviour. 
For the new recruits police training, whether in Rabaul or, from the late 1930s, Sogeri, was hard and 
long. For six days a week they got up at six in the morning and went to the parade ground to begin 
their daily exercises. They did not return to the barracks (except for an hour for lunch) until about 
half past four in the afternoon. A lot of emphasis was laid on physical exercise so that they would 
be fit and mentally alert for patrol work, if they were selected for this work, in unfamiliar and 
hostile territories. 
The training lasted from seven months to a year and if a recruit was unable to shoot the target or the 
bull's eye with a rifle, then he had to painstakingly start all over again. The non-commissioned 
officers who trained them showed no mercy, regardless of the situations they were in. Guise 
recalled, 'if you disobeyed any sergeant major, you knew what you would get: a full-pack on your 
shoulders, and you were made to run for about fifteen to sixteen miles'. Amero in Rabaul recalled 
the officer who was training them using a stick to hit them around the legs if they showed any sign 
of fatigue or clumsiness. The toughness of their training was something that all the police had in 
common. It helped bind them together as comrades-in-arms, and it strengthened their belief in 
themselves as superior men. 
Several months before the end of their training, they were lectured every day on how they should 
perform when out in the field. Guise, with his normal fluency, described police training as a great 
moral force: 
We had a teacher there who taught us about law and order and the various laws of the 
country which we as policemen had to uphold. We were told about the protection of 
weak people, those who were not able to defend themselves. If we saw them in 
trouble, we were to defend them. We were told to be friends of the people. We were 
told that it was our duty to work as policemen and that meant we were available for 
duty on a twenty-four hour basis .... And we were told emphatically that even if a 
member of our family broke the law we would have no other course but to arrest that 
person, whoever he or she may happen to be: your wife, son or grandfather. 
Guise recalled an incident in which his son was caught swimming at Ela Beach at a time when 
'natives' were forbidden to do so. His son pleaded with him to consult his superiors in his capacity 
as the sergeant major of police, to make an exception for him. Guise's was simple and 
straightforward: 'being a policeman I am serving within the system. I can hardly kick against it, 
because I am bound by an oath of loyalty' .  
Both Amero and Naguwien recalled similar instructions about caring for the weak and defending 
those who were unable to defend themselves, those who were by the 
government. This was what the colonial government demanded of the And that was 
what they did, most of the time, even if they as individuals felt no compulsion to do so. 
At the conclusion of their training the three men were posted to different areas of Papua and New 
Guinea. Guise finished as the regimental sergeant major and was sent to work police 
headquarters in Konedobu. Amero, after a short spell in Salamaua, was posted to Kundiawa. 
N aguwien served in the army during the war years and was posted to Rabaul after the cessation of 
hostilities. 
Was this To the participants was in three respects. First, we 
must remember that, with only a few exceptions, a great number of these men were drawn 
from their A lot of them may have been well versed in their own tribal laws and therefore 
may have known what remedial steps they had to take to the wrong-doers in 
their own (see, for example, Malinowski 1940, p. But in this case they 
were recruited become the ears and spokesmen of a people whose codes and ways of 
behaviour were poles apart from their own. 
For their own peace of mind, then, they needed to be educated in the ways of the white men. 
Regardless of how scanty this education may have been, it nonetheless them in their task 
of translating this nupela pasin for the villagers. What this nupela pasin entailed would require a 
complete study in itself. Generally stated, it involved instructing policemen to go out into the field 
and assist in putting a stop to the practices of homicide, immolation of widows, warfare, 
headhunting, cannibalism and infanticide, as well as murder and manslaughter; in other words, 
practices which the whiteman found to be 'particularly repugnant to his ethical code' (Todd 
1935:443-4). 
Race Relations and Colonial Rule in 
members of the Armed 
were not 
pru11cuianv not among those of Caucasian 
The other type of action had to take was nrever1tive. 
'crimes' which were considered to be 'native torts' (Todd 
be maintained in the 
was their to put to 
so peace and good order would 
Second, the was necessary because police were made to understand the need to develop a 
strict work ethic, behind what was considered to be the had known in 
the villages. Their new way of life, they were told, and commitment. 
Wherever they either to or to the outstations work, they were to 
carry out their duties with dedication and If carried out their responsibilities as 
required, would be rewarded with prc>m<>tla1n 
For a Papua New Guinean at that time, the 
class. Sir John Guise recalled: 
rank he could achieve was a sergeant major first 
When we were in the we were told we were the mainstay of any government 
whether colonial or otherwise. The police was the most important body because it 
carried out law and order on behalf of the government Therefore, w e  were to be 
extremely loyal to the officers whether they were white or brown ... From the ranks 
respect and discipline was demanded: a constable had to stand to attention for a 
lance corporal ... We were told to be loyal to our NCOs, loyal to our officers, to be 
friends of the people and when on patrol, going into restricted areas, we were not to 
mistreat the people, and also not to steal from their but to ask for any food 
and not to sort of throw our weight around and be cruel to the people. Those sort of 
things were told to us on the parade. And furthermore, they told us that we should 
always be loyal to the government of the day. 
Most of the ex-policemen that I interviewed seemed to have been overly loyal, almost to a fault. 
Joseph, the son of Naguwien, made the following statement about his father: 
I think one of the most important things about my father was that he was a very loyal 
servant of the administration. At no time did he go against an administrative order. 
When he was told to go on patrol he went wholeheartedly - putting his family 
priorities at the bottom. So in that sense, I would say his loyalty was towards the 
government. There were no two ways about it 
Third, it was during police training and subsequent years of service that a sense of police identity 
developed. Policemen soon realized that there was little value in their continuing to emphasize 
where th�y came from. They began to look upon themselves as policemen first and foremost: as a 
group of Papua New Guineans who had been brought together to work and live as a team. And so 
an esprit de corps, a feeling of brothers-in-arms, grew within the police force. Guise remer.1bers: 
Although Papuans could say 'I am a Papuan' and a New Guinean could say 'I am a 
New Guinean', yet at the same time, you could see a New Guinean sergeant major 
taking a group of Papuan recruits and there was complete obedience to the superior 
officer - complete obedience. There was none of this, 'you don't do this thing to me 
because I am a Papuan'. No. That was not allowed .. .  and in that sense, as I 
declared before, my nine years in the force were my happiest years because it 
showed me the spirit of comradeship which no other had taught me but 
the police force. 
The type of work the performed depended on their rank and the centre in which they 
were stationed. Whatever was that they did, they never lost of the fact that they were 
employees of the government, trained to maintain law and order within the administrative centres 
and among the communities. Generally the most senior members, with the rank of 
sergeant worked close to the central administration or at the main stations. Occasionally 
ventured beyond to the remote outstations. Otherwise their duties involved supervising 
other policemen below them in rank. Officially were also the communication link between the 
..twroo,ean officer and his subordinates. 
ne�ld.Qiu.ar1ters detachment, and all office staff 
res1oon1s1b.Le to Guise: 
with records and 
The other that came under me was the court retwms: courts of 
native matters, courts of native affairs and the court of sessions, returns of 
which were in from the districts job was to go these court 
retwms and try to locate any to out a 
of a his under Section of the 
out to the officer. An appeal was then 
made to the Court and the matter was quashed ... then at half past five I 
took the parade and marched up to the government house with the band and lowered 
the flag and then our respects to the Administrator . .. In the night I was in 
charge of the in the Konedobu area. 
No responsibility pleased a more than to be selected duties. 
wrote in a Papua annual report: 'As regards this part of their they are almost too keen, 
weep bitterly when a patrol goes out and they are left behind' (Conunonwealth of Australia 1908 : 
8). It was on patrol that a policeman could shine and show his natural ability; it was a task he 
performed with courage and determination. While in the bush, on patrols, a policeman was one step 
away from the trappings of the colonial establishment. If outwardly he still felt bound by his 
responsibilities to the government, he nonetheless experienced a temporary psychological release 
which allowed him, in part, to relive his traditional lifestyle. 
As described by Amero Bega for Simbu and Joe Naguwien for Talasea, patrolling was by no means 
an easy task. Elaborate preparations had to be made in assembling food supplies, equipment, 
was a offence 
were sergeants a was taken off them and 
If you were a constable, you had to 
drill with your full for four hours every Saturday until such time as 
your officer was satisfied that you had learnt your lesson. If the matter was of a very 
serious nature, his [the offender's] contract was terminated. 
A number of both secondary and primary sources testify to the extent to which a policeman was 
punished if he seriously exceeded the powers given to him. I shall cite three of them, if only 
briefly. In 1929 Constable Karo Araua, a Toaripi man from the present day Gulf Province, received 
a five year gaol sentence for the murder of a policeman companion in the vicinity of Kokoda (Inglis 
1982:24-30). During the 1930s another policeman, Constable Sipi of Vanimo, was hanged in 
Ambunti after he was found guilty of wilful murder of Assistant District Officer Colin McDonald 
(McCarthy 1963:132-134). According to Amero Bega's oral testimony, Sergeant Awai of Manus 
was given a life sentence for damaging government property and inciting relatives of his Chirabu 
wife to attack a government patrol in the area. 
However, despite the fact that some policemen were punished for breaking the colonial 
government's law, others escaped punishment simply because their officers, both black and white, 
denied allegations of murder or other acts of violent behaviour by In almost all cases 
the reasons the officers advanced for the untoward behaviour of their men was that they had acted in 
self-defence. For example, after the arrest of Sergeant Awai and some men from his wife's clan, 
Constable Amero shot dead two of these men and the third upside down on a nearby yar tree. 
He did this, not because the arresting party had been in any since the men's bows and 
arrows had been disposed of, because to run away from police 
The European officer for his more was said of the murder . 
The communities that tried to pacify and control held a of views about police. 
Generally it was a love/hate Like the beachcombers of the 1800s, the policemen were 
the culture to the were confused about 
this nupela pasin. What did it  mean? did they have to stop their enemies and 
abandon their cannibalism, sorcery and head-hunting? it was because of the 
new law that had come into their midst. An end to these activities would ensure that: made 
bigger and better wives would no longer wait for the return of their husbands 
from their children would, did not die from natural causes, live inherit their 
prn;se�;s101ns : and peace would within their communities. If anyone committed an 
offence them, were not to deal with the matter themselves report it to the 
kiap (see Read 1943:174) or the resident policeman, and he would deal with the offender on their 
behalf. 
Policemen interest in what villagers were doing and lived amongst them. 
NagmN1en, for instance, lived in Rabaul for twelve years, from 1946 to 1958. this period he 
served under three different European officers. This suggests that officers were posted to 
other districts than policemen. long s tay in Rabaul allowed him to 
learn the Tolai and he was always available to listen to people's grievances and problems. 
As a result he described himself as their unofficial 'resident magistrate'. 
Other policemen, as consequence of their lengthy stay in particular communities, married local 
girls . The was not only physical but also symbolic: it was a bridge built over a sea of fear 
and suspicion. It confirmed the close relationship the policemen had estabiished with the people, 
and demonstrated the people's trust, confidence and acceptance of their presence. 
1 Tawi of Bundi in the Madang Province was a young man when a kiap and his policemen arrived from Chimbu and 
demanded both married and single girls for the night. He remembers selecting, after much struggle, the prettiest girl for 
the kiap and the rest of the women were forced to spend the night with the policemen. Had he refused to obey he 
would have been caned (interview, 14 July 19 85). 
deterioration taking place within the Papua New Guinea society, particularly in relation to law and 
order. Naguwien tells the story: 
Comparatively speaking, the conditions were much better in those days than today. 
Now you see tall grass, litter etc. around stations. Before people kept these places 
clean. Also law and order has broken down. It wasn't like this when we were in the 
force. Everyone took notice of the law and the regulations - tins were removed, 
rubbish was out of sight and generally the town area was very clean ... There were 
any break and enter If there were, they occurred once or twice in 
a year. Crimes were few ... but in those days it was peaceful ... People 
could walk - because police were there doing patrolling during both and 
... mind you, on foot. And they were there whenever trouble emerged 
so were able to control a situation before it got out of hand. But this, 
of course, doesn't mean that there were not any crimes or instances of criminal 
in the past, because there were instances of rape, murder etc . ... but it wasn't 
as bad or as nor did it occur with such as ..,,...,,.,..,r1 ... ,,, 
ask 
were violent, 
their considered view the 
warnungs of the to engage criminal activities 
enforcers of law and order. 
had 
one definite conclusion can be drawn about the state of law and order then 
p0Jl1ceme:n of that era worked hard and contained the law and order 
were able 
colonial Had it been otherwise, the 
than the one that exists 
receive prompt assistance from an authoritarian 
of that era may have been no more law-abiding 
4 
Introduction 
The view of this paper is that crime in Papua New Guinea is a symptom of a society with 
internal conflicts and contradictions. Crime cannot be seen as a phenomenon on its own, but must 
be related to its economic, social and context. Government and planners dealing with 
crime face a number of competing pressures that influence the decisions of people to engage in anti­
social or criminal behaviour. Some of these pressures are direct but many of them are indirect and 
at first appear quite tenuously linked with the incidence of crime. 
With the International Monetary Fund warnings that Papua New Guinea should not increase foreign 
borrowing, with the predicted fall in net private capital inflows as Ok Tedi' s loan needs are 
reduced, with internal revenue down, and with unemployment up, the policy of the Papua New 
Guinea government to fight the root causes of crime with an increase in employment through 
economic growth appears doomed. 
The economics of the exercise are complicated by irresolute and unprincipled politics. The tone of 
national politics is illustrated by the decision in 1985 to introduce television, and by the case of the 
Minister for Industrial Development, who has a 25 per cent interest in a joint Singapore-Papua New 
Guinea venture to import spirit essence, add industrial alcohol and water, and sell 350 ml sachets of 
liquor on the domestic market. 
If the government's long-term policies of solving crime by economic growth of the capitalist brand 
and by employment are failing, and the population is growing, the conclusion must be that Papua 
New Guinea's overall quality of life, including rates of crime, will deteriorate. 
In this paper I take a closer look at the economic and political context of crime in Papua New 
Guinea. I consider a number of factors in this context: the origins of crime in the wider society; 
economic trends in modern Papua New Guinea; the role of youth today; the quality of political 
leadership; bureaucratic weaknesses; and development prospects. 
The theme is that all these factors influence the level of lawlessness in Papua New Guinea. Hence 
remedies for lawlessness must be sought in these areas as much as within the formal justice system. 
This was very much the message of the Morgan Report (Department of Provincial Affairs 1983). 
This paper can be seen as an elaboration on the Morgan Committee' s  message. However it goes 
further by suggesting in its conclusion that the message of the Morgan Committee is likely to a 
considerable extent to fall on deaf ears. 
What is the source of the crime problem in Papua New Guinea? I do not propose to quantify the 
elements of the social, political, and economic milieux in which crime arises. B ut a of the 
elements of the mix may be useful. 
First, we have a country that suffers from underdevelopment. is a country with one of the 
average rates of population growth in the region. It is a country where the bulk of the population 
lives according to traditional customs, influenced marginally modernization. As far as 
infrastructure, roads, and communications are concerned, country lacks the linkages 
necessary to facilitate development. Further, the workforce is : there is a lack of 








Third, the whole modernization process must be seen the of New 
Guinea' s international status. New Guinea has become an international entity; can no 
longer hide away and remain, as it once was, a collection of introverted communities. International 
competition and international cultural influences are now a fact of life. 
the country's  underdevelopment and the pressure for modernization have historical 
context. Colonialism bequeathed to Papua New Guinea a number of features that contributed to the 
conditions that rise to the law and order problem. One of these conditions is the dislocated 
economy. This can be seen in the contrast between the modem and the traditional sectors of the 
economy, with traditional sectors very much a backwater. 30 per cent of 
the New Guinea government budget has to be provided in the form of Australian aid. The 
economic model by successive Papua New Guinea governments since independence 
assumes that development depends on foreign investment. 
Another feature of the colonial legacy is the failure of government to develop a self-supporting food 
industry. The cities and towns of Papua New Guinea are, by and large, dependent upon. imported 
food. The underdevelopment in domestic agriculture and in food production was a direct result of a 
colonial policy that emphasized tree-crop production and encouraged the formation of a class of 
small peasant cash-crop producers. Significant urban markets for food within Papua New Guinea 
were neglected and became the monopoly of Australian and Japanese exporters . 
A further aspect of the colonial legacy is the education system. This system is geared to produce 
manpower for the small modem sector. It ignores significant numbers of children, either by not 
providing for them at all, or by 'pushing them out' at the end of primary school. The final bequest 
of colonialism that I wish to mention is the bureaucracy. Papua New Guinea is burdened with a 
large, expensive and inefficient salaried bureaucracy. One third of the national government budget 
is allocated to public service salaries. 
The economy 
The private sector holds the key to economic prospects in Papua New Guinea, since 
government policy that development should be led by private investment. However, 
numerous disturbing features about the private sector in Papua New Guinea, features which are 
significantly linked to employment levels and the extent of economic activities available for youth. 
These employment levels and opportunities for young people are important elements in the context 
of crime (see also the next section on youth). 
Private capital inflows in the late 1970s and early 1980s appear on the surface to be quite promising 
(see Table 4. 1) .  The massive increases in capital inflows 198 1 and 1982 are 
associated with the Bougainville copper the Ok Tedi petroleum exploration and 
timber projects. Although these inflows at this time appear promising, suffer from a defect in 
that they are mainly into capital intensive, export-oriented resource industries. 
Table 4 .1  
Net private capital inflows to Papua New Guinea, 1 976-1984 
Yea r  
1 9 7 6  
1 9 7 7  
1 9 7 8  
1 9 7 9  
1 9 8 0  
1 9 8 1  
1 9 8 2  
1 9 8 3  
1 9 8 4  
Source: Bank of Papua New Guinea various dates. 
Value o f  f l o w  
Millions o f  kina 
2 0  
3 1  
-2 0 
1 1  
3 0  
1 8 9  
2 8 3  
2 6 2 
2 2 0  
Part of the problem of th e  Papua New Guinea economy is the limited amount of capital available 
for reinvestment within the country. Bank of Papua New Guinea figures give some indication of 
Crime Politics and Economics 33 
problem. The total value of loans, advances and bills discounted denominated in kina and held by 
commercial banks as at the last Wednesday in 1983 was K395 million (Bank of Papua New Guinea 
1986 . Table 3.2). This figure can be compared with the value of funds employed by Bougainville 
Copper Pty Limited in its operations during 1983 : a total of K78 1  million (Bougainville Copper 
Ltd 1984 : 24). 
The distribution of commercial bank should also be a matter for concern. Table 
4.2 sets out the supplied by the Bank of Papua New Guinea for May 1983. First, loans to 
and fishing accounted for only 19 cent of the total, and were almost 
to coffee, cocoa, and oil No loans were made for food 
Second, wholesale and retail trade (commerce) accounted for one quarter of all 
Third, advances to individuals were 7 per cent of all loans and 
ex<unJHe, than loans any in the and fishing sector, 
which received K28.8 million. This does not bode well for the 
the ooi:>ortumues 
Guineans. 
Report increase to year age group over 
1990 (ibid. : was calculated that there were 559,000 persons in this age 
group; was estimated that the number would be some 736,000 and thereafter the size of 
the age group would continue to increase by about 20,000 young people annually. The report 
concluded 
If economic is as limited over the next few years as in the past then the 
conclusion is inescapable : over 700,000 young persons will be without any form of 
employment by 1990 (ibid. : 96). 
Table 4.2 
Advances outstanding to commercial banks by borrower, at last Wednesday of May 1983 
Type of 
borrowe r 
BUS I NE S S  
Agr i cu l ture 1 f o re s t ry 
and f i shing 
Manu f a c turing 
T ranspo rt , s t o rage 
and communicat ion 
F inance 
Comme rce ( wh o le s a le and 
ret a i l  t rade )  
Bui lding and c on st ruct ion 
Mining and qua r rying 
Othe r bus ine s s  
Tot a l  advan c e s  t o  bus ine s s  
GOVERNMENT 
P ERSONS 
NON-PROF I T  ORGANI ZAT IONS 
NON-RE S IDENT BORROWERS 
ALL BORROWERS 
Value of advance s  
in 
mill ions of kina 
6 6 . 2  
4 4 . 4  
2 4 . 8  
4 . 6  
8 7 . 6  
2 3 . 5  
7 . 5 
6 1 . 2  
3 2 0 . oa 
3 . 9  
2 5 . 6  
6 . 8  
0 . 2 
3 5 6 . 5  
Source 
Note : 
Bank of Papua New Guinea 1986: Table 3.5. 
a Discrepancy in total due to rotmamg 
P e rcent o f  
a l l  
advances 
1 8 . 6  
1 2 . 5  
7 . 0  
1 . 3  
2 4 . 6  
6 . 6  
2 . 1  
1 7 . 1  
1 . 1  
7 . 2 
1 .  9 
0 . 1  
1 0 0 . 1  
The of the young is In 1982 there were some 3,000 youth groups. 
These groups were to have about 200,000 participating members. The 1984 budget 
indicated that the Office of Youth, Women, Religion and Recreation had a 1984 appropriation of 
Kl .9 million (Papua New Guinea 1983a : 1 12). The National Public Expenditure Plan for 1984 to 
1987 indicates that in 1984 the National Youth Movement (NYM) has been allocated Kl million, 
the development fellowship scheme K69,000, the National Youth Movement Corporation KS0,000, 
and the rural sports programme K30,000 (Papua New Guinea 1983 : 279). These funds represent a 
per capita allocation of K l0.97 for each person in the 15 to 24 age group. 
The overall imbalance between government resources allocated to youth and young people's 
expectations is well known to government. In the 1979-1990 national manpower assessment we 
read: 
. . .  more than 130,000 students will emerge from the Papua New Guinea secondary 
school and university system over the period 1979-89, of whom more than 75,000 
will be at grade 10 level or above (National Planning Office 1981 : 45). 
The assessment also noted that on current trends about 4,000 new formal would be 
created each year over the 1980s whereas the active labour force would increase about 40,000 
per year over the same This means that for every new worker who finds a 
employment over the next decade there will be nine others who will have 
subsistence sector (ibid. : 1-4). 
programmes; 
schemes; the creation of kibbutzim. 
the government, and 
of these : universal sclltoolmi:?:: 
New Guinea. The 
on current government infrastructure and There is no doubt 
i:>v1ni:>r1 c;:n1P exercise. However, a second model is also being discussed which involves 
ordinary school-leavers associated with their own local communities, with an on rural 
development, construction, agriculture, fishing, and forestry. This model need not be as expensive 
as a national service which envisages the quasi-employment of undergraduates either in public 
service activities or in association with the disciplined forces. 
At present when the g overnment establishes land s ettlement schemes based upon nucleus estates, 
land is generally allocated to married persons above the age of 25 years. Selection criteria 
priority to applicants who are between 26 and 35 years old, and who are married and have children 
(Peter Eaton, Land settlement schemes, nucleus estates and mteg1·atE:C1 
agricultural projects could be of great benefit in rural youth and channelling their 
energies into productive if these s election criteria were amended and younger people were 
able to take part 
The Morgan Committee recommended that the government consider the establishment of 
cooperative s ettlements which in Israel are known as kibbutzim. Two concepts were offered. The 
first was to encourage young people to engage in modem agriculture, both 
and subsistence, in their own areas, and with this agricultural activity cottage 
service industry and manufacturing. The s econd idea put to government was 
that kibbutzim could be established in underpopulated parts of Papua New Guinea for the particular 
purpose of encouraging young people from different parts of the country these communities. 
The 
Perhaps for the first time in an official report in Papua New Guinea, the Morgan Committee 
attempted to make some assessment of formal party political platforms on crime, law and order. 
The report examined individually each party' s manifesto, and arrived at the conclusion that in 
general political thinking on crime in Papua New Guinea lacked s ophistication. There is a serious 
political vacuum in the country. There is no official on crime, law and order. Because of the 
lack of political direction, policy on crime, law and order is left in the hands of the bureaucracy. 
This lack of direction is compounded by the fact that many of the public s ervice departments which 
were questioned by the Morgan Committee, and which were thought to have a major role in justice 
administration, stated that they did not have a policy function at all. The standard response from 
these was to the effect that they were responsible for the law; it was for 
the politicians to make policy. It follows that much of the policy, such as it is,  that is administered 
by the j ustice system is based upon values contained in statute law (still largely colonial in origin), 
or reflects colonial policy unchanged s ince independence. 
There is in New Guinea a great deal of political National-level is 
between a number of some of which are little more than vehicles to assist in the election 
process .  There are also further divisions, now within politics. 
On the whole the country suffers from low levels of political consciousness. While the 
associate crime and about crime tends not to go any Undoubtedly 
have responded to this in their The do not see the 
need to educate the people, or to build on the basis of education. in 
Papua New Guinea is still more associated with the status of candidates than with party-political 
platforms, although some changes in party consolidation can be detected. 
The Morgan Report was concerned with the general need to inform the people about crime, and the 
links that exist between crime and the lack of economic development. The report also drew 
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attention to a lack of concern about crime amongst those government departments which had an 
economic function. 
The committee recommended that the government should open dialogue with the people based 
upon the values expressed in the national goals and directive principles with the purpose of 
allowing the people to become aware of the nature of their own society, the impact of history, and 
the need to work hard to produce and to engage in socially acceptable activities (Department of 
Provincial Affairs 1983: 357). 
The report also directed attention to an important aspect of the political system in Papua New 
Guinea that has a direct effect upon the nature of society. This political system tolerates a number 
of undemocratic features. The most noticeable is the political inequality that exists between men 
and women. The report notes: 
While the Constitution calls for 'Integral Human Development' , equal opportunities 
and participation for both men and women, in practice women fare much worse than 
their male counterparts' (ibid. : 135). 
The participation of women in national politics has dropped recently. While there were previously 
three women members in the national parliament, there is only one in the current parliament. In 
1978 there were only seven women local government councillors out of a total of 4,313 (ibid. : 
139). Women constitute a little less than half of the national population. However, if we consider 
that leadership in Papua New Guinea is primarily in the hands of men aged between 35 and 75 
years, the country is effectively ruled by some 12 per cent of the population. 
A further aspect of political inequality is the political isolation of youth. Young people under the 
age of 1 8  years do not have a vote but constitute about 35 per cent of the total population. These 
people have little say in the government of the country or in the formulation of policies and 
programmes which affect them. 
Politics in Papua New Guinea are often the politics of avoidance. They take place against a 
background of a dependent economy, rapid urbanization, rapid population growth, the emergence of 
classes and deteriorating social conditions. These are the realities of the second half of the 1980s 
and the beginning of the 1990s. Political leadership and planning have tended to follow colonial 
models, and to take soft options. In particular there has been a reluctance to offend foreign 
investment and the private sector. It is questionable whether such policies can be maintained owing 
to population pressure and the social dynamics which flow from the increasing numbers of young 
people. The strategy of avoiding issues by pretending they do not exist will become impossible as 
the decade proceeds. 
Bureaucratic weaknesses 
The Morgan Report was particularly concerned with the impact of the public service on the law and 
order situation. This impact takes a number of different forms. 
First, the size of the public service and, more generally, the costs of public sector 
institutions inhibit national development. The public service consumes approximately one third of 
the national budget and around 12 per cent of gross domestic product. It thus takes up resources 
that could be used more productively in terms of national goals to develop infrastructure and 
services. 
Second, inefficiency in the public sector has an on law and order in two ways : it inhibits the 
work of the formal justice system, and it reduces the ability of the government to achieve its more 
general goals for economic de,1ei<Jprnertt. 
There are many weaknesses in the police, justice, correctional and courts services of Papua New 
Guinea. In addition to inefficiencies in particular departments or agencies, there are also 
inefficiencies caused by a lack of coordination between them. At present they are loosely gathered 
through the National Planning Office. There is no statutory framework by which the 
different components of the legal system are coordinated. There is of course a particular problem 
with the adminiJ;tration of justice in that the Constitution requires the decision to prosecute, the 
decision to give legal aid, and the decision to decide guilt or innocence to be kept separate. 
However, while not interfering with any of these individual constitutionally protected institutions, 
there is a need for coordination at the level of statistical analysis, statistical collection, operations, 
funding submissions, and the allocation of resources. To this end the Morgan Committee 
recommended the establishment of a crime commission. This would be an independent statutory 
body with powers to advise government on budgetary planning, resource allocation, statistics and 
research in relation to crime, law and order. 
There was considerable debate within the Morgan Committee as to whether or not the form of 
coordination should be left to inter-departmental committees or whether a statutory form should be 
adopted. In the end the committee recommended a new statutory body because it was 'concerned 
about accountability and continuity, both of which in its experience tend to deteriorate within the 
context of less formal inter-departmental committees' (ibid. : 361). 
The more general administrative weaknesses of the public sector are well known and have been 
documented in several reports. Many recommendations have been made, but the ability of the 
public service to right the imperfections within it is probably limited. Not only are there material 
interests which may persuade public servants to be less than enthusiastic in implementing changes, 
but there are substantial impediments to upgrading efficiency within the public service. A lack of 
necessary conceptual skills within the service and of management training lies at the root of the 
efficiency problem. The history of education in Papua New Guinea is a short one: the secondary 
school system is barely thirty years old; the universities are not yet twenty years old. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that the skills available to run the public sector are something less than 
appropriate. 
Third, the public sector, especially in the area of justice administration, tends to discourage public 
participation and to encourage reliance on initiatives from the bureaucracy. There is a need to 
increase public participation in the solution of law and order problems. 
The village court system has substantial economic advantages over the formal court system and 
encourages public participation in decision-making. However, the Morgan Committee made no 
Crime Politics and Economics 39 
recommendation for further democratizing the judicial decision-making process, for example by the 
use of juries or assessors. What the report did do was to recommend the extension of the local 
government council ward committee system down to suburb level in urban areas. One of the 
problems in the towns is that urban government stops at the level of the town authority. 
The prospects for economic and social development 
The Morgan Committee was aware that amongst the public at large there was a widely-held view 
that the crime rate and unemployment are closely linked. This became apparent from an 
examination of the written submissions that were sent in to the committee (Department of 
Provincial Affairs 1983 : Appendix 4). This view also figured prominently in a survey of prison 
detainees, although there were some problems about the validity of this survey (ibid. : Appendix 5). 
After examining all the available information on unemployment the committee concluded 
... th�t unemployment, 'having nothing to do', 'not being involved in any worthwhile 
activity',  and the feeling of purposelessness and alienation are closely associated 
with the choices people make to indulge in anti-social behaviour (ibid. : 355). 
The committee then recommended that two steps be taken. The first was to involve more people in 
the process of creating employment and increasing productivity, and generally making people 
aware about the link between unemployment, productivity, social alienation and crime. The second 
step was to establish a mechanism to enhance rational coordination, planning, and communication 
across the public and private sectors. Hence the committee recommended that the government 
should establish a statutory body to be known as the commission for employment and production, 
which would have the functions of planning and coordinating employment and production to ensure 
the maximum involvement of people in the productive process and to ensure that resources, 
including capital, were utilized in an economic manner to increase employment opportunities. 
However, even with a propaganda campaign and an improvement in coordination and 
implementation capacity, I am pessimistic about economic development and the prospects for 
formal employment in Papua New Guinea. There are two problems. The first concerns the 
direction of current economic policy. The second is the nature of existing institutions involved in 
economic development. 
Although formal emphasis in the strategic objectives is on rural development, in fact it is the towns 
that appear to be offering the greatest inducement to businessmen. Real estate, retailing and service 
industries appear to be the boom areas. The post-independence development strategy argued that 
Papua New Guinea does not have the resources to stimulate industry to the extent that would 
produce the necessary increases in wage employment, and that therefore development strategy 
should promote self-employment in rural areas as opposed to wage employment in industry 
(National Planning Committee 1976). This general approach was reiterated in the national 
manpower assessment (National Planning Office 198 1 : xv). 
However, current government thinking seems to ignore these propositions.  The thrust of planning in 
the departments of Industrial Development and Primary Industry appears to be centred on large­
scale nucleus estate activity and the development of capital-intensive manufacturing. The dilemma 
in which the government finds itself is familiar enough for developing countries. Rural 
development using traditional modes of production is not dynamic and is not likely to create the 
surplus which is needed for reinvestment in job-c:rnating activities. On the other hand, the advice 
received by government appears to be that in the foreseeable future, formal employment is not 
likely to be sufficient to absorb all the potential labour-force. 
In the long term there would appear to be a choice between, on the one hand, involving more people 
in some modest levels of economic activity and, on the other hand, creating sufficient surplus to 
reinvest and develop infrastructure to create formal employment. But there are real restrictions on 
the sorts of choices that Papua New Guinea can make about economic development. The Papua 
New Guinea market is fragmented and limited in size. The workforce is relatively un1derde11e1{-me:d 
and unproductive. There is virtually no metal-based industry in the country. 
The second problem for economic development concerns the institutions for economic development 
as they presently stand. The lack of political cohesion in Papua New Guinea and the absence of a 
common view qf national destiny restrict the ability of the government to lead the people in the task 
of economic development. The political life of New Guinea is fraught with tensions and 
contradictions.  First, there is a low level of political debate in the country. What debate occurs 
centres on parochial issues of resource allocation and personal aggrandisement of the most basic 
form. Second, there are low levels of political consciousness, and yet public awareness is needed to 
release the energy within the community for productive purposes. Any sharpening of the political 
consciousness is also likely to sharpen criticisms of the inequalities that exist within Papua New 
Guinean society and of its neo-colonial nature. Third, urbanization and industrialization create a 
working class which will begin to confront its own class enemies as it becomes increasingly 
organized. 
Finally, there is the problem of ineffective administration already described. Ineffectiveness within 
the bureaucracy limits the impact of the political will to pursue economic and social development. 
Furthermore the bureaucracy has emerged as a cohesive class within the past decade or so. It has 
generally low levels of productivity, but nevertheless it is a significant interest group. It functions 
as a privileged elite with access to scarce urban resources such as housing, schooling, and medical 
facilities. This privileged elite consumes a large proportion of the national budget and thus diverts 
resources from reinvestment in infrastructure and economic development. 
In sum, the political and economic context of crime problems in Papua New Guinea is not only the 
source of many of these problems, but also contains many impediments to their solution. My 
review suggests that the current economic and political environment of Papua New Guinea is 
unlikely to produce activities that would satisfy even the limited reformist notions of the Morgan 
Report, much less lead to the more major changes many observers believe are necessary. 
5 
The Constitution of the State of Papua New Guinea is located within the 
recent western tradition of and liberalism. Democratic elements are found in the 
guarantees of a universal adult franchise and of elections held on boundaries fixed an 
ma.evi�nd.ent:_ tlector;u Commission. The relationship between the national and the 
national executive follows the Westminister model, and there is detailed for the 
transfer of executive power from one group of parliamentarians to another to the will of 
A from that model is the system of checks and balances which 
constrain executive power, part found in the creation of office-holders such as the 
ombudsman, the prosecutor, and the solicitor, and the of action allowed 
to various offices in the and defence services 1982; 1982). 
Liberalism is  reflected first and most in the of constitutionalism and the 
to the courts to enforce the The Constitutional Committee 
a.i...1.-•;;11u;;u that the notion that the people should be 'the very idea of 
a constitution at all' (CFC 1974:811). the Constitution sets legal 
limits to the power to affect the lives Guineans, and distributes power 
between a distribution between national and bodies 
.t'0Jtlm1Ving the CPC ' s  recommendations, the and 
power to determine whether bodies have stayed within 
powers allocated by the Constitution (see generally, Bayne 198 1) .  The 
Constitution attempts to ensure that the of the courts will not be c01np1·omllse,d. 
The basic 
The basic provisions of the Constitution also reflect the liberal tradition. The Constitution 
allows for qualification of the rights, but in ways which are more narrowly expressed than in 
comparable constitutions, and generally only by means of a 'manner and form' parliamentary 
procedure (S.38). Most but not all of these rights can be qualified or displaced in times of 
emergency, but again there are many restrictions. 
Significant limitation of the power of both national and provincial governments is found in the 
detailed provisions of the Constitution (SS.32 to 58) that limit their power, out of concern for the 
rights of both citizens and non-citizens. The Constitution gives to all persons in Papua New Guinea 
the protections of the right to life and the right to privacy; and the freedoms of conscience, thought, 
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expression, assembly, association, and It provides guarantees of freedom 
from inhuman treatment, forced labour, and search and entry. There is also a right to 
liberty section, and the section providing for the protection of the law contains a comprehensive 
code of protections for persons who are charged with offences. In addition, citizens of Papua New 
Guinea must be treated and are in respect of their to property, to 
vote and stand for public office, to information and to movement. Almost all of these rights and 
freedoms are This means that laws which fall within these qualifications will be valid 
no1tw1thstandrn1g conflict with the and freedoms. Generally, however, these 
qu:llitica1t1m1s must be 'reasonable' which allows some 
In addition, S.38 provides that some of the rights are subject to a qualification 
which laws made to protect the interest in such matters as defence, public safety, 
public order and public welfare, but where such laws are 'reasonably justifiable in a 
democratic society having a proper respect for the and dignity of mankind' . There is a 
check in that a law which must under the general qualification must have been 
ex1Jresse:d. to do so, and must have been passed by an absolute majority of the national parliament. 
The practical effect of this is that if it appears that a law could conflict with any of the 
freedoms mentioned above, that law must be passed an absolute majority of the parliament, and 
it must contain a declaration that it is intended to override the protected right. 
Further erosion of the basic rights may occur during the period of a declaration of national 
emergency under Part X of the Constitution. Such declaration may be made by the National 
Executive Council and is subject to periodic review by parliament. an emergency, 
emergency acts passed by the parliament are not limited by most of the basic rights protections. 
Those which continue to operate are the right to life, freedom from inhuman treatment, freedom of 
conscience, thought and religion, and the citizen' s  rights to vote and stand for public office and to 
be treated equally. There is limited scope for the National Executive Council to make emergency 
regulations, and in addition to the protections mentioned immediately above, regulations may not 
be in breach of the freedoms of expression, of assembly and association, of privacy, or of 
information. 
Part X also contains a close definition of the circumstances in which a person may be interned 
without charge or trial during an emergency. Internment is permitted only by virtue of an act of 
parliament which is passed by an absolute majority. In addition, such an act can operate during a 
particular emergency only after parliament, by an absolute majority vote taken after the emergency 
has commenced, resolves that it should take effect. Section 245 provides a comprehensive scheme 
for the protection of persons who are detained, to ensure that their cases are promptly and fairly 
reviewed by an independent tribunal. There have been occasions when a state of emergency has 
been declared, but the provision has not yet been employed on a regular basis. A lack of detailed 
studies of the declarations which have been made has precluded a review of them in this paper. 
The National and the Supreme courts are given ample power to enforce the basic rights. Section 57 
of the Constitution extends considerably the common law rules concerning standing, and the courts 
may award damages to remedy a breach of the rights . 
There has been a considerable number of cases (for an early survey, see O'Neill 1982 and for 
details see Brunton and Colquhoun-Kerr 1985). Most have been concerned with various of the 
protection of law paragraphs of S.37, and have had consequences primarily for the system of 
criminal procedure encompassing arrest, trial and correction. That most cases are of this kind is 
hardly surprising. Those charged with criminal offences have a vital interest in asserting their 
rights, and such persons are more easily able to obtain legal aid from the public solicitor. There 
have not been many cases concerned with the political freedoms of expression and so forth, 
although the recent case relating to electoral deposits marks an important exception. The courts 
have enforced the rights without regard to political considerations, and some decisions such as the 
two Inter-Group Fighting Act cases, have created problems for government policy. The courts have 
nevertheless been cautious in cases dealing with criminal procedure, and demonstrate a tendency to 
interpret S.37 as if it stated the common law (Bayne 1982a). 
Although the courts have not resiled from enforcing the basic rights, we need to acknowledge that 
there are other factors at work, which can render the rights of little meaning. A constitutional 
statement of a right cannot guarantee that a person can exercise the right. Freedom of movement 
(S.52) means little to a person without the means to travel. The purpose of the Constitution is to 
prevent stat� action which restricts the potential for the exercise of such rights. In this respect, an 
assessment of the efficacy of the rights must take into account both the extent of state violation of 
rights, and the inability of the state to control violations of the rights by others. It is apparent that 
there is not only violation of the of law by the but violence 
by them which breaches the to property (S.53) and which, violence to the person, 
undermines the concept of the individual to freedom (S.32) (see Brunton 1980). 
The of the state to control personal and property violence more widely in the 
creates a more fundamental is the extent of this violence which is leading to pressure 
for solutions which would limit the basic and which constitute the greatest challenge to their 
continued This is taken up in the concluding section of this paper. 
ae'\leliop1ne11t of administrative law also deserves attention. Administrative law encompasses 
pnnciple and the system of remedies relevant where a challenge is made to the 
go'\lennmental action. Its fundamental is that to be valid such action must be authorised 
by a law. A clear illustration is to be found in Schuiling v Krau [ 1977] PNGLR 176. In this 
context, ' action' refers to a wide variety of activity; common examples are the grant or refusal of a 
licence, or the dismissal of a person from office. 'Government' refers to both the political 
executive and ai1y part of the administrative arms of the national or provincial governments. It is 
of course the Constitution which is the ultimate source of all governmental power, but in a 
particular case source is an or some kind of subsidiary legislation. 
In the pre-independence period, there was only resort to the courts. The past few years 
have revealed the potential for judicial control of administrative action, as the courts have 
demonstrated their willingness to declare governmental action invalid, even in cases with political 
overtones. In the two school-fee cases described below, the Supreme Court found that an economic 
fee which the governing bodies of schools purported to impose was invalid for the reason that there 
was no statutory authority to levy the fee. In this case the action taken by the bodies concerned 
followed a National Executive Council decision to impose such a fee. In Okuk v Fallscheer [ 1980] 
PNGLR 274 the Supreme Court held that a minister was obliged to accord natural justice to the 
general manager of the National Airlines Commission before taking action to dismiss the manager. 
In this context, natural justice required that the manager be given reasons for the dismissal, and an 
opportunity to be heard in his own defence. The Constitution recognizes that the of 
natural form part of the law 60), and this may have for 
judicial recognition that of contexts (see Mitchell 198 1) .  
Administrative law is part of the law, and may be displaced by 
statute. The Constitution has however entrenched some of the fundamental principles. Section 
155(4) has been to liberalize the law the remedies that a court may award to 
restrain invalid action. As drafted, S.4 1  is difficult to but it has 
been taken to a means the courts may some basic standards validity 
of governmental action. A statute cannot of course the authority of the courts to ad1uct]lca1:e 
on the constitutional of such action (Premdas v The State [ 1979] PNGLR 329). 
may, however, displace review where other than constitutional validity at 
issue, and the deportation cases (the Premdas case and Perryman v Minister for 
Foreign Affairs and Trade [ 1982] PNGLR The courts have shown that are to 
adopt as part of the law of government which are more 
extensive than those recognised the common law. In Kofewei v Siviri and Others (Ramage A.J., 
National Court, 21 December 1983), it was held that the State was liable for damages as a result of 
actions of the police which breached constitutional 
Judicial control is of course dependent on the willingness or ability of a litigant to pay for the 
expense of a court action. Most cases of corrupt activity government officials probably involve 
unauthorised action, but by the courts. The potential for judicial remedy is 
demonstrated by Gorio v National Parks Board [ 1982] PNGLR 364, in which the National Court 
held that the statutory power of the National Parks Board to acquire and dispose of land did not 
authorise it to sell a house to a staff member at a price grossly below a real valuation level. It must 
be acknowledged, however, that there have been many such cases where abuses of power go 
unchecked. 
The Supreme Court and constitutional review 
The Constitution is, according to its terms, 'supreme law' (SS.10, 1 1) ,  and thus any laws 
inconsistent with it are to that extent void. To reinforce this supremacy, the Constitution vests in 
the superior courts the function of constitutional review. Thus they may review the 
constitutionality of legislative and other governmental (or private) action to determine whether it 
conforms to the supreme law of the Constitution. The CPC was prepared to accept constitutional 
review and the consequent role of the courts if they would take account of the National 
Goals and Directive Principles of the Preamble (CPC 1974: 8/15; now incorporated in SS.25 and 
63). Further, it recommended that the legal tie between the Papua New Guinea legal system and 
Australia should be cut (ibid. 8/2). This was to be achieved by devices that made the Constitution 
legally autochthonous. It also recommended that the courts be permitted to take account of the 
CPC's report and the debates on it in both the House of Assembly and the Constituent Assembly 
(see now S.24). The Constituent Assembly added provisions designed to ensure that the common 
law of England should be applied only if conformable to the Constitution (Schedule 2.2). While 
such provisions are useful signposts, they do little more than restate the fundamental problem of 
how the courts should justify the exercise of their function. 
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The Supreme Court has exercised its function of review in a variety of situations, several of which 
concerned matters of political controversy. A list of the issues involved in the major cases 
illustrates the point: 
- the legality of the 'economic fee' imposed by the boards of multi-racial schools: held 
invalid (Mari v Tololo (No. 2 )[1976] PNGLR 125, and Mileng v Tololo [1967] PNGLR 
447); 
- the legality of part of the Organic Law on the Duties and Responsibilities of Leadership 
(held invalid) Ex parte Moses Sasakila [1976] PNGLR 491) ;  
- the extent to which the Ombudsman Commission could investigate complaints against the 
public solicitor: held no substantial power to investigate (Constitutional Reference No. 1 
of 1978 [1978] PNGLR 345); 
- the validity of provisions of the Inter-Group Fighting Act 1977 which affected the onus of 
proof: held invalid (Constitutional Reference No. 3 of1978 [ 1978] PNGLR 421 and 
Supreme Court Reference No. 1 of 1981 [ 1981] PNGLR 151) ;  
the scope of the discretion of the Public Solicitor to  decline to provide legal aid: held valid 
in circumstance (Evertz v The State [1979] PNGLR 1974); 
- the validity of an order of deportation: held valid (Premdas v The State [1979] PNGLR 
329); 
- whether the Minister for Justice committed a contempt of court: held guilty (Public 
Prosector v Rooney (No. 2) [1979] PNGLR 448); 
- the application of the constitutional provision (S.53) for the payment of 'just tenns' upon 
the acquisition of property, where a coffee plantation was acquired from a naturalized 
citizen: held applicable (Frame v Minister for Lands [1980]PNGLR 433); 
- a dispute between a provincial government and the national government concerning the 
grant by the latter of a fishing licence: held not justiciable at that stage of the dispute 
(Milne Bay Provincial Government v Evara [1981] PNGLR 63); 
- the legality of treatment accorded to prisoners in the Bomana Corrective Institution: held 
violation of the right to freedom from inhuman treatment (S.36(1 ) ) and other rights 
(Pauta and Susuve [1982] PNGLR 7); 
- the validity of a resolution of the national parliament to commit troops to Vanuatu, and of 
the act which supported the resolution: held valid (Supreme Court Reference No. 4 of 
1980 (No. 2) [1982] PNGLR 65); 
- the extent of the power of the head of state, the National Executive Council and the 
Minister of Police to give directions to and to discipline the Commissioner of Police: 
held the minister could not in the circumstances (Supreme Court Reference No. l of 1982 
[1982] PNGLR 178); 
- the validity of an amendment to the Organic Law on National Elections which increased 
the deposit required of candidates for an election to the national parliament from KlOO to 
KlOOO: held invalid (Supreme Court Reference No. 2 of1982 [ 1982] PNGLR 214); 
- the validity of the appointment of a secretary to the Department of the Morobe Province: 
held invalid (Morobe Provincial Government v Papua New Guinea, Supreme Court, 2 
August 1984); 
- the validity of legislation which required the courts to impose minimum penalties: held 
valid (Supreme Court Reference No. 1 of 1984, 2 November 1 984); and 
- the validity of provisions of the New Ireland Provincial Constitution concerning 
qualification to stand for elective office: held invalid (Supreme Court Reference No. 2 of 
1984 27 1984). 
There have, in addition, been many cases in which the and National courts have found 
invalid legislation or governmental action (by the police, in particular) on the ground that it 
breached the protection of law provisions of S .37.  
1m1nr"''""nJP one. Very few constitutional courts in the world have been called upon in 
ac1:1uditca1te on such diverse range of action. The 
cn2u1e1age by its to the law of standing. In 
1980 [198 1] PNGLR 265 K.idu C.J. and J. held that any 
of (the did not go so far 
to Mr Michael Somare as leader of the of persons and 
bodies such as the Ombudsman Commission to seek an has been in 
critical � constitutional issues to come before the court (see the electoral case, 
Supreme Court Reference No. 2 of 1982 [ 1982] PNGLR 215). The Court has further 
facilitated review by a more liberal attitude to the manner of and of 
'constitutional facts' (ibid.), and a liberal of its power to award remedies. The 
court has also been to off er advice on constitutional issues or as to how laws be 
drafted so as to avoid unconstitutionality (Bayne 
The of the courts and the of are of course critical 
factors in the courts' efficacy. Section 157 of the Constitution provides that, except as in 
the Constitution, 'no person or authority (other than the Parliament outside the 
National Judicial System has any power to directions to any court, or to a member of any 
court, within that in respect of the exercise of judicial functions or powers' .  Acts of 
pru:·11aime1at must, of course, conform to the Constitution, and the Court has employed 
set:lar�1tic1n of powers to restrict the extent to which can withdraw judicial 
functions from the courts (see 1982a:232-235; Supreme Court Reference No. IA of 1982 
[ 1982] PNGLR 123, 134-1 3 6). 
The Constitution regulates the manner of appointment of j ustices, and in this respect, as in several 
others, restricts the scope of executive power to the pre-independence 
The chief is in effect appointed by the Executive Council after 
consultation with the minister responsible for national justice administration (S. 169(2) ). The other 
justices are appointed by the Judicial and Legal Services Commission (S.170(2) ), which consists of 
the minister, the chief justice and deputy chief justice, the chief ombudsman, and a member of 
parliament appointed by the parliament. There is no evidence that the government has attempted to 
make appointments for political advantage, although one Minister of Justice did make an attempt to 
have the Commission appoint a lawyer who did not have the necessary qualifications.  Those Papua 
New Guineans appointed have generally been drawn from the ranks of senior lawyers with 
reasonable experience. The Australians appointed have held senior appointments in the service of 
the governm�nt, and �n some cases have come from the Australian profession (although in one case 
the Commission apparently failed to take int() account that the appointee had been criticised by an 
Australian Royal Commission). 
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The Supreme Court has not demonstrated any undue deference to the executive or to the legislature, 
as its record in its review jurisdiction illustrates. The court would undermine its legitimacy were it 
to make a political decision, in the sense of one which was influenced by immediate political 
outcomes, or which sought to influence the immediate political situation. On the other hand, a 
concern for the stability of the constitutional polity as a whole is a matter for consideration. There 
is also a risk that a decision which reflected hostility to a current government policy, or to a current 
government, could undermine the authority of the court. From this point of view the curial and 
extra-curial statements of some of the j ustices at the time of the Rooney case posed a serious 
problem (Weisbrot 1979, 1980). 
A report prepared in May 1981 by Barnett (Barnett 198 1) identified a range of problems faced by 
the independent office-holders. Briefly, these were: a lack of proper servicing of the institutions 
and of cooperation between them, so that they often worked at cross-purposes with one other and 
came into sharp conflict with the government and parliament; threats of violence to particular 
individuals such as judges, magistrates, prosecutors and defenders; improper directions from 
ministers and provincial government leaders to judges, Leadership Code Tribunal members, and 
others; the problem of bribery and corruption of and by the staff of office-holders; and an 
inadequate level of funding, staff, and facilities.  
So far as funding is concerned, there is obviously a limit to what the country can afford, but within 
this limit the choices made seem to give insufficient attention to the need to maintain the financial 
viability of the office-holders. The 1982 Ombudsman Commission' s  report noted that the 
Government Flying Unit received an allocation of funds not much less than the combined total 
allocated to the Ombudsman Commission, the public solicitor, and the National Court (Ombudsman 
Commission 1982:22). 
A recent episode demonstrates that the problem of improper directions persists. On 10 February 
1985, The Times of Papua New Guinea revealed that a month earlier Mr Iambakey Okuk had 
written to the prime minister, Mr Somare, urging him to instruct the electoral commissioner to issue 
writs for a forthcoming by-election immediately, or face dismissal. The prime minister was further 
advised to hold such a conversation alone with the electoral commissioner, and to advise the 
commissioner that any report of it by him would be denied by the prime minister. The purpose of 
this stratagem was said to be to procure Mr Okuk's return to parliament in the by-election, so that 
he could support Mr Somare against a minister, Mr Paias Wingti, from Mr Somare' s  Pangu Pati, 
who was thought to be planning a vote of no confidence in the prime minister. 
The course of events which followed point up the distinctive character of Papua New Guinean 
politics and the ambivalent respect paid to constitutional proprieties .  The prime minister denounced 
the suggestion (The Times of Papua New Guinea, 17 February 1985), and the by-election was not 
held as Mr Okuk had wanted. On the other hand, it is not likely that the incident has caused Mr 
Okuk any loss of standing with his electorate, and his own National Party president was more 
concerned with who leaked the letter (ibid.). 
It is debatable what conclusions should be drawn from this episode. Politics being the art of the 
possible, politicians of all countries are prone to disregard constitutional form. In developed 
polities such as Australia the problem of independent office-holders is often dealt with by making 
the right kind of appointments, and if the occasion arises to say anything it is not put on paper. Of 
course, in many systems there is no semblance of constitutional propriety. Certainly this stage has 
not been reached in Papua New Guinea, and the minister's affirmation of the principle of 
independence of constitutional office-holders, just as that of the Supreme Court in the Rooney case 
in late 1979, may be part of what will be a long process whereby these principles come to be 
understood and n:t:>r•<>r<1 1 1" '1\,\..ct.Jt.cu. 
The Constitution in retrospect and in prospect 
The CPC is infused with a strong commitment to liberal and democratic values in which the 
rights of the individual are of The Somare Government of 1974 
strong basic but the National Constituent '"""'·..i, .. u,_ 
adopted the CPC The reason for further this dimension of the Constitution is 
that it has in recent years come under criticism from a number of quarters. The major elements of 
the are revealed in a report entitled Law and Order in Papua New Guinea (Clifford et al. 
1984). The three- elements are: that these provisions of the Constitution are from western 
systems (ibid.: I/1 10) ;  that the Constitution failed to the conflict between them and 
customary values (loc. cit.), the of Bernard Narokobi, one of the CPC's 
legal and that the the way of an effective strategy for with the law 
and (ibid.: 
... ... ..,Al'.>"..... in a rather harsher form in the controversy which surrounded the 
Premdas and cases. One Australian that the affair reflected 'widespread 
frustration at the limitations of a colonially influenced constitution and the adopted Queensland 
criminal code' (The Age, 30 1979). also Mrs as saying that the 
Constitution and the laws had been 'inherited'. An editorial in The Herald saw as 
the fundamental problem 'that Australia a British legal system and traditions to Papua 
New Guinea's alien soil' (12 1979). A letter written to the Port Moresby Post-Courier 
of 28 September 1979 by 'National noted that 'various people, mostly Ministers and other 
Members of the Parliament, have been reported as that "the Constitution was written by 
foreigners and it has foreign notions" '. National Lawyer went on to refute this claim, and detailed 
the stages of the making of the Constitution and stressed the heavy involvement of Papua New 
Guineans at every stage. This response was not confined to New Guinean Mr 
Thomas Kavali (MP for Jimi) wrote 'it is not a white man's Lo111stituuon, 
which we ourselves and which our Parliament sutmorte1rl: 
1979). 
The historical record belies an argument that the basic rights provisions were an inheritance from 
the colonial period. The colonial style was indeed in direct opposition to such guarantees, and 
neither the Australian nor the English constitutional systems make such provision. Nor is it true to 
say that the CPC adopted the provisions from western law. The CPC's approach to the question is a 
fair reflection of the way the Committee formulated its proposals generally. It looked for 
inspiration in a number of directions: to the western democratic experience; to the experience of 
Third World countries with constitutional governments, such as Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, 
and Zambia; to Papua New Guinea's own experience, and in particular to the recent political 
experience of resistance to the Australian administration; and to the opinions it had gathered in its 
tours around the country. 
In parts of its report, the Committee relied on what it perceived to be the custom of the country, but 
not often, and there was no pretence that its recommendations would somehow restore the 
customary ways of doing things. The Committee stressed the need to draw from both the colonial 
and the customary experience, recognizing the limitations of both: 
We should use the good that there is in the debris and deposits of colonisation, to 
improve, uplift and enhance the solid foundations of our own social, political and 
economic systems. The undesirable aspects of Western ways and institutions should 
be left aside. We recognise that some of our institutions impose constraints on our 
vision of freedom, liberation and fulfilment. These should be left buried if they 
cannot be reshaped for our betterment (CPC 1974:2/13). 
The CPC ' s  human rights recommendations reflect clearly the western and Christian traditions, and 
make few concessions to customary traditions, but it would not be correct to characterize these 
recommendations as merely copying from other constitutions. 
The CPC was not alone in advocating strong basic rights provisions. Conferences on this subject in 
1965 and 1970, sponsored by the International Commission of Jurists, had involved leading Papua 
New Guineans, and the notion of co�stitutional guarantees always received strong support from 
them. It is true that in the latter half of 1974 the Somare Government's position was that the 
Constitution should state only a programme for rights protection, to be implemented in law after 
independence, but support for this view was not very strong. It hardly surfaced in the period May 
to June 1 975 when, as a result of discussions between the political parties and the work of Papua 
New Guinean lawyers in the Department of Law, the CPC's  recommendations were substantially 
reinstated. In the end of course the Constitution was adopted by the National Constituent 
Assembly, and a great deal of time was spent in informal sessions in explanation of the effect of the 
basic rights (see B ayne 1982b). 
So much might be acknowledged, but the critics then argue that Papua New Guineans (and lawyers 
in particular) had assimilated western values and that they were instruments for the transfer of these 
values into the post-independence period. Put in this way the critique is unanswerable. If there had 
not been a colonial experience, it is highly unlikely that for many decades, if not centuries, the 
many societies of Papua New Guinea would have evolved into a nation. The colonial experience 
created the national boundary and national institutions. It also created a class of educated Papua 
New Guineans who necessarily became acquainted with the values and traditions of the 
metropolitan power. Thus the ideas held by this group about the kind of national institutions 
desirable for an independent Papua New Guinea were drawn from the traditions of the metropolitan 
power and of other national entities. There was very little in the pre-colonial exprience, and such of 
that as had continued after colonisation, that could serve as a guide to the constitution-makers. 
However, it is not correct to take the further step and argue that the Constitution is necessarily a 
product of the colonial experience. To do so would be to miss the possibility that Papua New 
Guineans were making choices about what parts of the western experience would be incorporated in 
their Constitution and in what form. The history of the basic rights clauses indicates that they were 
making such choices. The result was that there was a sharp break with the colonial pattern and that 
on some important points of detail the Constitution adopted a solution unique to Papua New 
Guinea. 
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To proceed to the second element of the critique, Papua New Guineans were also aware that the 
notion of individual rights ran counter to customary ways .. While it is true, for example, that leaders 
such as members of parliament may take part in tribal fighting, most articulate opinion is that it 
should stop. The point that customary ways should change is often made in other contexts. 
The third element of the critique - that basic rights provisions hamper effective law enforcement - is 
not so easily dismissed. On the evidence presented in the INA/IASER Report (Clifford et al. 1984), 
the problem seems to lie primarily in the poor resources and the poor training of the police and 
prosecutional services. There is ample substantiation of these facts, but none for swingeing 
condemnations of the constitutional provisions such as that 'some of the liberties protected by the 
Constitution have been allowed to deteriorate into licence' (ibid.: I/130). The report recommends 
that the informal system of social control, centred around the village courts, should be strengthened. 
Its critique of the Constitution seems to proceed upon an assumption that the emphasis on 
individual rights makes this difficult (ibid.:I/265). The report, however, overlooks the fact that 
SS.37(21)  and 37(22) provide specifically that the provisions which provide guarantees concerning 
the burden of proof and the criminal process generally do not apply to village courts. These courts 
are required to abide by natural justice, but that is a flexible concept and no doubt allowance would 
be made for the informal nature of the courts. 
The considerable body of current opinion that there should be change to the rights provisions will 
no doubt at some point result in change. It would, however, be unfortunate if wholesale change 
were to proceed upon a false revision of the historical record and a misunderstanding of what the 
Constitution does provide. Certainly any criticism which denigrates the contribution which the 
courts have made to the maintenance of the values expressed in the basic rights, and of the principle 
of constitutionalism, fails to understand the primary purpose of the Constitution. 
APPENDIX 
The metropolitan tradition 
If the Westminster system is taken as that system which operates in the United Kingdom, in the 
several constitutional systems in Australia, and in New Zealand, it is apparent that it is not part of 
this system to restrain by constitutional limitations the power of the parliament to infringe on the 
rights of individuals. In these systems, the extent of an individual' s rights is, with few exceptions in 
the case of the Commonwealth of Australia, the residue of that right left to the individual after the 
sum of the legal restrictions upon it are taken into account. 
It is often argued in justification that the common law and the common law tradition embody the 
principles reflected in bills of rights, and that this law and tradition are adequate to restrain state 
power. But this is clearly not so. There are some substantial differences between the law 
concerning individual rights in these Westminster systems on the one hand, and the law in a country 
such as the United States of America on the other. Moreover, the absence of a bill of rights in, for 
example, the Constitution of Australia cannot be explained simply by the English tradition. Such 
provisions were omitted from that constitution precisely because they might work to the advantage 
of minority racial groups in the Australian colonies. 
The colonial pattern 
For almost all of the pre-independence period in Papua New Guinea, there were no laws which, in 
general terms, protected civil rights. There was no legal bar to a statute or other law reducing the 
residue of a person's rights, and such reductions occurred frequently. The only possible exception 
to this was S . 1 16 of the Constitution of Australia, which guaranteed freedom of religion. However, 
the High Court of Australia held that the right to trial by jury (S.80) and the protection against 
compulsory� acquisition of property except on just terms (S.51 (xxxi) of the Constitution) did not 
apply in Papua New Guinea: R v. Bernasconi ( 19 1 5) 19 CLR 629; Teori Tau v. Commonwealth 
(1969) 1 19 CLR 564. 
The body of pre-independence law which placed restrictions on the significant personal freedoms 
followed much the same pattern as similar laws in other British-influenced legal systems. 
Compared to the situation in many of the British colonies, the law was less draconic in the limits it 
placed on the political rights of speech, association and assembly, but the colonial situation did 
produce a variety of laws which imposed limits on personal freedoms. Restriction of movement 
was authorized by the Native Regulations and laws such as the Restricted Areas Act 1950. Land 
has never been constitutionally protected from acquisition and some of the early acquisitions were 
probably illegal even in terms of the law that did apply. In addition, the Native Regulations 
permitted a wide range of interferences by the administration in the use of land. These Regulations 
and other statutory law also embodied racial distinctions (Bayne 1975; Wolfers 1975). For example, 
the concern with race produced laws such as the Criminal Code (New Guinea} Amendment 
Ordinance 1934, which punished miscegenation between a white woman and a 'native man'. This 
provision was not repealed until 1958, and a provision of the New Guinea Marriage Ordinance 
1935 which permitted a marriage between a 'native' and 'any other person' only with the written 
consent of a district officer was not repealed until 1963. 
Aministrative practice limited civil rights in greater measure than the law allowed. Field 
administration officers were virtually uncontrolled by the legal system and the exigencies of 
particular situations were often seen as justifying departures from the law. For example, forced 
labour and illegal punishments were fairly widespread and in the late colonial period there were 
allegations that the police commonly exceeded their powers (see generally Adams 1974; Bayne 
1 975; Hamilton 1974). 
The background to the Constitution 
In 1965 and in 1970 the Australian section of the International Commission of Jurists, which in Port 
Moresby was supported strongly by the judiciary, organized conferences in Port Moresby which 
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considered the legal system of Papua New Guinea. The 1965 conference was not much concerned 
with constitutional matters, although a paper delivered by Mr Justice Smithers, a former judge of 
the T erritory Supreme Court, did consider the bill of rights in the Nigerian Constitution at that time. 
The judge was sceptical about the value of such provisions, b ut there was an airing of the issues and 
some of the Papua New Guineans who attended may have learnt something about the idea of a bill 
of rights. 
The 1970 conference was of greater significance, and was concerned primarily with the kind of 
constitutional system that might be adopted to facilitate independence. The conference was held in 
late August 1970, a time when Papua New Guinean opinion was becoming more articulate� and 
when there were challenges to the authority of the Australian administration in the Gazelle in 
Bougainville. Professor Enid Campell delivered a paper which was in favour of a bill of rights 
along the Nigerian lines, and recommended that the j udiciary be empowered to enforce the 
protections. Only one Papua New Guinean, Mr Joseph Aoae, spoke in the plenary session, and he 
favoured the adoption of such a bill of rights. Mr Percy Chatterton, then a member of the House of 
Assembly, also � spoke at length in favour of a 'justiciable and legally and constitutionally 
entrenched' bill of rights, although he favoured one which was in ' the simplest possible terms with 
a minimum of provisos and exceptions' .  
Professor Campbell' s paper was considered by a number of working groups. T hese groups 
favoured an introduction of a bill of rights, but apparently there was substantial support for the view 
that the judiciary should not be responsible for its enforcement. Of the forty participants in these 
groups, only seven were Papua New Guineans, although there were in addition five of the expatriate 
members of the House of Assembly). Some Papua New Guineans obtained first-hand knowledge 
about the bill of rights, and there was no doubt some press reporting of the conference proceedings. 
But perhaps the most significant aspect of the conference was that this discussion was held at a time 
when many Papua New Guineans were beginning to assert their rights against the Australian 
administration. 
It was the strength of the opposition in places such as the Gazelle and Bougainville which led to the 
introduction into the house by the administration' s  secretary of law, Mr Lindsay Curtis, of a 
draconian Public Order Bill. This bill attracted widespread criticism (Ais a  1974; B all 1971) and 
was withdrawn. It was resubmitted in a modified form, although it was still very restrictive of the 
political rights of assembly and of association, and passed as the Public Order Ordinance 197 1 .  
Out o f  opposition t o  the Public Order Bill, and perhaps stimulated b y  the discussion a t  the 1970 
conference, came the proposal for a Human Rights Bill. This bill was introduced into the house by 
Percy Chatterton on 12 November 1970. The matter was put in abeyance until May of 197 1 when 
the debate resumed on a redrafted version. In the committee stage, Lindsay Curtis successfully 
moved an amendment which restricted substantially the effect of the bill on existing or even 
subsequent legislation, and thus the Human Rights Act of 197 1 was a very weak form of a bill of 
rights. It may be surmised that the opposition of the Australian administration to an effective act 
stemmed from their concern that such laws would hamstring their efforts to deal with the growing 
opposition to Australia in Papua New Guinea. Nevertheless, there were several cases in the pre­
independence period in which the courts were able to give some effect to the act, and thus by 
independence there had been established some tradition that the courts could protect individual 
rights. 
The Constitutional Planning Committee 
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In mid-1972 the then House of Assembly approved the establishment of an all-party committee of 
fifteen comprised only of members of the house, to make recommendations for a constitution for a 
self-governing Papua New Guinea with a view to eventual independence. It should be noted that 
according to Woolford, Mr Andrew Peacock, the Australian Minister for External Affairs, advised 
Somare against establishing the committee (Woolford 1974: 158). The chairman of the CPC was 
Somare, but the responsibility for the work fell largely to the deputy chairman, Father John Morn.is. 
No expatriates were members of the CPC. The CPC toured the country and in other ways consulted 
with Papua New Guineans. 
The CPC report included proposals for a detailed bill of rights along the lines of the 1959 Nigerian 
model, although the protections under the CPC version were somewhat greater. These 
recommendation are now substantially reflected in the Constitution. The report indicates that the 
CPC was influenced by a number of factors. It cited, as historical background, the western tradition 
of protecting individual rights, and mentioned developments in England, the United States of 
America, France and other European states. The report then argued that 'since the establishment of 
the United Nations Organisation, there has been general agreement internationally that there are a 
number of basic rights and freedoms ,which all people everywhere are entitled to have recognised' 
(CPC 1974: 5/1/1 ). The committee then outlined the experience in Papua New Guinea which led to 
the Human Rights Ordinance of 197 1 ,  and recorded that the submissions it had received 'were 
heavily in favour of incorporating the substance of the provisions of the Human Rights Ordinance 
in our Constitution and these provisions legally enforceable ... ' (ibid.: 51114). 
The committee canvassed objections to a bill of but it came to the conclusion that legally 
enforceable protections were necessary. So far as the form of these provisions was concerned, the 
CPC was influenced by the Constitutional Commission of Trinidad and Tobago. This commission 
reported in 1974, and one of its members, Mr Justice Telford Georges, had visited Papua 
New Guinea in 1973 and had spoken to the CPC. The commission's report recommended a 
means for limiting the general qualification clause that is found in many bills of rights and in the 
Nigerian model. This means was recommended by the CPC and is now reflected in S.38 of the 
Constitution. 
The CPC report was tabled by Father Morn.is in parliament on 15 August 1974, and at the same time 
the chief minister, Mr Somare, and deputy chief minister, Dr John Guise, who were both members 
of the committee, tabled a minority report. This minority report was shortly withdrawn and 
replaced by the 'Government paper: proposals on constitutional principles and explanatory notes' 
(Papua New Guinea 1974). 
The government paper 
This paper took issue with the CPC on every chapter of the CPC's  report, although in many 
instances there was no substantial disagreement. In the early stages of its preparation at least, some 
of the young Pangu Pati officials such as Rabbie N amaliu and Moi A vei, were influential in shaping 
its content, but it is likely that some of the expatriate lawyers close to Somare's  office, in particular 
T.E. Barnett and probably to a lesser extent CJ. 
influence. 
the par·11aime11tar-y counsel, had more 
The of difference between the government paper and the CPC emerges in the first 
paragraphs of the paper: 
(a) As far as practicable, the Constitution itself should be a short document which 
clearly sets out a statement of the main principles about the nation' s  structure of 
government and major goals and social principles. 
(b) Where necessary, the Constitution should contain directions that more detailed 
statements implementing these principles should be enacted by the National 
Parliament as separate Organic Laws (ibid.: 1) .  
This difference led to the government paper position on human rights: 
The Government supports the CPC recommendations . . . [but] the Government 
proposes that only main principles should be stated in the Constitution and that it 
should direct that the elaboration of the principles and any qualifications to them 
should be set out in an organic law (ibid.: 18). 
The notion that the Constitution might be supplemented by laws appeared for the first time 
in the government paper. The paper cited the experience of Israel as an example of this approach. 
The basic justification was that organic laws, which could be amended by an absolute majority of 
the parliament, would allow for easier amendment of the constitutional laws. The government, the 
paper said, was 'conscious that Papua New Guinea was going through times of rapid and substantial 
social, economic and political change' ,  and did not wish to 'tie the hands of this or the next 
government too much in advance' (ibid. :2). 
However, it is also possible to see the notion that there should be only a short and simple 
constitution, with organic laws to be added later, as a response to the opposition to early 
independence that Mr Somare had struck in the House of Assembly. On 25 June 1974, Somare had 
moved that Papua New Guinea should achieve independent status on 1 December 1974. This was 
widely opposed: the United party, and particularly the highlands members, wanted the matter put to 
a referendum; the newly formed Nationalist Pressure Group (NPG), which comprised most of the 
former CPC members and some others, together with a small Country Party of indeterminate 
objectives but which was allied to the NPG, opposed independence until the Constitution was 
adopted; and several of the Peoples Progress Party were also wary of early independence for 
reasons similar to those of the United Party. Thus on 8 July, Somare moved that the date of 1 
December 1974 be replaced by a date 'as soon as practicable after a constitution has been enacted 
by this House' .  Tei Abal, the United Party leader, moved an amendment that the house must 
endorse any date proposed, and with these two amendments the original motion was passed. Faced 
with this resolution, the Somare government seems to have adopted the idea of a short and simple 
constitution. 
There was, nevertheless, some thinking in government circles that the human rights protections 
recommended by the CPC were too extensive. The government paper said that time was needed to 
assess their effect upon possible group punishment provisions in tribal violence cases and the effect 
on a possible national youth service (ibid.: 16). The government was concerned also that the 
recommendations concerning emergency powers might not allow for the government to get extra 
power quickly enough after an emergency was proclaimed (ibid.: 18). However, on some crucial 
points the Government agreed with the CPC: for example, that preventive detention should be 
introduced only by an act of parliament (ibid.: 19). 
Resolution of the differences between the CPC and the government 
Debate on the CPC Report began in the house on 16 Ausgust 1974, and on the sitting days up to 27 
September the debate was confined to a general debate on the report. On this latter date, the house 
constituted itself as a Committee of the Whole, and Somare began proceedings by a motion that 
Chapter 1 of the CPC Report be accepted as drafting instructions for the Constitution, subject to the 
modifications in the government paper. In the debates which followed, the United Party and the 
Nationalist Fressure Group moved amendments to So mare's motion, to counter the Government 
Paper or to introduce new proposals. This was the form of the debate on each chapter of the CPC 
Report, and it had the important consequence that unless amended the adoption of a 
part of the government paper or some other motion for amendment, the CPC stood as the 
drafting instructions. 
Debate on 5, the recommendations on human took on 15 October 1974. Tei 
Abal moved an amendment that reinstated the CPC recommendations and overrode the government 
paper. The CPC's  recommendations on emergency powers were amended, but not any 
substantial sense. These motions were agreed to by the government before debate as a result 
of prior discussions that had occurred between the parties. 
The matter rested there for some months until the release from January 1975 of the 
second draft of the Constitution prepared by the counsel, CJ. Lynch (the first draft 
was not made available outside government). On the question of the human rights 
recommendations, as indeed on many other questions, the second draft differed significantly from 
the CPC recommendations. The change of nomenclature to basic rights was not troublesome, but 
what did give rise to considerable opposition was a provision which allowed for much greater 
qualification of the rights, and the allowance that some important matters were to be left to future 
organic laws. These differences to the CPC recommendations were carried over into the third draft. 
In the first two weeks of March 197 5, Tei Ahal, the leader of the United Party, Father Momis of the 
NPG, and Sinak:e Giregire of the Country Party, wrote letters to the chief minister protesting about 
the substantial departures from the drafting instructions set by the House of Assembly. These 
protests led to the establishment of an inter-party working group of politicians, party officials, and 
legal advisers from the opposition groups and from the government. Their task was to examine the 
third draft and to resolve, as far as possible, the differences that existed as a result of the third draft. 
By this time, Ilinome Tarua had become acting head of the Constitutional Development Section of 
the Chief Minister's Office, and he became responsible for representing the government's view and 
for maintaining liaison with the parliamentary counsel. Two other young Papua New Guinean 
lawyers were also constantly involved in these meetings. Pokwari Kale participated in his capacity 
as a legal officer of the House of Assembly, and Bernard Narak:obi attended as an adviser to the 
NPG. The three non-Papua New Guinean legal advisers who attended these meetings tnD:lu�.n011t 
were John Ley, who was the counsel to the house but in this respect was acting as an adviser to the 
NPG, CJ. Lynch, and Peter who was a consultant to the chief minister but who was acting 
on a brief to assist the United At various points others, both New Guinean and 
expatriate, participated in these April it had been agreed that most of the CPC 
recommendations on what had now become the basic would be reinstated, although there was 
still much argument over detail. 
During 1975, a committee was formed within the Department of Law to examine in detail the 
basic rights provisions. The committee comprised only Papua New Guinean lawyers. Its 
participants were Buri Kidu, Mari Charles Maino, and Bernard Sakora. Once this 
began, it took over policy making on the basic provisions, and the results of their 
deliberations were conveyed to the counsel by Tarua. 
What was called the fourth draft (revised) of the Constitution was circulated after 10 May 1975 and 
it was this draft that went to the Constituent Assembly. There were still, however, points of 
controversy, and again meetings between the various groups and their advisers were held 
in an attempt to resolve differences before the debate. At in late May several points were 
settled. By early June, the carriage of the government position in the Constituent Assembly had 
fallen to Ebia Olewale, and he was now advice on matters related to the basic rights from 
a group of Papua New Guinean lawyers employed in the Department of Law, in particular from the 
two senior lawyers, Joseph Aoae and Buri Kidu. These officers were present at several meetings of 
the Constituent Assembly. 
As a result of this process the CPC recommendations were almost wholly adopted, and in the end 
the support given by the Department of Law lawyers was crucial in overcoming the narrow 
approach of the drafts. The variations that may be found do indeed somewhat broaden the coverage 
of the Basic rights provisions from those recommended by the CPC. The emergency provisions 
appear in a form different to the CPC' s recommendations but in substance the CPC view prevailed. 
One point of difference that deserves mention is the qualification in the protection of property 
clause: for five years after independence it should apply only in respect of automatic, rather than 
naturalized, citizens (S.68(4) ). This amendment was supported strongly the CPC, whose 
recommendations that non-Papua New Guineans could not become naturalized independence had 
been defeated. There was opposition, of course, from the expatriate owners who were 
members of the United Party and the Peoples Progress Party, but on this issue the CPC group 
received strong support from government members. It was two ministers, Iambakey Okuk and 




Tribal fighting in the highlands has gained widespread publicity both within Papua New Guinea and 
abroad Many people have expressed their concern over its rate of increase and its effect on the 
ecdnomy of the highlands. Responding to the calls for action, the colonial administration took the 
matter up in 1972 and established a committee of inquiry, the Paney Committee. Tribal fighting 
was seen then not only as a problem affecting the people and the supply of government services, but 
also as a challenge to the power monopoly of the government 
Before that time the police had been engaged in trying to combat the problem at the local 
operational level. In other words the problem had beert left to the police to handle. The 
administration, which wanted to lead' the colony peacefully into independence, had no tested policy 
at hand. Thus its first step was the deployment of the police mobile squads early in 1973, following 
the advice of the Paney Committee. This repressive approach continued from then to the present 
time. This paper examines the effectiveness of this policy and approach. 
The sequence of measures employed was as follows: 
- the committee of inquiry was set up to investigate tribal fightingin 1972 (Paney 1973); 
- police mobile squads were deployed for the first time in early 1973;  
- the Inter-Group Fighting Act was passed by parliament in 1977 ; 
- a state of emergency was declared in the highlands in 1979; 
- a special police operation was set up in the highlands for the 1982 national elections;  
- a more general special police operation was mounted in the highlands in 1983;  
- the INNIASER Report, including a chapter on tribal fighting, was published in 1984 
(Clifford et al. 1984). 
The police and courts have been the main implementors of the state's  policies. This paper discusses 
only the police side of the story. It is divided into four main sections. The first is a case study of a 
tribal fight. The second presents statistical information on fighting and crime in the highlands. The 
third reviews police and civilian views on tribal fighting. The last section deals with governmental 
approaches to tribal fighting at the local level, with particular reference to 'Operation Mekim Save' 
initiated by the Enga provincial government. , TJle paper is based on experiences in Enga and 
interviews in the highlands provinces . 
A tribal fight in the Tsak valley in 1982 
Following a national election campaign rally in 1982, two large tribes, the host of the rally (Tribe 
A) and another (Tribe B), fell into dispute over the honouring of a particular candidate, and after 
further ' bad blood' went to war. 
The fighting took place in the Tsak valley in the Wapenamanda District of the Enga Province. The 
valley has a total population of nine to ten thousand people from six large tribes, seventeen 
medium-sized tribes and eight smaller ones. Tribes A and B are two of the six large tribes in the 
valley. Within ,tliis area there are no police stations except for a base-camp, Yogos B ase-Camp, 
with five general duty policemen under the control of a kiap or officer of the Division of District 
Administration. The nearest police station is Wapenamanda, about twenty kilometres from the 
Tsak valley. The police mobile squad is based in Wabag which is one and half day' s walk away. 
A small fight had broken out at the election rally when a splinter group from Tribe A tried to 
honour a rival candidate. Then a few days later a young girl was found dead in suspicious 
circumstances on Tribe A's  land. Tribe B demanded the votes of Tribe A in compensation for the 
girl ' s  death. In the event the votes were not given. 
It was on 1 1  July 1982 that the actual battle broke out around mid-morning. Tribe B initiated the 
attack after having given warning the day before. The first victim in Tribe A was one its two 
leaders, who was a clergyman and politically influential. Because of his popularity in the Tsak 
valley, and more widely in Enga, the news of his death brought to the battle hundreds of warriors; 
both formal allies and friends. Tribe B, which was then on the defensive, had quickly to recruit 
more men from its own allies and friends. 
The battle was one of the largest staged in the area since 1977, when two others of the six larger 
tribes had fought. The estimated number of warriors involved was between 1 ,500 and 2,000. The 
battlefield covered a whole clan territory which had been vacated in an earlier fight. This was the 
first b attle between these two large tribes since before the colonial intrusion into Enga Province. 
According to older men from Tribe A, those previous battles between the two were small and did 
not include allied clans and friends, as in this battle. 
The total number of men killed was nine: two from Tribe A and seven from Tribe B. Of Tribe B ' s  
seven victims, five were from allied tribes. The number o f  men injured (generally with arrow 
wounds) was in hundreds, while four men had serious spear wounds. Many food gardens, trees and 
coffee-gardens were destroyed. Tribe B itself lost no property. However, its two allied tribes, 
whose territories were in the battle zone, lost ten to fifteen houses, several food gardens and seven 
coffee gardens .  Tribe A lost one house, two coffee gardens, and three sweet potato gardens. 
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It was not until the beginning of the second week of fighting that the mobile squad of twenty-three 
men from Wabag intervened. The call to intervene, which had been made by the kiap at Y ogos 
Base camp through the Wapenamanda police station, had been delayed for some unknown reason, 
possibly because the mobile squad was said to be engaged at three other tribal fights in the province 
at that same time. 
On its first day of intervention the squad arrived in two ten-seater four-wheel drive trucks, plus the 
police helicopter based in Mount Hagen. The first tactic they employed was to chase and disperse 
warriors with tear-gas. The effect of this operation was such that the warriors ran in confusion, 
struggling to escape from the tear-gas, the police, and any enemy who might take advantage of the 
situation. 
The day's fight ended when the mobile squad withdrew, heading for Wabag after a stay of a few 
hours. On the following days the helicopter came and went. Sometimes it came two or three times a 
day. The use of tear-gas and rubber bullets from the helicopter was frequent, but most warriors had 
already dispersed into hiding places upon hearing the engine noise of the helicopter. However, on 
one of those days the helicopter had come in very low along a river valley and caught the crowd by 
surprise on the battlefield. Rubber bullets, tear-gas, and a gun were fired from the helicopter, 
killing one man and injuring two others. The death of this man added to the number of men killed 
in the battle. The victim was of an allied clan of Tribe B, and the two injured with rubber bullets 
were from Tribe A. One of the two injured was admitted to the Mount Hagen hospital, while the 
other stayed back in fear of being arrested. The police action in this fight was more extreme than in 
some earlier fights. 
The fighting continued day after day. However, the warriors became careful to avoid fighting at a 
time when the police might attend. Men who had previous experience of police interventions were 
the key figures in this response. Two of the first raids were dawn raids and two were night attacks. 
In these dawn raids one man was speared to death and hundreds were injured. Coffee and food 
gardens were destroyed and houses burnt It appeared later that the police knew about the sporadic 
raids and weekend battles, but were unaware of the dawn raids and the night attacks. 
These skirmishing tactics were developed in the Tsak valley and then spread to other parts of the 
Wapenamanda District. As a consequence of the forceful mobile squad intervention in this case the 
style of further fighting in the valley changed greatly. The change had begun to take place soon 
after the first day of police intervention. To avoid the police, the warriors of Tribe A had launched 
dawn raids, night skirmishes, early morning and late-afternoon fights, plus large-scale attacks on 
weekends. 
This battle went on for almost seven weeks. Then an attempt was made by the provincial police 
commander (PPC) to mediate between the clans. The PPC, although accompanied by the mobile 
squad in the two vehicles and the helicopter, indicated that his approach was that of a peacemaker. 
Promising not to arrest any warriors on that day, the PPC arranged for two separate meetings in 
which he asked the two tribes not to do battle again. The visit was respected to the extent that there 
was no fighting on that day. The PPC talked for several hours to each side, promising both sides 
that a mobile squad from outside the province would camp in the area to prevent further trouble. 
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This proved to be the first successful mediation by a police officer in that area. The words of the 
PPC were respected, not 
'
out of fear but with understanding, and brought an end to the fight. 
Probably the PPC' s  intervention occurred when the clans were ready to stop if they could be 
assured that the other side would not resume the fight. The PPC placed a mobile squad camp 
between the territories of the fighters to give that assurance. 
There was a payback killing some months later by the brother of the leader killed early in the battle. 
This, however, did not lead to any further killings. A compensation settlement was arrived at 
between the tribes in 1985, over two years after the election incident. 
The statistical background 
From data at police headquarters, it appears that at the peak of fight activity in 1982 and 1983, new 
fights were occurring at the rate of about two a week (see Table 6. 1).  The largest number of fights 
occurred in Enga Province, followed by Chimbu. The Western Highlands and Eastern Highlands 
came next, with fewer fights taking place in the Southern Highlands Province. 
When the general state of lawlessness was examined, it was found that police crime statistics 
showed significantly less serious crime in some highlands provinces than for Papua New Guinea as 
a whole (see Table 6.2). In 1 984 rates were considerably lower in Southern Highlands and Enga 
provinces, while in Chimbu and Eastern Highlands they were above the national average. 
Police and civilian views on tribal fighting 
I conducted a survey in 1985 to obtain the views of police officers who had experience of 
intervening in tribal fights, and of civilians, including local officials and educated villagers, living 
in fighting zones. I interviewed thirty-eight policemen and fifty-one civilians. A structured 
interview guide was prepared for each group, using a number of hypotheses drawn from the 
literature as the basis for questioning. There was a general perception among civilians interviewed 
that lawlessness was worsening. Tribal fighting itself was not perceived as an example of 
lawlessness, but it was felt that criminal offences were associated with fights. Tribal fighting was 
seen as an attempt at solving a problem. It can be viewed as a procedure consistent with respect for 
custom and law. Serious conflicts between groups have customarily been resolved by group 
fighting. 
The prime cause of fighting traditionally was land disputes. In the recent past, election disputes, 
particularly over allegations of bribery, have become another major cause. On the face of it, these 
election-related fights concern promises of resource allocation. They are generally instigated by the 
losing candidates. 
Customarily fights were settled through third-party negotiation to restore a power-balance, usually 
involving the defeated party receiving compensation. Election-related fights are not readily resolved 
in this manner unless deaths occur. 
Item 
Eng a 
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Table 6.1 
Statistics on tribal fighting, 1982-1983 
P r o v i n c e 
Chimbu Wes t e rn E a s t e rn S outhern 
H ighlands Highlands Highlands 
Total 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Clan 
f ight s  8 4  4 7  2 6  3 0  1 3  2 0 0  
War r i o r s  
involved 2 7 , 0 0 0  2 4 , 0 0 0  1 3 , 9 0 0  4 , 2 0 0  8 , 0 0 0  7 7 , 1 0 0  
Men 
i n j ured 3 5 2  1 0 2  8 4  1 0 7  1 4 5  7 9 0  
Men 
k i l led 3 1  8 8 5 1 6  6 8  
Hou s e s  
des t royed 7 9 4 1 5 3  3 6  6 0  1 9 0  1 , 2 3 3  
C o ffee 
t rees cut 
down 3 , 0 0 0  1 , 4 2 0 0 1 , 4 0 0  6 6 6  6 , 4 8 6  
Yar t re e s  
cut down 6 0  0 0 0 4 0  1 0 0  
Banana 
t rees cut 
down 3 0  0 0 0 0 3 0  
P ig s  
k i l led 1 5  5 6 1 4  8 4 8  
Trade 
s t o re s  
des t royed 9 0 6 7 3 2 5  
Food 
gardens 
des t r oyed 2 2 2  2 5  8 6 2 5  2 8 6  
Veh i c l e s  
damaged 0 0 4 0 0 4 
Government 
bui ldings 
des t royed 12 4 0 0 0 1 6  
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Source: Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary (RPNGC) headquarters records. 
Note: For population figures see Table 6.2. 
Table 6.2 
Comparative crime rates for the highlands provinces, 1 984 
P r ovince 
S outhern Highlands 
Enga 
We s t e rn H ighlands 
Chimbu 
E a s te rn Highlands 
All high lands 
p rovinces 
All P apua New 
Guinea 
E s t imated E s t imated 
populat i ona pe r s on s  per 
sq kma 
2 5 1 , 5 0 0  1 0 . 6  
1 7 5 , 1 0 0  1 3 . 7  
2 8 9 , 3 0 0  3 4 . 0  
1 8 3 , 4 0 0  3 0 . 1  
2 9 8 , 1 0 0  2 6 . 6  
1 , 1 9 7 , 4 0 0  1 9 . 2  
3 , 2 5 9 , 4 0 0  7 . 0 
Sources: a Department of Industrial Development 1984; 
b RPNGC headquarters records 
S e rious 
c r ime s 
repo rtedb 
1 , 0 9 7 
7 9 3 
2 , 0 6 1  
1 , 6 7 8  
2 , 9 0 0  
8 , 5 2 9  
2 4 , 9 3 7  
S e rious 
c r ime s 
per 1 0 0 0  
persons 
4 . 3 6 
4 . 5 3 
7 . 1 2 
9 . 1 5 
9 . 7 3 
7 . 12 
7 . 6 5 
Other causes of recent fights have included theft, road accidents, brideprices, drunken brawls, 
common assault, unacceptable court decisions, moka (traditional exchange) disputes, murders, and 
gambling debts. Traditional clan alliances remain strong, but may have weakened as party politics 
have induced splits within clans. As yet there is little evidence of tribal fighting for party political 
purposes. 
When interviewed, policemen said that in a week of fighting there would frequently be many 
injuries, but seldom deaths. At most there might be one or two deaths. From Table 6. 1 it can be 
seen that in 200 fights a total of sixty-eight men were killed. In other words, a warrior died in one 
fight in every three. Note, however, that there were some 77,000 participants. Hence the chance of 
being killed in a fight is one in 1 , 1 34 .  
In a year, police interviewees suggested, one or  two deaths would be the result of  police action 
either with rubber bullets or with firearms. Policemen interviewed claim that they find it necessary 
to use firearms when they are outnumbered by thousands of warriors, and for self-defence in other 
extreme situations.  
Police interviewees had noted changes in tactics and weaponry over the years. Traditional weapons 
have been superseded to some extent. Now iron spears are used, and corrugated-iron shields, steel 
axes, and, increasingly, shotguns. Motor vehicles sometimes transport warrior' s to the battlefield. 
Wet cloths are used against tear gas. Battle locations are selected that are difficult for police access.  
Watch towers are used to look out, not for the enemy, but for the police. Set-piece battles are being 
replaced with raiding, looting, and ambushes. Lone victims are selected. Women are attacked. 
Educated indiviuduals have become actively involved. 
In imitation of the police, dawn raiding is being practised by the warriors too. Battles are arranged 
when the police are least likely to be on hand: typically, late afternoon and early morning. 
Weekend battles are arranged to bring in employed persons to assist. Unexpected night raids and 
sudden attacks without warning take place on occasions. The coffee season is favoured to inflict 
the maximum damage on the enemy. 
It may be over-simplifying to view the changing battle tactics as a direct response to police 
intervention: However, it is reasonable to argue that the death rate in Table 6. 1 is the result of 
increasing sophistication. Deaths in the past, when customary weapons and tactics were employed, 
may have been less common. 
The civilian perception remains that clan fighting is the best method of handling group conflicts: it 
is effective, and not normally costly in life or material goods. The villagers involved rarely show 
reluctance to fight 
Opposition to fighting comes from the churches and government representatives primarily, plus 
some educated villagers and local businessmen. Villagers who are not directly involved, but are 
connected in some way, often call for police action. 
To the fighters, the police have only nuisance value. They are, in effect, another enemy, but 
unpredicatable and interfering, as well as irrelevant. 
Police interviewees admitted to instances of misbehaviour at fights, but put it down to poor 
discipline by squad commanders. However, they maintained that most public allegations are 
maliciously motivated and false. 
The civilian interviewees claimed that there was considerable evidence of violent misbehaviour by 
the mobile squads, including arson, malicious damage, murder, grievous bodily harm, rape, 
stealing, and wrongful arrest. It was further alleged that squad commanders could be bribed, and 
that they were easily influenced by powerful politicians. 
The police view was that the squads are normally competent and calm when handling fights, but 
that they become exasperated and angered by certain clans who persist with repeated and sustained 
fights. Police misbehaviour arises as a result of this exasperation. 
Civilian interviewees were generally critical of the police approach to tribal fighting. Some could 
see no policy behind the police approach, only, as they put it: force, misbehaviour and general 
ineffectiveness. Others saw the police use of mobile squads as 'futile' . 
In particular, the police were accused of the following errors: 
- not seeking to negotiate peace; 
- not trying to improve relations with communities ; 
- not cooperating with the local authorities ;  
- not investigating offences associated with fights; 
- not acquiring intelligence on clans and disputes ; and 
- not consulting with village leaders. 
Police interviewees confirmed that the police only learned of a dispute after a fight had started, and 
that normally mobile squads had no information on which clans were fighting until they arrived at 
the scene of the battle. The police explained their inadequacies in terms of lack of manpower and 
other resources. 
Civilian intervie'Yees generally were aware of police initiatives in starting a 'mediation squad' in 
Chimbu, and a similar activity in the Western Highlands. These police initiatives met with almost 
unanimous approval. Only a small number of interviewees felt that mediation was not a proper role 
for the police. 
Most civilians wished to see the police identify more closely with the highlands people. They 
referred to the need for more rural police stations and more manpower in the highlands provinces. 
They wished to see the police trained both for the highlands environment and for negotiation and 
mediation roles. 
The police were thought to lack sensitivity and respect for villagers. It was suggested that there 
should be community relations officers based in the highlands provinces.  Several civilians, 
however, felt that there was still a need for a tough mobile squad to be held in reserve and used in 
the last resort, when negotiation and mediation had failed. 
In interviews, the police view on mediation was that it was frequently undertaken by individual 
police officers, but that this was not a proper police role. At the same time, many of the police 
interviewees recognized that stopping fights and dispersing the fighters was not a solution either. 
The only changes in police tactics that were noted over the years since independence were the 
forced abandonment of mass arrests and the increased use of firearms. 
The policemen interviewed generally would prefer: 
- to have good community relations ; 
- to have good local intelligence; 
- to not use firearms; 
- to cooperate with local officials and village leaders ; 
- to investigate offences properly; 
- to undertake law-awareness campaigns; and 
- to see the police negotiation role officially recommended. 
The Chimbu tribal fight mediation squad goes some way to realizing these preferences. 
Police policy towards tribal fighting 
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One must assume that the objective of police policy is to end tribal fighting. It has been clear for 
some years that the police are signally failing to achieve this objective. In fact material presented 
so far shows that police interventions have been counter-productive. They have prolonged fights, 
increased fatalities, and obstructed negotiations and settlements. Essentially the police have made 
matters worse. One must question, therefore, why the police persist with their current approach. 
Perhaps the police are pursuing some covert policy objective, or there is some structural failure 
which could explain the persistent use of paramilitary force in tribal disputes. 
It is instructive to review the history of the police mobile squads. Their origins lie in civil rioting 
which occurred in Buka in 1962. As a result, part-time mobile units were established at main police 
stations. The first  full-time squad was set up at Bomana Police College in 1 966. Initially it was 
intended that this should handle any form of emergency anywhere in the territory. Civil unrest in 
Bougainville and the Gazelle Peninsula in 1969 led to the establishment of the main depot at 
Tomaringa. The sguad was subsequently much involved in combating the activities of the dissident 
Mataungan Association. 
By 1 975 there were twelve mobile squads, comprising nearly 600 men and posted to eight locations 
around the country. A 'primary role' had been defined as 'tasks associated with civil unrest and 
internal security' (RPNGC 1 976a: 17). Thirty-five tribal clashes were attended that year. The 
training of the squads was based upon that of similar squads established in Fiji (ibid.). 
The 'Riot and emergency procedures manual' was revised in 1975 and 1976 and is in use currently 
(RPNGC 1976b). It contains no reference to tribal fighting but is the basis for mobile squad 
operations. However, tribal fighting is neither civil unrest nor a threat to the security of the state. It 
is manifestly a dispute between two villager groups. The s tate and the concept of civil obedience 
are not relevant 
It is difficult to believe that tribal fights were ever seen in these terms. It is plausible to see the 
mobile squads being deployed due to the lack of police manpower resources in rural areas. It may 
have been their availability rather than their suitability that determined their use. Hence the 
recommendation of the Paney Committee of 1 973,  when seen in the context of the development of 
the mobile squads between 1969 and 1975, may have been more opportunistic than well­
considered: the availability of mobile squads was a 'gift' to the committee. 
It was clear from my police interviews that the mobile squads, in practice, are invariably successful 
in halting b attles by disrupting the action. Police interviewees did not believe_ that the effect of the 
disruption was to prolong the fight or to make the dispute worse. 
Since the discovery of the defect in the Inter-Group Fighting Act in 1978, which meant groups 
could not be charged, warriors are arrested and charged individually with various summary 
offences, including carrying offensive weapons, intending to fight, organizing and aiding a fight, 
and fighting itself. Note that these are the same charges that are applied to urban street brawling. 
The cases are prosecuted before the magistrate' s  court, with custodial sentences of up to twelve 
months being imposed. 
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Since these offences are not crimes under the Criminal Code, no formal advice is passed to police 
headquarters. Only incident reports are made. Any police officer may prepare an incident report. 
Thus several reports may be prepared independently on the same fight. From those interviewed it 
was clear that there is uncertainty as to responsib�lity, and that monitoring of fighting is unreliable. 
Furthermore, it was clear that deaths and serious injuries are not always investigated. One must 
assume, therefore, that police homicide statistics do not include deaths in tribal fights. 
One component of uncertain reporting relationships is the semi-autonomous status of the mobile 
squads. By design, these squads operate independently of the line management of the constabulary. 
They enter a situation, achieve a set objective, and withdraw. There is no continuity of 
involvement. 
Police policy-makers are faced, therefore, with decision-making data which are unreliable, and with 
disrupted lines of command between the rural police (who might be under the control of a division 
of provincial affairs) and operations management at headquarters. They are not well placed to 
evaluate the effectiveness with which police policy is implemented, or to direct changes in the field. 
Conceivably this explains the persistent use of the paramilitary approach to tribal fighting 
throughout the ten years since the mobile squads were first es_tablished. 
In sum, in the thirteen years since the Paney Committee recommended the use of mobile 
squads to combat tribal fighting, the frequency and of fighting has increased. No review of 
police policy, strategy and tactics appears to have been attempted. Within the police force itself 
there appears to be a structural weakness lessons are not learnt, and actions 
persist to the general detriment of the highlands, and ultimately of Papua New Guinea. 
Provincial-level approaches 
Under the. Constitution the police force is a national function. In this section I give a brief account 
of various local or provincial initiatives that have occurred since the early 1970s. A special 
reference is made to the 'Operation Mekim Save' initiated by the Enga provincial government in 
198 1 .  
From the early 1970s, the responsibility fo r  enforcing the law i n  the highlands was shared by the 
police and the Department of District Administration. However, tensions and conflicts emerged 
between the two as to who should do what Since 1950 the kiaps have been limited in their control 
of police detachments by two instructions from police headquarters, Konedobu. There were certain 
areas where the kiap was to take charge of police detachments, while areas closer to towns became 
police zones. There was not much cooperation or coordination between the two groups, which 
resulted in confusion and inactivity. 
District-level law and order committees were set up in 1973, with district commissioners as 
chairmen in each of the districts (now provinces). Included in these committees were the most 
senior police officers in each district. However, inter-departmental bickerings continued. In effect, 
these committees did not in any way provide a solution. 
Police Policy Towards Tribal Fighting 67 
With the introduction of the Inter-Group Fighting Act in 1977, new committees were set up. These 
were the peace and good order committees for each of the highlands provinces. Section 5 of Part II 
of the Inter-Group Fighting Act was amended to allow for these committees to be  established. 
Their role was to declare fighting zones, if situations warranted. This would then make it easier for 
the police to make arrests. In 1979, the Emergency Committee had noted ' Several of these 
Committees already function effectively and have declared a number of areas as fighting zones 
under the Act' (Guise 1979:28). 
Special attention should be given to the Enga provincial government's effort in initiating a measure 
to combat tribal fighting. This was known as 'Operation Mekim Save' , approved by the provincial 
executive council in 198 1 .  The aim was to have a third party group mediate and negotiate for peace 
between warring tribes at district level. This operation was initiated, funded and controlled solely 
by the provincial government of Premier Tindiwi. This government felt that it was necessary to 
mobilize its own resources towards curbing the problem. The move came about at a time when all 
other resources and ways had been fully tried, and tribal fighting was increasing. For instance, ' . . .  
from 1/1/80 to 3t3/8 1  .. .. there were more than 50 cases of tribal fights in which police attended 
under difficult conditions '  (Enga Provincial Government 198 1 : 3).  The operation was initially 
staged in only three of the five districts of Enga, Wabag, Wapenamanda and Laiagam, these being 
the most prone to fighting. 
The operation consisted of three district-level mediating teams headed by three assistant secretaries 
of the Department of Enga. The total strength of the operation was about forty-eight with sixteen 
members in each team, including five policemen. The groups were made up of public servants, 
police, provincial government personnel, village and local court magistrates, and local government 
councillors. Normal working hours and services were disrupted. Of the team members, the village 
court magistrates were the most influential in mediation and negotiating for peace. 
One of the mediations took place in early 1 982, between the Waiminakuni-Kepe and the Aluni 
clans who had fought a few months earlier. In this mediation the Aluni clan was asked to give fifty 
pigs while in tum the Kepe clan was to give fifty pigs plus a few more. The agreement created a 
mutual understanding between the two clans after much discussion on the issue. The exchange took 
place in a second round of talks at a set date. The Kepe clan was asked to give extra because the 
Aluni clan had been defeated, with the loss of several of its warriors, and they had been driven out 
of the territory. The Aluni clansmen who feared a second defeat by the powerful Kepe clan 
accepted the mediation and exchange. Similar mediations followed. Most of the mediations were 
successful, with an estimated success in forty to fifty cases according to the deputy provincial 
secretary, Luke Kembol. 
Unfortunately, the whole operation halted when it was declared unconstitutional early in 1983 by 
the Justice Department. It appeared that the force behind the halting was political, rather than a 
genuine concern for the Constitution by the Justice Department. According to the deputy secretary 
of Enga, operation had been welcomed by a majority of the public; although it was an expensive 
exercise. 1 984, Operation Mekim Save was again at work, although this time it came entirely 
within the framework of the village court systems (Clifford et al. 1984:1/1 82). The message of 
Operation Mekim Sa: ;': · ";eems to be that traditional mediation should be looked to for the answer to 
tribal fighting. Customarily in times of tribal war it was the duty of a third party, usually a 
neighbouring tribe, to intervene as a peacemaker between warring tribes. The mediating tribe 
usually requested that the battle be stopped. When it was, the mediator followed to negotiate for 
peace and compensation payments. 
Conclusion 
Police to combat tribal has been neither wholly successful nor has it entirely failed. 
It has been a policy that has proved to be simply inappropriate. While police interventions in fights 
have temporarily halted them, ultimately they have prolonged battles, and possibly have made 
matters worse. 
The INNIASER argued that 
turn to tribal fighting not to create disorder, but to make their 
re1au1ons;h11>s with others more satisfactory or more Tribal fighting is a 
response to disorder not a itself (ibid.:IJ92). 
The nature of tribal does not warrant the counter-insurgency of the mobile 
Neither is civil unrest to be given anti-riot treatment. The and emergency 
ou1erati011s have failed to any solution, and have proved hugely expensive 
While the economic cost of tribal has been the cost involved in 
combating is believed to be much (although the data are not available to confirm this 
view). 
The of the constabulary, as an organization, has been inadequate throughout the years 
since the first for independence. The police can be criticized on four grounds: poor 
crime management; poor organization; poor policing; and poor integration into the overall justice 
system. 
In their approach to crime management, the police have perceived their role to be that of law­
enforcers, not peace-keepers. They have acted as the coercive arm of government, without 
seemingly providing advice to that government on the appropriateness or effectiveness 
of their operations. 
As far as their own is concerned, the have not been effective in acquiring 
adequate resources for their requirements . Further have not developed reporting and 
communication channels so that the decision-makers and policy formulators can monitor 
performance. they have failed to fully the rural police detachments into 
the command and control structure of the constabulary. Similarly, the mobile squads operate as 
largely autonomous units without adequate accountability to headquarters. 
In relation to 'on the ground' policing, the police have weak intelligence in rural areas. They do not 
conduct proper investigations of crimes that are incidental to tribal fights. They have poor 
disciplinary control over the members of mobile squads. Worst of all, they do not recognize that 
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they are as much the servants of the village people as of the government: they have appalling 
community relations in rural areas. 
As a part of the bureaucracy, the Police and Justice departments have not collaborated in 
formulating and implementing workable laws, with a notable example of their failure being the 
Inter-Group Fighting Act 
In view of this record of failure throughout the ten years of independence, one must ask the 
disturbing question: where is Papua New Guinea heading? Unless present policies are changed, the 
conclusion must be that the people of the highlands provinces will increasingly perceive the police 
as an army of occupation to be driven out through mass insurgency and possibly cession from 
Papua New Guinea: an ironic outcome for a misguided policy. 
7 
In October 1 984 the Papua New Guinea government, due to escalating criminal activities in some of 
the major urban centres, formulated the much-publicized forty-nine measures to curb lawlessness 
and other anti-social activities in the country, particularly in the rapidly growing urban centres 
(Papua New Guinea 1984a) .  Of the forty-nine measures formulated for both the short and medium 
term, four were centred on how village courts could help in maintaining law and order. These four 
measures were: 
- improved cooperation and coordination between village courts and police (Measure 19) ;  
- improved supervision and inspection of urban village courts, and the establishment of new 
village courts in some urban communities (Measure 20); 
- a direction to the public and private sectors to support the use of village courts by 
employees (Measure 29) ;  and 
- an increase in the number of urban village courts to assist dispute settlement within 
communities, reduce pressure on the formal justice system, and provide a cost-effective 
means of dispute settlement (Measure 40). 
The report entitled Law and Order in Papua New Guinea and published in September 1 984 
(Clifford et al. 1984) contains a very detailed and comprehensive section on village courts, their 
jurisdiction, functions and general operations over the nine years since their introduction. I would 
like to say a few things about that report since the forty-nine measures were more or less formulated 
along the lines it recommended. 
In their final recommendations on village courts the authors suggested a three-phase strategy aimed 
at ' improving the quality of service provided by village courts' over the next decade (ibid.:II/80) . 
The importance of the village courts is that they form a vital part of the system for maintaining 
order in Papua New Guinea because they are based on community involvement. 'Village courts are 
run by officials within communities and are responsive to community needs and opinions' 
(ibid.:II/79). As the team notes: 
Village courts are the best mechanism available to government to strengthen and support the most 
fundamental element in the overall system of order in Papua New Guinea: the informal structures of 
the community (ibid.:II/80). 
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A strategy for village courts was suggested in the INA/IASER Report: the government was to 
support among those agencies directly under its control those which most 
complement and enrich the informal institutions .. . other elements of the formal 
justice system are best linked to the community through village courts rather than by 
inadequate and inept direct contact (ibid.:II/80). 
Many people would like to see village courts strengthened and extended to other parts of the 
country where there are no village courts established. In line with this the INA/IASER Report 
recommended the following: 
- strengthening existing programmes ; 
- extension to full coverage in rural areas; 
- a special urban village courts programme; and 
- changes in jurisdiction and function. 
The authors further pointed out that each step is a precondition for the next, except in the case of the 
urban programme, which they regarded as a necessity not to be delayed. 
It is anticipated that more urban village courts will be established when funds are made available. 
For the other recommendations, it will take some time before they are implemented. Since village 
courts are primarily a provincial function, it really depends on what the provinces want and whetl1er 
or not money can be made available from provincial budgets to establish, supervise, inspect and 
undertake related administrative duties. 
Activities and performance of village courts 
Village courts are staffed by lay officials who are mostly uneducated, illiterate village elders. The 
system is part of the formal justice system through the Village Courts Act (Chapter 44 of the 
Revised Laws). However, village courts are more informal and apply relevant custom to settle 
disputes (S.20). Village courts have jurisdiction to hear minor cases as specified in the act and 
regulations, except a matter involving the ownership of land, a dispute involving the driving of a 
motor vehicle, and any matter involving a prescribed offence (S.20). While being more informal 
than the other courts, village courts have access to government services outside the community. In 
fact, many of our village court officials see themselves as representing the government, rather than 
just being lay officials, and seek external validation whenever they run into any conflict$or problem 
with the community they serve. 
As of August 1985 there were 856 village courts in Papua New Guinea, with a few more to be 
established by the end of the year. Further expansion has been temporarily deferred. Provinces like 
Milne and Western in the Papuan region have very few courts while North Solomons, East and 
West New Britain, Enga and Western Highlands are almost fully covered. Over the whole country 
we estimate that 70-7 5 per cent of the population is served by village courts. On a regional basis 
the highlands and New Guinea islands are better served by village courts than the Papuan and New 
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Guinea mainland regions.  Of the total of 7,674 officials who are currently ori the national payroll, 
more than half (4,386) are in the five highlands provinces. 
The general administration and day-to-day running of village courts is the responsibility of the 
Village Courts Secretariat, which has a small staff in W aigani and forty officers based in the 
provinces. Even though the secretariat operates separately, village courts are linked to the higher 
courts through the magisterial services, since provincial village courts officers (PVCOs) and their 
village courts inspectors (VCis) report to the senior magistrate in each province. Appeals and 
reviews of village court decisions are referred to the local and district court magistrates. 
The role village courts play in the community can best be seen in what they do. The village courts 
are a mechanism of dispute settlement to which the people refer as a last resort, when other methods 
have been exhausted in the community. The people go to village courts to seek external assistance 
when other informal methods of settling disputes outside of a court fail to yield a s atisfactory 
answer or solution. While village courts play the role of adjudicating over cases, their mediating 
function has been encouraged, and officials are instructed to mediate in every case before their 
compulsive jurisdiction is used. 
The role village courts seem to be playing now is very similar. to the traditional means of 
maintaining peace and good order in the community. But today I see a shift, although a very slight 
one, towards the system of village courts as a whole complementing the work of other law­
enforcing agencies in pursuit of the objective of peace and good order in the community. 
Generally speaking, the village courts system is working satisfactorily. People have accepted the 
courts. The general popularity of village courts can be witnessed in areas where they have been 
established, particularly in the highlands. The use made of village courts cannot be accurately 
calculated, because of late return, damage, and loss of used order books and other records. 
However, it is believed that there has been a marked increase in the· number of cases being heard by 
village courts in the areas where they have been established: an increase, that is, from the estimated 
150,000 cases heard in 1979, this being the same number of cases as was heard in all local, district 
and children's courts put together (Village Courts Secretariat 1980). Micro-studies also suggest a 
high usage rate (e.g. Warren 1976; Westermark 1978). 
The village courts system has not avoided criticism over the last ten years. Politicians as well as the 
ordinary people, sometimes without establishing any real fault, have made allegations of bribery, 
nepotism, corruption and other forms of improper dealings by our officials. Still others have 
claimed that village courts are becoming too legalistic, particularly village courts in Port Moresby, 
where they operate just like the higher courts with a bench, flag, and those who appear before the 
village magistrates having to bow before proceedings begin. Some of these allegations are true, 
although not everything is as bad as it is sometimes made out to be. Corrective measures have been 
employed to counter the problems. 
If there was anything the independent government did to help people live in peace and harmony in 
the many rural communities of Papua New Guinea, it was the introduction of village courts. 
Village magistrates are drawn from the communities they serve and are generally well aware of 
local customs and ways of settling disputes and any other problems that come up in the village. 
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I f  the general public realises the importance of village courts a s  community-oriented courts, and 
makes regular use of them, the village courts system, I believe very strongly, can contribute to 
social harmony in our society. Village courts are not poor men's  courts, as some well-to-do people 
think. They are courts which anybody, big and small alike, can use. The more village courts are 
used, particularly by big people, the more they will be accepted. So far no government minister nor 
senior public servant has either used or appeared before a village court. 
Relations with police and other agencies 
Cooperation between the police and village courts has been minimal. Any relationship that exists is 
on an ad hoe basis, which leaves a lot to be desired. There is no formal, well-formulated 
programme for the two organizations to work together to achieve what is their common aim: to 
maintain peace and good order in the community, be it in a rural or an urban setting. Many a time 
village courts orders have been left unenforced for long periods because police do not carry out 
their responsibilities. Some orders for imprisonment have never been executed. PVCOs and their 
police counterparts, the provincial police commanders, need to work together with the senior 
provincial magistrates to remedy this shortcoming. Orders that are not enforced put the cfficials and 
the system as a whole in a position where they can be ridiculed. This lowers the standing of the 
courts, and any later decisions can be affected. It has happened in some village courts that the 
community has lost confidence in the officials and the system. 
Police do not realize that, with over 7,600 officials chosen for certain qualities they possess and the 
respect in which they are held, village courts are a vast manpower resource. Frankly this resource 
has not been fully utilized either by police or by any other law-enforcing agency. In cases where 
police and village court officials have cooperated and worked together, it is a story of success. 
Very recently a pilot project was started at B adili police station in the National Capital District to 
formalize cooperation between police and the Village Courts Secretariat. The two organizations 
met on a regular basis to discuss problems and how they would help each other. The chairman of 
each village court in the B adili area had to report to the station commander at B adili and the 
provincial village courts officer, so that problems could be attended to, and criminals and possible 
trouble makers could be watched carefully. Unenforced orders were to be dealt with more quickly. 
Matters that were referred to police but over which village courts had j urisdiction were to be 
referred back to village courts for hearing. It is still too early to make any statement on the success 
of this project. If it does succeed, it will be extended to other areas in the country. 
The relationship with magisterial services is that the provincial village courts officer has to report to 
the senior provincial magistrate. He oversees the operations of village courts in the province, even 
though administrative and other responsibilities are performed by the PVCO and his inspectors in 
each province. Sometimes, when directed by the Minister for Justice, magistrates from local and 
district courts carry out inspections and do other administrative duties. As more village courts 
inspectors are recruited, more of this responsibility will pass to the officers of the s ecretariat. 
Staff from the divisions of provincial affairs in each province help with inspections, general 
supervision of village courts and any other administrative duties.  As village court functions are 
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transferred to the provinces, these same officers will work more closely with the village courts 
inspectors. The Village Courts Secretariat will only play an advisory role in relation to the 
provinces. 
Problems facing village courts 
There are certain constraints which hinder the operation of village courts in Papua New Guinea. 
There are not enough inspectors to cater for the needs of the system with regard to training, 
inspections, supervision, and first-hand assistance to village courts and their officials. At the 
moment the secretariat tries to do all it can within its limited resources. 
Village court officers (PVCOs and VCis) are not adequately trained to meet the demands of their 
jobs. Their legal background is very scanty and this can create complications in the executing of 
their duties. This shortcoming has been realized and arrangements have been made with the 
University of Papua New Guinea for training programmes so that officers are better prepared to 
carry out their duties. 
Existing village courts need to be improved so that they provide better services to the community. 
More urban village courts need to be established, for they have a part to play in settling disputes and 
conflicts in the urban community, particularly in settlements. Expansion programmes need to be 
carefully monitored so that only a few village courts are established at a time, and only after there 
has been close scrutiny of whether or not they will be well maintained. In the past many courts 
were established with insufficient officers to supervise them. 
Long-term prospects appear to be quite good. Village courts will not be done away with; they are 
here to stay because they have already become an integral part of the people' s  life. In cases where 
village courts were temporarily suspended, the people have been very bitter and have urged their 
politicians to restore the courts. The importance of village courts cannot be over-emphasized. 
I would like to see educational qualifications for some of the officials, such as chairman and village 
court clerk, raised, as more young and educated village leaders come to take their place in 
community concerns. General operations will improve as a result of this new wave of officials. 
Remuneration is another matter requiring attention. 
The mediatory jurisdiction of village courts (S.16) should be encouraged and emphasized more, so 
that disputes are mediated before a court can exercise its compulsive jurisdiction (Div. 5). All 
peaceful means should be exhausted, both outside and within the area of the village court, before a 
full court can hear a case. 
As village court functions are transferred to the provinces, village courts will come under provincial 
departments. Each province has to pass its own legislation to control the operations of village 
courts. Appropriate changes will have to be made to suit the needs of individual provinces. 
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Police and the higher courts should refer people who go to  them to  village courts on matters that 
come under the j urisdiction of village courts. Police and the higher courts should only deal with 
matters that come before them that are beyond the jurisdiction of village courts. 
There is more to be done in the area of research into village courts and their general operations in 
Papua New Guinea. This matter is raised as a challenge to members of Australian universities who 
may be interested in doing research on village courts. The results of such research could benefit 
both the researcher, the Village Courts Secretariat and the people of Papua New Guinea. 
8 
Sinclair D innen 
The issue of law and order has assumed central importance in Papua New Guinea. It is not  obvious, 
however, that the incidence of crime, or particular crimes, is disproportionately high in Papua New 
Guinea today as compared to the colonial period. As the INNIASER Report recently remarked: 
Through the entire colonial period and a full decade of independence, the problem of 
'law and order' has been under active (sometimes almost paranoic) consideration by 
government and people alike (Clifford et al. 1984:I/ 1).  
Nor is it obvious that crime rates are significantly higher than in other countries, nor that they are 
presently on the increase (ibid. :I/Chapter 2). 
Evaluating the extent of Papua New Guinea' s 'problem' is not as straightforward as it is often 
presented. The measurement of crime is a notoriously difficult task and most criminologists handle 
official criminal s tatistics with considerable caution. Moreover, the quality of data available in 
Papua New Guinea has been described as 'immeasurably less reliable than comparable statistics in 
most other j urisdictions' (ibid. :I/28). 
Despite these difficulties of quantification, crime and lawlessness are seen by the Papua New 
Guinea government as constituting a major problem adversely affecting the nation and its 
international image. The government has become increasingly sensitive to the perceived economic 
consequences of such an image and has taken what it sees as drastic measures to control the 
problem and assert its commitment to restoring social order. The most recent of these was the 
imposition of a state of emergency in the National Capital District between 17 June 1985 and 4 
November 1985. 
In view of the complexity of empirically evaluating the nature and extent of the problem, the 
manner in which it is understood is of considerable significance. By this I mean the way the 
government perceives and defines the problem; the kind of evidence it treats as serious; and 
consequently the range of solutions it can conceive of and contemplate implementing. 
This paper identifies some of the main characteristics and assumptions of the current law and order 
debate in Papua New Guinea. In doing so, it discusses some of the similarities in the understanding 
of crime and crime-control strategies between Papua New Guinea and other countries and the 
problems inherent in such a perspective. The debate on law and order in the United Kingdom is 
introduced to illustrate some of these similarities, and also to indicate the possibility of constructing 
a more adequate theoretical understanding of crime and crime control. 
The Morgan and INA/IASER reports 
In the first section of the paper I shall examine two recent reports on law and order in Papua New 
Guinea. The first of these is the report of the Committee to Review Policy and Administration on 
Crime, Law and Order established by the National Executive Council under the chairmanship of 
senior public servant, Leo Morgan (Department of Provincial Affairs 1 983).  The second is the 
result of a joint project between the Institute of National Affairs (INA), a privately funded research 
organization; and the Institute of Applied Social and Economic Research (IASER), a parastatal 
agency (Clifford et al. 1984). This latter project was carried out by William Clifford, formerly 
director of the Australian Institute of Criminology, Louise Morauta, presently associate professor in 
the Department of Anthropology and Sociology at the University of Papua New Guinea, and Judge 
Barry Stuart of the Yukon Territories Supreme Court (Canada), who had previously served as a 
lawyer in the Central Planning Office. 
The Morgan Report originated in a recommendation made by a sub-committee on law and order 
established at a meeting of the Premiers Council at Arawa, North Solomons Province, in October 
1982. The terms of reference laid down by the National Executive Council (National Executive 
Council Meeting No.1 8/83, 5 May 1983) were extremely wide. They called for a comprehensive 
review of government policy and administration relating to law and order. The report is 
consequently wide-ranging. As well as examining the law and order agencies of the state it deals 
with many economic and social factors in discussing the wider genesis of lawlessness. 
The Morgan Report gives prominence to the effects of social and economic change. Crime and 
lawlessness are located: 
in a mixture of the country's chronic under-development, the nature of its history, 
the colonial legacy, and in a host of pressures resulting from the modernisation 
process (Department of Provincial Affairs 198 3 :4). 
The report identifies three crucial factors. First, there is unemployment. Second, there is the large 
proportion of young people in the population. Third, there are major problems of formulating, 
planning, coordinating, and implementing economic policy in Papua New Guinea. 
Underlying Part I of the report is the relationship between crime and unemployment. The analysis 
is highly economistic. Thus it is urged that investment policy be informed by the need to generate 
employment opportunities, and that capital available within the economy be used to 'maximise 
productive activity and participation by the largest number of people' (ibid.: 29). Land and rural 
development policy are also said to be linked to crime. This is because land shortages in rural areas 
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and population expansion are seen as contributing to social tension and urban drift. In tum acute 
land shortage in urban areas creates major housing problems and further fuels social tension. 
The report is cautious about the benefits of industrial development and points to the likely social 
consequences, particularly the emergence of an urban working class which, according to the report, 
would generate further tension: 
This class, if organised into labour unions, creates pressure groups with interests that 
may well conflict with the interests of ownership (ibid.:58). 
The recommendations on the non-formal sector are based on the somewhat contentious assumption 
'that people engaged in worthwhile productive activity tend not to commit crime' (ibid.:70). The 
conservation of this sector is advocated to provide some kind of employment for a large section of 
the population. 
Part II considers a number of social factors related to law and order. Concern is expressed about the 
significant proportion of youth in the overall population and the perceived link between 
unemployment among youth and crime. This concern is related to the possible politicising 
consequences of this state of affairs: 
In other countries, neglect can be seen to encourage the involvement of youths in 
extreme politics and the formation of political parties both of the far right and far left 
(ibid.: 1 12). 
The remedies suggested are similar to those proposed in the United Kingdom and other metropoles, 
and include work-sharing programmes, employment generation, and early retirement. 
Part III examines the main agencies of law enforcement and legal administration. A number of 
concerns underlie this section. First, there is concern to provide an integrated approach to the 
management of crime control. The establishment of a Crime Commission is recommended to plan 
and coordinate the work of individual agencies. In addition, an integrated approach must also be 
pursued in respect of employment generation and productivity. 
Second, there is concern to improve the public image of the legal system in general and the criminal 
justice system in particular. Failure to prosecute successfully so-called white collar offenders has 
adverse consequences for the public attitude to law and criminal justice. 
Finally, there is an underlying populist theme to the recommendations. This stresses the need to 
involve 'the people' more in the processes of job creation and productivity, and the need to educate 
people about the perceived links between economic development, social alienation and crime. 
The focus of the INA/IASER Report is narrower than that of the Morgan Report and it pays more 
attention to ways of improving techniques for maintaining social order. 
In a short discussion of perspectives the report identifies two broad meanings of the phrase 'law and 
order' .  The first is the notion of peace and order generated and maintained within a community. 
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Secondly, there is the view of law and order as imposed by the state. This latter view accords with 
theory and practice in most industrialized societies: it is the state, through its law and order agencies 
(police, courts, prisons etc.), that plays the dominant role in the maintenance of social order. The 
report believes that the first view, which it sees as being that of the ordinary people, should provide 
the guiding philosophy for law and order policy in Papua New Guinea. This belief stems from the 
perceived failings of what the authors call 'the state option' ,  as well as the better established roots 
of the 'non-state option' (Clifford et al. 1984:1/ 15). 
The INNIASER Report's examination of the problem, like that of the Morgan Report, has an 
economistic dimension. However, the emphasis is quite different and is markedly less reductionist. 
Whilst the economism of the Morgan Report manifests itself in concern with the causes of crime, 
that is unemployment, the economism of the INNIASER Report stems more from concern about 
the impact of crime upon economic development, and in particular upon production, business 
confidence, and foreign investment. Whilst acknowledging the problems of quantification the 
report concludes that crime represents a significant drain upon the country' s  resources: 
If we only take the figures we have arrived at of K76 million for the private sector 
and K56 million odd for the public sector, the planners and accountants have to 
confront a bill of Kl32 million a year. This is a sizeable hole in the economic bucket 
- more than a half of the aid received annually from Australia and maybe in excess of 
other forms of technical assistance which the country is receiving (ibid.:I/65). 
Whilst acknowledging a relationship between unemployment and crime, the INNIASER Report 
emphasizes the factor of education in its brief causal analysis. The view of the report on education 
is similar to that of the Thatcher government in the United Kingdom (see, for example, Hall 1983). 
Namely, it is seen as raising employment expectations unrealistically and thereby discouraging 
educated youth from taking on work they consider beneath them: 
The unemployed are waiting for the kind of jobs they feel they are entitled to expect 
by virtue of their education. Even a community school education raises expectations 
of good employment status and a place in a non-traditional community. This is not 
to oversimplify. There is, of course, a problem of structural unemployment with new 
migrants failing to find any gainful employment The point here, however, is that 
the education system we have at present feeds the voluntary type of unemployment 
(ibid.:I/83). 
A central theme of the INNIASER Report is the concern to diminish the gap between the state and 
the people which is seen as contributing to social disorder. This concern is similar to that expressed 
in the Morgan Report, although it is presented primarily in terms of a dichotomy between the state, 
on the one hand, and the community on the other: 
Law and order in Papua New Guinea depends therefore on the government regaining 
its position and prestige with ordinary people and forging the links that will build 
confidence and community backing (ibid.:I/107). 
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The law and order issue is thus understood primarily in political rather than economic terms. The 
performance of state institutions and their relationship with the citizen are seen as related to social 
disorder. For example, abuses of public position are seen as destructive not only in terms of the 
economic cost to the nation but also as generating popular disrespect for state authority. 
Maladministration, ineffeciency and corruption in the workings of the state system are seen as 
indirectly fuelling the law and order problem. Like the Morgan Report, the INA/IASER Report 
warns of the risk of political instability: 
Neglect of crime and the build up of the social disparities which appear to induce 
crime are typically punished by eventual revolution (ibid.:JJ130).  
Examination of the formal agencies of social control reveals their apparent inability to cope with the 
demands being made of them. Therefore the recommendations are informed by an appreciation of 
informal structures in the maintenance of social order in Papua New Guinea. These include the 
work of local government officials, village moots, churches, voluntary organizations, and, notably, 
the village courts. Using Black's hypothesis that law varies inversely with other forms of social 
control, the report reasons that the recognition and development of these informal mechanisms is 
more likely to be effective in maintaining social order than the further development of formal state 
structures (ibid.:I/249; Black 1976). This is because at present Papua New Guinea's informal 
community structures continue to play a far more significant role in the maintenance of social order 
than the law and other formal mechanisms. 
Crime, development and positivist criminology 
Both reports are based on a correctionalist perspective: the problem to be corrected is that of crime 
and lawlessness. Whilst they look for the wider causes of social disorder, the reports treat crime and 
lawlessness as unproblematic categories, as commonsense and without need for further 
specification. 
The INA/IASER Report recommends a shift in state policy as a consequence of the poor 
performance of the inherited formal state mechanisms of social control. The recommended shift 
entails enhancing reliance upon informal (non-state) structures whilst reducing reliance upon 
official (state) structures: 
'The non-state option' emphasises the role of non-state mechanisms in the 
maintenance of order and the handling of disorder. It aims to preserve these 
mechanisms where they exist and develop them as needed. 'The non-state option' 
does not mean that the state has no role, but that it sees its role as to support and 
complement non- state mechanisms, rather than appropriating a larger share of the 
action for itself. The role of the state is not to go first but to go last, reducing to a 
minimum its direct role in law and order. The resources of the state are to be used 
where informal resources are inadequate and in areas in which the 'formal system is 
best suited to help (ibid. :JJ252-253). 
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This recommendation i s  based on an over-simplified distinction between forma1/state mechanisms 
of social control on the one hand, and informal/community mechanisms on the other. This 
dichotomy implies that the state cannot act through informal/ community mechanisms. Such an 
implication is clearly untenable in view of the significant inroads into informal dispute-settlement 
procedures already made by the state through, for example, the village courts. It has been argued by 
Paliwala that the enactment of the Village Courts Act 'rather than the mere strengthening of 
existing dispute-settlement machinery ... is a further encroachment by the state into village life to 
preserve law and order' (Paliwala 1982:210). Likewise, the emphasis upon the informal sector in 
the INA/IASER Report would, if enacted, entail an extension rather than diminution of state 
influence through community institutions .  
Both reports are ultimately concerned with adapting existing institutions and relations of  social 
authority, whether state-imposed or community-based, to the correctionalist cause: the protection 
of the existing social order. In the causal analysis, problem social categories, most notably youth, 
are identified� and then linked to crime through the explanatory framework of positivist criminology 
as developed in the metropolitan context. Thus, juvenile crime is explained in terms of: alienation; 
sub-cultural theory (gangs); unemployment; and unrealistic expectations generated by education 
(the 'blocked opportunities' theory). All these are familiar in positivist criminology' s  explanation 
of the disproportionate representation of urban working class youth in crime in the metropoles. 
Several writers have warned of the parochialism of western criminology in its neglect of 
underdevelopment (see, for example, Boehringer 1978;  Sumner 1982). This neglect is most 
apparent when the concepts of that science are applied, with minor modification, to developing 
societies. The resulting analyses have a tendency to identify discrete categories of crime and 
criminal (j uvenile crime, tribal fighting, white collar crime) which are then treated largely in 
isolation from one other. 
Important and awkward questions about the nature of law, crime and state response, and their 
location within the wider political economy of development/underdevelopment are sidestepped, 
obscured or distorted. And yet a historical understanding of crime and crime control demonstrates 
that these conflicts have often been integral in the establishment of new political and economic 
formations (see Fitzgerald et al. 1981; Thompson 1977). Moreover, this wider context for crime 
and its control can hardly be denied in respect of post-colonial societies, given the predominantly 
instrumental nature of law and its enforcement during the colonial period (see, for example, 
Paliwala et al. 1978). 
Both reports attempt to situate crime within the overall processes of development, but neither 
undertakes any sustained analysis of what these processes entail. The Morgan Report, for example, 
talks of the 'colonial legacy' but nowhere does it proceed to analyse what this legacy is and what 
decolonization might mean. In both reports white collar crime or corruption appear as the product 
of individual greed or overbureaucratization. In the absence of an analysis of the role of the state in 
Papua New Guinea, alternative understandings of corruption, for example as manifestations of a 
transitional s tate form combining the features of both patrimonial and modem bureaucratic modes 
of administration (Sumner 1982:29), are understandably difficult to conceive of. 
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Underlying both reports is a criminological variant of the modernization thesis associated with 
conservative development theorists. The underdeveloped nation (in this case Papua New Guinea) is 
seen as undergoing in an extremely short period of time the same social and economic 
transformations that have taken considerably longer in presently industrialized societies. A 
consequence of this accelerated, and seemingly inevitable, process of growth is the generation of 
significant social tension that is likely to manifest itself in crime. The American criminologist, 
Marshall Clinard, speaking at a crime prevention seminar in Port Moresby in July 1975, put it in the 
following way: 
As the less developed nations attempt to bring about transformation in one or two 
generations that have culminated from several centuries of more gradual 
development in most of the industrialised nations, severe social repercussions 
become apparent. .. [T]he rapid increase in crime, particularly property crime, [is] a 
concomitant to the developmental process (Clinard 1 976:48). 
The modernization approach is most evident in the causal analyses of both documents. Thus the 
Morgan Report concentrates upon the relationship between youth, urbanization, unemployment and 
crime, whilst the INNIASER Report highlights the role of education in raising employment 
expectations amongst youths. In addition, an inevitable and natural link between modernization and 
crime is seen in a number of factors: growing social and economic inequalities between the 'haves' 
and the 'have nots ' ;  major housing shortages in urban areas ; increased alcohol consumption; 
growing numbers of educated youth with no employment prospects; corrupt politicians and 
bureaucrats; and a decline in traditional values and authority matched by a growth of western 
hedonism. The resultant forecast is gloomy: 
As the second-half of the 1980's approaches it is likely to become apparent that if 
young people are not satisfied then tensions will increase. These tensions are likely 
to manifest themselves in increased levels of crime, and probably in increases in the 
seriousness of offences (Department of Provincial Affairs 1983: 11 1). 
The solutions proposed by the Morgan Committee follow the diagnosis: employment generation; 
development of youth programmes; control of migration; promotion of rural development; state 
control of alcohol production; review of national education policy; and so on. 
Modernization theory and its criminological derivative are widely acknowledged as failing to 
appreciate or, as in the case of the Morgan and the INNIASER reports, as understating the 
structural nature of underdevelopment and its international context. More particularly, 
modernization theory tends to ignore the economic and social dislocations of the colonial 
experience upon developing countries. Set against the background of the colonial legacy the 
recommendations of positivist criminology, such as restrictions on urban migration, are not only 
unlikely to succeed on their own terms (i.e. to reduce criminality) but are likely to accentuate the 
social and economic inequalities of post-colonial society: 
Unless proposals are offered which face up to the facts of rural stagnation and little 
industrialisation, facts intimately bound up with the international economy, such 
liberal interventions could be worse than useless: they would simply work to protect 
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capitalism from the threat of the urban mass and to make rural misery compulsory 
(Sumner 1982:26). 
The nature of the imperialist relationship is not discussed in either report. Whilst both acknowledge 
the wider roots of social disorder in Papua New Guinea, including reference to the colonial legacy, 
these roots are understood as being firmly implanted in Papua New Guinea soil. The 
internationalism of the INNIASER Report, for example, tends to be restricted to an unquestioning 
desire to foster and protect foreign investment for the purpose of economic development. 
Both reports, and the INNIASER Report in particular, identify the inappropriateness and 
ineffectiveness of the formal criminal justice system, inherited from the colonial period, in the 
Papua New Guinean context. Their concern, however, leads not to an examination of the nature of 
the colonial legacy but to a narrower focus upon alternative techniques of control. In discussing the 
options available to the government, the INNIASER Report suggests that it can either: continue 
with its present policies; increase the role of the state and s tate sanctions in the maintenance of law 
and order; or decrease the role of the state and develop existing 'non-state' mechanisms. The last 
option is the one preferred, and is consistent with the deregulatory approach proposed by the INA in 
relation to land tenure (Knetsch and Trebilcock 1981) and private enterprise (Trebilcock 1982). 
The assumptions of positivist criminology underlying the reports fr�e the manner in which the 
problem is understood and the solutions proposed. They also forestall alternative explanations. 
Thus the issue of who is being controlled and why is largely taken for granted. The nature of the 
post-colonial state, its laws, and the pattern of economic and social development that these laws 
encourage and protect are not subjected to critical scrutiny. Ultimately both reports are based on an 
uncritical acceptance of the state's  own definition of the problem. 
State response to 'the problem' 
The response of the state to the law and order problem has been primarily opportunist: hastily 
conceived measures have been imposed in the face of crisis . 
Pressure on the government to act has come from both inside and outside the country. An image of 
Papua New Guinean towns as dangerous and lawless places has been cultivated in the Australian 
media, following extensive news coverage given to a number of assaults and rapes committed 
against expatriate residents. Domestic pressure has come from the parliamentary opposition, the 
local media, the business sector, churches, women' s  groups, educational institutions and from 
concerned residents, mainly in urban areas, demanding tougher government action. For example, in 
October 1984 there was a public demonstration of an estimated 25,000 people (or about one in five 
of the entire urban population) outside the Central Government Offices in Waigani, Port Moresby, 
calling for government action to restore order. 
Measures that have been taken in recent years include the enactment (and recent partial withdrawal) 
of the controversial minimum penalties legislation in May 1983, the establishment of a Law and 
Order Task Force in 1984 to oversee the implementation of forty-nine measures designed to 
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upgrade law and order agencies, and, most recently, the imposition of the state of emergency in the 
National Capital District that commenced on 17 June 1985. 
The incoherence and pragmatism of the state response is evident in the fate of these measures. The 
minimum penalty legislation, which was introduced into the national parliament and passed in the 
space of two hours, ran into immediate judicial opposition. The judiciary perceived the measures as 
a curtailment of their discretion. One senior judge referred to the new provisions as 'ill-conceived, 
ill-advised, ill-considered, inherently illogical and draconian' (in Lakea Sareaka v Simon Papi 
(Pratt, J., National Court, 15  December 1 983) ). The initial judicial response was to identify 
loopholes in existing legislative provisions that enabled the judges to by-pass the new provisions. 
Parliament responded by closing these loopholes thus leaving the judges with no choice but to 
impose the minimum penalties. The entire episode served to increase tension between the judicial 
and executive arms of the state and to emphasize major differences in their respective approaches to 
the wider law and order issue. The chief justice wrote: 
Although Parliament has exercised its power to make these laws, we think it is in the 
spirit of the Constitution and most of our laws relating to the criminal justice system, 
that independent tribunals be given a proper sentencing discretion in order to do 
proper justice. We appreciate the concern of the Parliament with problems relating 
to law and order. We are disappointed that the concern we have expressed in 
previous reports coupled with observations as to what is presently going wrong in the 
administration of criminal justice, has been ignored in favour of a very narrow 
legislative thrust at the problem (Papua New Guinea 1984b:para.10). 
At a more practical level, the minimum penalty policy served to further overcrowd the corrective 
institutions by preventing judges from imposing non-custodial sentences. Opposition to the 
measures has gradually spread beyond the judiciary and the government has responded by passing 
the Summary Offences (Amendment) Act of 1985 which abolished minimum penalties in respect of 
many less serious offences. 
The Law and Order Task Force has not fared much better. Since its inception it has been involved 
in bureaucratic conflict, most notably with the Youth Department over funding. Its long-awaited 
report recommending ways of implementing the forty-nine crime-control measures selected by the 
cabinet was s ubmitted to the prime minister's office on 17 June 1985, and has not been heard of 
publicly since. Recently the chairman of the Task Force, Mr. Pious Kerepia, suggested that the 
National Executive Council had decided to shelve the measures despite having been responsible for 
their original formulation (Niugini Nius, 19 September 1 985). 
The imposition of a state of emergency in extreme circumstances is provided for by Part X of the 
Constitution (SS.226-246) and has been used previously. In July 1979, the government declared a 
state of emergency in the highlands, in an attempt to suppress tribal fighting. The emergency 
provisions that were recently in force in the National Capital District enabled the government, 
amongst other things, to deploy the Defence Force in a policing role, to increase existing police 
powers, to prohibit demonstrations, and to impose a curfew. Although there are problems in 
quantifying the impact of the state of emergency there is an overall impression, shared by public 
and authorities alike, that there was a significant decrease in crime. 
'Law and Order' in the United Kingdom 
Concern with law and order in the United Kingdom is no more a creation of the 1980s than the 
concern expressed and experienced in Papua New Guinea today. Commentators on current events 
remind us that concern with street crime and social disorder has a long history. For instance, 
Geoffrey Pearson denies that street crime and hooliganism are the product of the permissive 
revolution of the 1960s. He finds: 
If this long, connected history of respectable fears tells us anything at all, then it is 
surely that street violence and disorder are a solidly entrenched feature of the social 
landscape (Pearson 1983: 242). 
Law and order resurfaced as a major focus of public concern and debate in the late 1970s and 
remains today a central paradigm in the understanding of Britain' s  economic decline. 
As in Papua: New Guinea the task of quantifying the problem is impossible with any degree of 
accuracy. Factors other than real changes in levels of crime affect the form of official statistics. As 
Pearson puts it: 
The growing size of the police force and its supporting apparatus is the most obvious 
and general factor. Changes in the routines of law enforcement, the increased 
inability of the police, changes in what the law counts as crime, fluctuations in the 
vigour with which the law is applied, and shifts in public attitudes and tolerance -
these must all be counted within the hidden dimensions of the manufac�ure of crime 
figures (ibid.:213). 
Even taking the official statistics at face value international comparison shows that the United 
Kingdom has a low crime-rate compared with other comparable developed nations (as, indeed, does 
Papua New Guinea when compared with similar developing nations). 
The fact remains, however, that public concern is high and that the state has responded to the 
perceived law and order crisis in an unequivocal manner. Before going on to discuss the 
presentation of the crisis and the nature of the state 's  response to it, I will attempt to say what I 
mean by 'law and order' .  
In the United Kingdom context there are two related ways i n  which law and order can be 
understood: one is an instrumental way, whilst the other is primarily ideological. First, there is 
criminal j ustice policy and the state's  agencies of law and order, notably, the police, the courts, 
prisons and other penal agencies. These agencies fall within Althusser's category of repressive 
state apparatuses: those agencies of the state that operate primarily through coercion rather than 
consent (Althusser 197 1). In the United Kingdom less obvious agencies such as immigration 
control, the social security administration, and the secret service can also be seen as repressive 
apparatuses. 
Second, there is the ideological character of the law and order debate. This entails an appeal for 
discipline in social and economic life. References to the legitimate authority of the state are 
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accompanied by warnings of the dire consequences, for the individual and nation alike, of ill­
discipline, flaunting of authority, and, more generally, permissiveness (the approach to pornography 
in Papua New Guinea in the context of the crackdown on law and order, is instructive in this 
respect). These appeals are addressed to social units and agencies in the non official sector - the 
family, educational institutions, churches, and the workplace. Such agencies fit into Althusser's 
category of ideological state apparatuses: those agencies that operate primarily through consent 
rather than coercion. The ideology of law and order attempts to legitimate coercive state action and 
is, according to Hall and others ( 1 978), how the state prepares for the 'routinization of control' .  
Whereas research into law and order in Papua New Guinea has tended t o  b e  characterised b y  a 
narrow empiricism, many observers of the United Kingdom' s  law and order crisis have attempted to 
develop a more theoretical understanding of the issues. A burgeoning literature attempts to locate 
the issue of law and order within the wider context of the economic crisis and the response of the 
British state. 
One of the most important theoretical contributions to date has been that of Hall and others (ibid.). 
They analyse the social construction of a moral panic around a particular form of street crime, 
mugging, in the early 1970s, and the manifestly disproportionate 'crime control' campaign that this 
generated. They see the problem of mugging against the wider background of political, economic 
and racial problems that have increasingly confronted the British state over the last fifteen years. 
Hall and his colleagues use Gramsci's concept of 'hegemony' in their analysis (Gramsci 197 1).  
This concept may be of use in understanding the wider background to the law and order 
phenomenon in Papua New Guinea. It acknowledges the ideological dimension of law and order, 
whilst recognizing the centrality of the state in the processes of definition and response. 
'Hegemony' is used by Gramsci to describe the processes whereby a ruling class or alliance attains 
and maintains a consensual authority in a given society. Hegemony is established and maintained 
through a range of mechanisms for the production of consent. Hegemonic domination disguises the 
partisan nature of social and political authority. There are, however, periods in history when 
profound economic and political contradictions result in a crisis of hegemony. In such a crisis, 
existing social and political authority is divested of its neutral and consensual disguise. Such a 
crisis induces drastic modifications in the modes of hegemony of the dominant group or alliance 
whose class nature has been exposed and challenged. 
If the state does not collapse, a crisis of hegemony is likely to lead to a shift away from rule through 
consensus towards rule through coercion: 
In such moments the 'relative autonomy' of the state is no longer enough to secure 
the measures necessary for social cohesion or for the larger economic tasks which a 
failing and weakened capital requires. The forms of state intervention thus become 
more overt and more direct . . .  The masks of liberal consent and popular consensus 
slip to reveal the reserves of coercion and force on which the cohesion of the state 
and its legal authority finally depends (Hall et al. 1978:217) 
Hall and his colleagues try to locate the mugging phenomenon squarely within the historically 
developing crisis of hegemony facing the British state. The response to crime, they argue, is and 
continues to be one of the forms in which this critical crisis of hegemony manifests itself. 
Conclusions 
How far do the analyses and recommendations of the Morgan and INA/IASER reports resemble 
official explanations of crime in the United Kingdom? I shall consider a number of themes common 
to the debate on law and order in both countries : youth; development; the state and the community; 
and politics, legitimacy and hegemony. 
In both countries young males, whether as 'muggers' or 'rascals ' ,  are identified as the main 
criminal actors. Positivist criminology explains juvenile delinquency in a number of ways : sub­
cultural theory; anomie theory; urbanization; unrealistic expectations as a consequence of 
inappropriate education; individual maladjustment; and so on. Clinard and Abbot provide a standard 
example of such a formulation in the context of their examination of crime in East Africa: 
Increased crime in less developed countries can be expected primarily because in 
these countries young people predominate, the growing cities attract the young, and 
it is the young who are most noticeably affected by the way of life in the city and 
who are drawn more easily into criminal activity (Clinard and Abbott 1973: 10 1).  
The crime-control remedies proposed following such a diagnosis are similar in both metropolitan 
and non-metropolitan contexts. 'Hard' remedies include, 'the short, sharp, shock' , the use· of 
corporal punishment in schools, and flogging for juvenile offenders. 'Soft' remedies concentrate 
more upon incorporating youth and include national service, vocational education and training, non­
custodial sentences, and employment generation schemes. 
In both contexts the focus upon youth may divert attention away from the less visible and structural 
aspects of crime: for example, the extent of white collar crime and corruption in the higher echelons 
of the power structure, and police crime. 
Crime, in both metropolitan and non-metropolitan contexts, is officially understood in 
developmental terms. Whereas in the United Kingdom crime is discussed against the wider 
b ackground of economic decline and the country' s  diminished stature as a world power, in Papua 
New Guinea it is related to questions of economic growth and, currently, questions about the 
priority of economic growth over redistribution. 
In both contexts unemployment, whether presented as structural or voluntary, is related causally to 
crime, although the emphasis differs between commentaries. Thus, in Papua New Guinea, the 
Morgan Report identifies structural unemployment as a major cause of crime, whilst the 
INA/IASER Report stresses the contribution of voluntary unemployment caused by inappropriate 
education. In the United Kingdom a major strand in the Thatcher government' s education policy 
has been to make education more 'relevant' in the context of de-industralisation. In addition, a 
wide range of job creation schemes has been devised to incorporate unemployed youth. 
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Both countries are part of the same international economic system and appear committed to a 
deregulation of the economy. An interesting paradox in both contexts is that, while seeking to 
reduce s tate expenditure, increasing amounts of money are being allocated to youth programmes 
and the maintenance and expansion of law and order agencies. 
The relationship between the state and the community is important in the law and order debate in 
both countries . There is an attempt to devolve a greater role in crime-control to community-level 
structures, away from formal state mechanisms. The emphasis is placed upon community policing 
and, more generally, upon community development/involvement projects. This approach is 
characterized in t.'1e INNIASER Report as the 'non-state option' .  Whereas in Papua New Guinea 
the community approach tends to be couched in terms of the breakdown of traditional social values, 
in the United Kingdom the favoured analysis revolves around the breakdown of the working class 
community or neighbourhood and, more generally, the breakdown of the family. 
Both the Morgan and INNIASER reports acknowledge that 'the law and order problem of the 
country is a reflection of its political malaise' (Clifford et al. 1984:I/102). In both Papua New 
Guinea and the United Kingdom law and order campaigns have been associated with political crisis: 
the demise of the Labour government and election of Margaret Thatcher' s Conservative 
government in 1979; the crisis in the Pangu coalition in mid- 1985.  
The concern expressed in both reports with the wider politics of law and order is an important 
departure from the assumptions of positivist criminology that inform much of the analyses in both 
documents. In so far as the INNIASER Report deals with the legitimacy of the state, however, it 
does so in a strikingly moralistic way, seeking remedies in greater personal integrity and 
accountability: 
The inability of so many political leaders to give an example of integrity and 
dedication, the corruption in high places, the questionable manipulation of 'slush' 
funds and the quite remarkable complacency which persists in the face of a break­
down of governmental accountability - all contribute directly to the country' s  blatant 
insecurity. It is possible to discuss law and order problems as if they were due to a 
contempt for authority or a reflection of weakness and incompetence in government. 
Yet both of these flow from the crumbling of integrity in the structure of the state 
itself (ibid.:I/102-3 ) . 
In the absence of any sustained analysis of the nature of this state and its international context, the 
problem is ultimately identified in local and personal failures and weaknesses. 
A fundamental question raised by these similarities between the analysis of crime in the United 
Kingdom and Papua New Guinea is: how far can the remedies flowing from such conceptualization 
be expected to work in the Papua New Guinea context when they have not met with much success 
in the United Kingdom? Another question is about the extent to which these law and order 
perspectives serve to divert attention from the particular characteristics of crime and crime-control 
in post-colonial Papua New Guinea and, thereby, reinforce the emergence of a new political and 
economic order. This second question was forcefully made by Boehringer and Giles in their critical 
review of positivist criminologists in the developing world: 
Perspectives on Law and Order 89 
Their unwillingness to investigate the relationship between political economy and 
law makes them incapable of understanding the nature of crime under neo­
colonialism and thus legitimates the political-economic status quo (Boehringer and 
Giles 1977:61) .  




This paper looks at industrial law and order in Papua New Guinea. Its starting point is the 
observation, based on Department of Labour statistics, that Papua New Guinea has a generally 
'good' record of industrial conflict. In other words, Papua New Guinea experiences relatively few 
and generally short strikes. Furthermore most of these overt manifestations of industrial conflict are 
resolved within the framework of the industrial relations system. There seems to be a trend away 
from use of the system's elements of compulsion and towards acceptance of voluntary conciliation 
in the settlement of disputes. 
In general such a 'good' conflict profile and this trend towards a more cooperative form of dispute 
resolution indicate that the New Guinea industrial relations system is to limit and 
settle strikes. There are, of course, many factors which contribute to this situation. In this paper, 
however, I want to focus narrowly on the contribution of the institutional arrangements of the 
industrial relations system. In particular I suggest that this relatively successful form of dispute 
settlement owes much to compromise between the agencies of the state and the of 
workers. The Department of Labour has been successful as a of industrial conflict 
because it has been seen workers to act in a fair and reasonable manner. There is considerable 
trust between those whose rise to industrial conflict and the state agency 
responsible for der1ing with such conflict. There may well be lessons in this situation which other 
state agencies can take to heart. 
Industrial law and order issues are not a new concern of government in Papua New Guinea. Labour 
regulation was a principle focus of the colonial administration from its early days. As in most 
colonial environments, government and investors needed local labour. In New Guinea, 
because of the success of subsistence economies, such labour was not readily available. It had to be 
coerced or coaxed from subsistence production without destroying the associated kinship structures, 
which were preserved to meet many of the costs of producing and reproducing labour. In order to 
achieve this the Australian colonial administration developed a plethora of labour regulations. This 
has been well documented by others (Fitzpatrick 1980; Jackson 1924), and elsewhere I have 
described the long-term aims of the colonial government in seeking to create a local labour force in 
the cash economy (Hess 1983). 
The problem with such a labour force, of course, is that it must be controlled. As long as labour in 
Papua New Guinea meant indentured, and hence unfree, plantation or mine employees the excessive 
detail of colonial labour regulation generally performed this control function, although at 
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considerable administrative cost. Even in the late 1960s, Douglas Parish has suggested that 'kiaps 
and District Officers spent more time on labour regulation than on all their other work' 1. 
Nevertheless the enormous effort put into labour administration was not entirely successful in 
creating and controlling this indentured workforce. Individual withdrawal of labour, unwillingness 
to renew contracts, and the many management complaints of 'malingering' are all pointers to its 
failure (see Rowley 1968). 
In this paper I want to consider more recent attempts to control free urban labour. Given the 
difficulties experienced historically with unfree labour in Papua New Guinea, it might be expected 
that the more independent workforce of today's towns would prove impossible to control. In fact 
this has not been the case and the country's record of industrial disputes is  not a Strikes 
tend to involve few workers, are short in duration, and are solved within the framework of the 
industrial relations system. This success in dealing with industrial disputes might be taken as an 
indication that the independent state is not necessarily doomed to failure in its more general 
attempts to ensure law and order. Working with the limited data available, I attempt to suggest the 
parameters of this success as well as the reasons for it. 
Historical background 
Some historical background is necessary on Papua New Guinea's industrial relations system (see 
Daly 1983 for a detailed acc9unt). In the early 1960s the Australian Minister for Territories, Paul 
Hasluck, imposed on a generally unwilling Territory administration legislation which remains the 
basis of Papua New Guinea's industrial relations system today. This legislation largely copied 
Australian provisions and established a system of compulsory conciliation and arbitration. Such a 
system involves a degree of democratic participation on the part of the workforce and in particular 
legitimizes trade unions . For these reasons it was bitterly opposed by Territory business interests 
and was not generally favoured by the colonial administration. Both of these interest groups 
expressed their concern specifically in terms of control, claiming that 'unions for natives' would 
undermine colonial authority. Elsewhere I have described Hasluck's response: that unions legalized 
within the context of a compulsory conciliation and arbitration system were preferable to unions 
organized outside the framework of state control (Hess 1982a:50-61). 
The fact that it was imposed from above undoubtedly posed severe difficulties for the system. In 
1963, when the legislation came into effect, there were no unions of Papua New Guinean workers 
capable of fulfilling the representative function allotted to them in the system. The result was that 
the Department of Labour took on itself many of these representative functions, either directly or 
through its efforts to create the necessary unions. Both of these actions represented a compromise 
with Papua New Guinea's emerging working class. On the one hand, government officers worked 
hard to establish the 'right sort' of unions (see, for example, Hess 1982b on Milne Bay). On the 
other hand, government- appointed arbitrators, who were also usually public servants, were 
sympathetic to union pressure for long overdue improvements in wages and conditions. For 
instance, Tom Bellew, who was seconded from the Australian Stevedoring Industry Authority, 
1 Fonner District Officer and one-time Secretary of the Territory of Papua New Guinea Department of Labour, interview, 10 
March 1983. 
. 
acted as arbitrator in a number of important waterfront disputes in the mid 1 970s. He recalls having 
been 'appalled' at the conditions of work which he said ' weren' t  fit for human beings' (interview, 
15 June 1 985). 
While unions in Papua New Guinea have remained overall extremely weak, the fact that they are 
protected by legislation and are aided by elements within the bureaucracy goes a long way to 
explain the low level of industrial discord. This has meant that the unions are secure, their 
existence is not at issue in industrial conflict. Where unions are strong enough to play a genuinely 
independent role, the lack of discord is even more remarkable. For instance, workers in the 
strongest union, the Waterside Workers and Seamen' s  Union, are involved in fewer strikes than 
those in the non-unionized plantation industries. 
Evidence on industrial conflict 
In describing industrial conflict, I consider the period 1978 to 198 1 ,  since 198 1 is the last year for 
which employment statistics are currently available in a consolidated form. The statistics I present 
have a number of limitations. First, the figures are those provided by the Department of Labour and 
Industry. This means that the categories are those used by the while the 
measure I have u3ed of industrial conflict is limited to strikes reported to the Department. Figures 
for other manifestations of conflict, such as days taken as sick leave, lateness, industrial accidents 
and low productivity, are not available. Furthermore there are undoubtedly some strikes which are 
not reported. Nevertheless I believe the available do provide a sufficient basis for 
identifying general trends in industrial disputation over the period. 
A second limitation is that the included in these are workers in the sector 
and state instrumentalities . are those whose industrial grievances are dealt with under the 
general provisions of the arbitration and conciliation system. Permanent public servants directly 
employed by government departments, police and teachers are not included. have their own 
tribunals and are prohibited from strike action. The statistics then look at the strike record of those 
workers who, in Papua New Guinea, are most likely to be involved in industrial disputes . 
Table 9 . 1  shows how few workdays are lost in strikes in Papua New Guinea. In 1 97 8  strikes cost 
the industries more than one day for each ten workers Only in the 
was the rate significantly than the average, with the relevant 
half a day for each As annual figures go these are extremely low. Australia' s average 
annual rates for lost per employee in the decade 1972-82 were: mining 8; mamutacturing 
2.5; and building 1 .5 (Deery and Plowman 1985:45). 
These figures are all the more remarkable because of the method by which strikes are recorded in 
Papua New Guinea. In many countries strikes have to lead to a given loss of work days before they 
are entered in official s tatistics. In Australia, for instance, a strike must result in the loss of ten 
workdays before it is included. The Papua New Guinea figures include every strike, no matter how 
minor. In the case of the 'others' category in Table 9. 1 the Department recorded one strike of 
twenty workers which resulted in no loss of working days. 
Table 9.1  
Workdays lost, 1978 
I ndu s t ry group 
P rima ry p roduction 
Mining and quarrying 
Manu f a c t uring 
Ut i l it i e s  
Building 
Comme rce 
T ransport and communicat ion 
Finance 
C ommunity s e rvices 
Other s  
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Mean workdays 
lost p e r  emp l o yee 
0 . 12 2  
0 . 0 0 3  
0 . 0 5 8  
0 . 0 2 2  
0 . 0 0 4  
0 . 0 0 4  
0 . 1 1 0  
0 . 0 0 0  
0 . 0 9 1 
0 . 0 0 0  
All workers in the se indust ries 0 . 1 0 7  
Source: Department of Labour and Industry 1980. 
Not only were very few workers involved in strikes but those who did go on strike lost relatively 
little work time. Table 9.2 shows that in the same industry groups the mean number of days lost per 
strike in each year was less than two. The average, inflated by a number of particularly long strikes, 
was slightly over three. 
A final set of figures in Table 9 .3 reveals how disputes were resolved. Over the four years several 
trends can be identified in the means by which the disputes were settled. The percentage of disputes 
settled by direct negotiation fell from 33 in 1978 to only 12 in 198 1 .  Compulsory arbitration and 
conciliation decreased even more, from 38 in 1978 to 7 per cent in 198 1 .  The compensatory 
increase was in the number of disputes settled by voluntary conciliation which rose from a mere 3 
to 57 per cent. The number of disputes which remained unresolved at the end of each year also fell 
sharply. 
· 
In summary these statistics should offer considerable comfort to Papua New Guinea's labour 
administration. The overall picture which emerges is that Papua New Guinea has relatively few 
strikes, that those strikes tend to be short and to occur in predictable areas, and that strikes are 
increasingly resolved by voluntary conciliation. I imagine that the Department of Labour would 
justifiably claim some credit for these figures and might also claim that the figures show how Papua 
New Guinea's industrial relations system has matured. A hidden factor in the data is the success of 
the Minimum Wages Board in its role as the central wage fixing tribunal. Under the competent 
chairmanship of A.K. Joel, this tribunal has provided basic wage increases and has had the effect of 
removing a potentially major source of industrial conflict from the workplace. 
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Table 9.2 
Workdays lost per striker, 1978-1981  
Indu s t ry group Workdays l o s t  per s t riker 
1 9 7 8  
P rimary p roduct ion 2 .  7 1  
Mining and qua r rying 0 . 8 0 
Manufacturing 2 . 5 5 
Ut i l i t i e s  1 . 5 0 
Building 7 . 8 8  
Commerce 3 . 5 2 
T ransport and c ommunicat ion 3 . 5 2 
F inance a 
Community s e rvices 1 . 3 2 
Other s  b 
T o t a l  3 . 2 3 
1 9 7 9  1 9 8 0  1 9 8 1  
4 . 4 9 3 . 1 0 2 . 2 3  
a 2 . 0 0  3 . 1 9 
2 . 1 4  0 . 7 4 5 . 2 2  
a 1 .  0 0  0 . 7 5  
2 . 6 1 3 . 7 4  2 . 6 6 
2 . 4 7 1 . 3 4 1 .  4 4  
2 . 4 7 1 . 3 4  4 .  7 2  
a 1 . 6 1 3 . 5 3 
3 . 4 3 1 .  0 8  a 
0 . 7 3 1 .  0 0  1 .  7 8  
3 . 9 0 1 .  8 9  3 . 4 5 
Sources: Department of Labour and Industry 1980, 1983. 
Notes: a No strikes. b No loss of workdays. 
Table 9.3 
Method of settlement of industrial disputes, 1978-1981 
Settlement 
met hod 
1 9 7 8  
No . % 
1 9 7 9  
No . % 
1 9 8 0  
No . % 
1 9 8 1  
No . % 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Direct 
negotiat ion 2 1  3 3  3 1  4 0  1 5  2 8  7 1 2  
Volunt a ry 
con c i l iat ion 2 3 4 4 1 1  2 1  3 3  5 7  
Compul s o ry 
a rbit rat ion & 
conciliat ion 2 4  3 8  3 3  3 7  1 7  3 2  4 7 
No negot iat ion 
or negot iat i on 
not known 7 1 1  1 4  1 6  1 0  1 9  1 4  2 4  
No sett lement 9 1 4  2 2 0 0 0 0 
Tot a l  6 3  9 9  8 4  9 9  5 3  1 0 0  5 8  1 0 0  
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Sources: Department of Labour and Industry 1980, 1983. 
An additional point which should not be overlooked is that the system works because it 1s seen to be 
fair by the participants and particularly by workers. The trend from direct negotiation and 
compulsory arbitration towards voluntary conciliation shows how pivotal and fragile the 
Department' s role has been. In the limited period covered by the figures I have used, management 
and labour showed increasing dissatisfaction with both direct negotiation and arbitration. Rather 
than being content to reach resolution of disputes themselves or rely on official judgements they 
increasingly opted for conciliation. In this process Department of Labour officials have played the 
crucial role of bringing the parties together and helping them reach a mutually acceptable solution. 
If figures for the years since 1981 indicated that the preference for conciliation had continued, some 
interesting conclusions would suggest themselves. The principle one, and the one is most 
likely to provide lessons for areas in which dispute settlement has been less successful, is that 
conciliation by a respected and authoritative state agency may be a practical way to settle disputes.  
While my understanding of dispute settlement procedures in Papua New Guinea' s rural 
communities is limited, I suspect that these procedures may have played a part in the trends in 
industrial diSpute settlement. It may be that the success of conciliation in industry reflects workers' 
familiarity with this approach, workers who still have substantial links with rural communities and 
many of whose attitudes are informed by factors in the rural mode of production. 
Overview 
This paper has not attempted to address all the issues in industrial conflict in Papua New Guinea. 
What it has sought to do is focus attention on particular aspects of that conflict. It has shown that 
workers in those industry groups in which conflict is most likely to occur are involved in relatively 
few and short strikes. It has also pointed to a trend towards resolving strikes by a process of 
voluntary conciliation, a process in which the Department of Labour is accepted as a legitimate 
mediating agency. Underlying this state intervention in dispute settlement is a history of 
compromise between one particular state agency and an emerging working class. 
By providing organizational security for unions and legal protection for their officials to engage in 
collective negotiation, colonial industrial relations legislation laid the basis for bringing the 
country' s  previously unrepresented workers into a system of industrial decision making.  The 
results of this have been mixed. At the very least, however, it has provided an avenue for the 
articulation and resolution of grievances. The trend towards more conciliation is a reflection of how 
Papua New Guineans are altering this basically Australian-style system to suit themselves. It also 
shows the extent to which the Department of Labour has been able to establish its authority through 
being seen to act in a fair and reasonable manner. The vital elements in this relatively successful 
approach to industrial conflict have been the representative function of unions, the sympathetic 
approach of the Department of Labour to unions and to workers' grievances, and the consequent 
willingness of workers to channel their grievances through the Department and the established 
industrial relations system. 




No one living in Papua New Guinea in 1985 would deny that the country has a law and order 
problem, although there would be varying opinions as to how bad the problem really is. The media 
have made a negative contribution by giving prominence to dramatic headlines and sensational 
stories, almost making heroes of the criminals.  They do not balance their reporting with stories of 
positive developments and signs of hope. This paper is designed to show that the problem, as seen 
from the Eastern Highlands Province, is not beyond repair. Indeed, there may be simple, 
inexpensive solutions. 
The philosophy in this paper overlaps in many ways with the community-based recommendations 
of the INA/IASER Report (Clifford et al. 1984). But in areas of community development the work 
of the Eastern Highlands Provincial Research Committee (EHPRC) goes beyond the report. 
The paper has four sections: a description of the EHPRC; a case study from the Unggai area of the 
province; a discussion of the possibilities of a probation service for Papua New Guinea following a 
pilot project and its success in Goroka; and a review of the work of the EHPRC, and the message its 
work may have for other parts of Papua New Guinea. 
The Eastern Highlands Provincial Rehabilitation Committee 
The EHPRC was formed in 198 1 as the result of pressure applied by various gangs on the town of 
Goroka. Goroka, the administrative headquarters for the Eastern Highlands Province, bad felt the 
consequences of the growing law and order problems. The town had responded defensively, as had 
other urban centres around the country. High fences had been erected around many residences in 
the town, savage dogs were kept near premises floodlit by powerful lights, and a new business had 
developed in the form of security services. Signs such as 'Lukaut dog i save kaikai man' (Look out, 
the dog bites people) and 'Sori no gat wok' (no job vacancies) had sprung up everywhere. 
As elsewhere in the country, the bulk of the population of the Eastern Highlands Province, 
approximately 260,000 people, is rural, while the town of 18,000 hosts a comparatively wealthy 
group of national and expatriate workers and entrepreneurs who enjoy the envied lifestyle which a 
thriving centre of this kind provides. Stretching away from the town boundaries into the rural areas 
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and reaching the remotest pockets of the province are large numbers of young people, men in 
particular, who are unemployed and underemployed, without the means of acquiring money to 
afford what the town offers. It is among this group, alienated in part by reason of their education 
from their own culture and traaitions, yet not absorbed into the western-style cash economy, that 
frustration and discontent abound. 
Prior to 198 1, gang forays into the town leading to offences against life and property were a 
common occurrence. In February 198 1 contact was made with one of these gangs and within a 
space of six months, six gangs came out of hiding to seek assistance. In September of that year the 
pressure by the gangs was so great that the EHPRC was formed with seventeen inaugural members. 
To give these young people something to do, and to keep them out of further trouble, contract work, 
permanent jobs, or economic projects had to be found. B efore long it was evident that it was 
dangerous to assist only those who had been in conflict with the law. That approach was saying to 
the law-abiding youth: the way to get help is to become a 'rascal' , surrender, and then help will 
come. Within three months the EHPRC decided that its as.>istance would be directed to all school­
leavers without a job. Those who were not 'rascals' today were potentially trouble-makers 
tomorrow in any case, and joining a gang must not appear to youth to be a 'rite of passage' ,  as many 
seem to think. Too many school-leavers 'graduate' into a rascal gang, filling the vacuum left by the 
decrease in tribal fighting and the discontinuation of prolonged initiation ceremonies - pursuits 
which traditionally occupied the young men of the warrior class. 
A document, 'Operation Rehabilitation' ,  was drawn up stating that the EHPRC was a community 
response to the problem of law and order, particularly as it affected youthful off enders who were 
not old enough to be considered mature criminals, but who were too old to come under the 
jurisdiction of the children' s  court. There were two purposes in mind in assisting these people: to 
help them rehabilitate themselves, and to assess the problem which predisposed them to get into 
trouble and to offer advice and assistance to overcome it. 
To help young people rehabilitate themselves, the EHPRC provides j uvenile delinquents with the 
opportunity to surrender with dignity and without fear of reprisal, and to answer any charges which 
might be preferred against them. It also advises them how and where to obtain legal assistance and 
representation. Where free legal aid is not available, being a service reserved for the more serious 
crimes, and where young people cannot afford the services of a private lawyer, members of the 
EHPRC are willing to act as guarantors for their future behaviour if the courts allow them reduced 
sentences pursuant upon their entering into bonds of good behaviour or being placed on probation. 
The second purpose was, and still is, more difficult to achieve. Invariably the problem which 
predisposes young people to get into trouble is rationalized or expressed as an economic one. The 
reality is that economic deprivation is only part of the problem, but it is the easiest to articulate: it 
is easier to blame the economic situation than to search for more abstract, underlying causes. The 
EHPRC felt that what young people needed, rather than handouts, was encouragement to tap their 
own potential, to become creative with their own resources, and to develop a sense of responsibility, 
pride and dignity in themselves. 
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The EHPRC recognized that young people had an uphill battle to break out of their stagnating 
situation. The town community was pushing them out through lack of job opportunities, and their 
rural communities were doing the same for a variety of reasons, one being that parents had no 
substitute of offer for the obsolete traditional roles. Banks and lending societies see young people 
as a poor investment risk, having no assets such as vehicles or coffee gardens which can be 
repossessed upon default of repayment of loans. Young people are a 'trapped' segment of society 
with few (if any) doors opening for them before marriage. 
Having no model on which to build, the EHPRC has developed its own philosophy and methods 
through trial and error. It recognized from the outset that in traditional Melanesian society, wealth 
was more equally and evenly distributed than it is today, and that the seeds of discontent have taken 
root as society has become divided between the urban elite and the peri-urban and rural people. 
Rural school-leavers, having been educated to the same expectations as their urban neighbours, are 
often unable to participate in the opportunities that economic development should provide. 
However, it did not take the EHPRC long to realize that while economic problems were paramount, 
more income was not a panacea. When money was injected into a community, it brought new 
problems with it 
The EHPRC s aw the wisdom in what at times can appear to be no more than an idle catch-cry, 
integrated human development: the need for economic, social, political and spiritual development 
to go hand-in-hand. The term 'drop-out', for instance, was rejected: school-leavers have neither 
'dropped', nor should they feel 'out'. Here was the root of one of the problems: young people 
needed to be 'in' ,  to be included in the:. communities, to feel that they belonged and had a 
contribution to make. A sense of belongir g was an important factor facilitating the exercise of 
social control. 
The EHPRC accepted the government's assertion that crime prevention is a community 
responsibility, holding the opinion that the answer to the problem did not rest entirely with 
increased police vigilance and harsher court penalties. Part of the answer lay with the communities' 
own ability to redirect their young people away from viewing crime as a legitimate means of 
obtaining a share in the prosperity to which they have otherwise been unable to gain access. But if 
the constant call for community involvement was valid, it did not mean simply the urban 
community buying off the rural offender� ' , .  urban or peri-urban settlement gangs) with kindly 
gestures; rural communities must also shoulder their responsibilities. But they needed help, and 
they needed information and re-education away from an attitude of dependency. This meant that 
communities had to have a political awareness of the likely consequences of the law and order 
problem getting completely out-of-hand (��e ..;Ufford et al. 1984:I/ 130). 
When making contact with groups, the EHPRC ensured that the whole community from which the 
young people come (particularly its leadership) was involved. Rural leaders without criminal 
records were asked to join the EHPRC and sustain the work in the rural areas. To this end, we 
aimed to work as informally and with as low a profile as possible, so there was a minimum of 
difficulty in assimilating rural people as active members in the work. The EHPRC did not wish to 
become part of the bureaucracy, although we accepted some funding from provincial and national 
government. We were keen to preserve our image of community involvement at the most local 
level. We did not wish to appear like another government department, dispensing a service, but 
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rather as a bridge between the community in crisis and representatives of government. B eing a 
voluntary organization provided a position of strength from which to motivate communities to 
respond to the situation, and the ability to view the problem not as a youth problem but as a 
community one. 
The Unggai surrender: a case study 
On 15 March 1982 a large number of young people from the Unggai area of the Eastern Highlands 
Province marched through Goroka town carrying placards asking for forgiveness, and finally 
surrendering themselves at the police station. They handed a stolen shotgun and nrn1se-or1eaKmg 
equipment to the police. Prior to the surrender a week's work had gone on behind the scenes with a 
district services officer (kiap) and several members of the EHPRC. Between eighty and one 
hundred young people surrendered, but charges were preferred against only eight of them. 
The build-up to the surrender began with a number of attacks on Goroka High School which 
resulted in an emergency meeting of the board of governors to discuss the problem. The Unggai 
people feared that government services might be cut off in their area, and police might raid their 
villages in reprisal, if law and order were not restored to the town. This fear became the catalyst to 
the surrender. Regrettably, people only seem to become creative under pressure. 
It is difficult to know if the work of the EHPRC had also had some impact on the Unggai people. 
For six months prior to the surrender, the EHPRC had been putting out a message that the 
community must own its own crime. People had been warned through newsletters and radio 
broadcasts that it was useless to close their eyes and ears to what was happening about them. It was 
explained that communities who enjoy the spoils of robberies are accessories to the crime and 
receivers of stolen goods, for which actions there are also criminal charges. Appeals had been made 
to responsible members of the community to bring pressure to bear upon their young offenders. 
Following the meeting of the board of governors, Unggai leaders made contact with the EHPRC 
through an officer of the Department of Provincial Affairs. The EHPRC agreed to offer its services 
as intermediary between the Unggai people and government authorities. By the end of the week, 
provincial government authorities, including the officer-in-charge of the Criminal Investigation 
Division (CID), had agreed to meet with Unggai people on Unggai land. 
An information sheet had been prepared by the Unggai people and was handed to the police. It 
listed the various gangs coming from the Unggai area and identified the gang members and the 
villages from which they came. It was clear from the sheet that the Unggais' intentions were to plea 
bargain with the police. In return for identifying themselves, returning the stolen gun and turning 
police informers on other gangs, they anticipated that they would be pardoned and found 
employment in town. Typically they suggested security services, which allow the old gang 
mentality to continue to operate on the 'right' side of the law rather than the ' wrong ' .  Most rascals 
consider themselves special people and expect to be rewarded with special work in return for their 
good behaviour. 
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The officer-in-charge of the CID read out a list of names of wanted people from the Unggai. 
Fifteen people stepped forward from a list of approximately sixty. The leaders explained that the 
Unggai is a large area extending into the Chimbu Province, crossing political boundaries, and that 
they only had influence over one quarter of the t6tal language group - the people who lived on top 
of the mountains overlooking Goroka valley, and in the eastern foothills. This accounted for the 
proportion of young people answering their names to the police list. 
The stolen shotgun from the raid on the abattoir, bolt cutters and house-breaking equipment were 
handed to the police. In typical Melanesian style, the law-abiding representatives applauded the 
criminals with a hand-clap. 
The young people wanted to march to town immediately while the euphoria lasted, but the 
authorities suggested that it would be better to wait until Monday morning when a government 
truck could be sent out to the Unggai to collect 'volunteers for prison' .  The sensitive handling of 
the situation by police and government authorities was commendable. 
The following Monday morning a truck drove around the Unggai and brought the youth and their 
leaders to town. During the afternoon they marched through Goroka in an almost carnival-like 
atmosphere, carrying placards asking to be forgiven and voluntarily surrendering themselves into 
the hands of the police. 
Tension, however, built up at the police station. The 'wanted' list was read again and 
approximately twenty-five people answered to their names. The police asked the others, whose 
names were not on the list, if they wanted to own up to the break-and-enter offences committed 
against Collins and Leahy, Sullivans, the high school or the abattoir. Group solidarity being very 
strong, the whole 'mob' surged forward. The police were dismayed and said they did not want all 
the supporters, only those who actually broke into and entered these premises. 
The situation became confusing as no one wanted to appear inconsequential in the robberies, and 
the police were starting to feel hassled and pressured When a young police informer from the 
Unggai appeared on the back verandah of the police station, placards were dropped, the mob again 
surged forward and momentarily it seemed as if the young man would be lynched! Police and 
Unggai leaders anxiously restored order before the surrender collapsed. 
Twenty-eight people were detained for questioning that night, but by the next morning, fourteen had 
been released. Presumably with much of the evidence being their own confessions, the police did 
not think their charges would hold in court and it was not worth the time and effort of the paper 
work to have the cases dismissed by the court. 
The reaction of the group was one of disappointment: they had all wanted to go to gaol together. 
Because of this situation, many of the parents and elders were ill at ease. The parents of youths not 
arrested felt embarrassed about the situation, and parents of those arrested felt bitter that their 
children had been singled out and used as scapegoats for the others. In retrospect it would have 
been better to have charged all of them, remanded them in custody until the National Court sitting, 
and had the cases dismissed a month later. In this way, everyone would have had a taste of prison. 
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Of the fourteen arrested youths, one came before the Children's Court the same week and the 
EHPRC was unable to assist him as the Children' s  Court is a closed court. Another had only one 
charge to answer which could be heard in a lower court. The EHPRC spoke on his behalf in court 
and his sentence was reduced to a quarter of what could have been expected. Charges were dropped 
against three other lads, and by the time the committals came before the lower court there were nine 
young men left. Members of the EHPRC visited these people in Bihute Corrective Institution and 
conducted interviews to assist the lawyer defending the case. Typical of the interviews is the story 
of Mr Imo, the gang leader: 
I am nineteen years of age and the fourth child of a family of six. I went to the 
Faniufa Community School until standard 2 when I was taken away because my 
parents could not afford the school fees. I was nine years old when I left school and 
my parents and I were disappointed that I could not continue. 
My village is in the foothills of the Unggai and my father grows coffee. The coffee 
has not been very good as it seems to be too dry. My father earns about K30 per 
year from the coffee. 
The two eldest children in the family did not go to school at all. They are now both 
married. The third child, a son, went to high school and now has a job in Lae. When 
he was accepted into high school, my father removed my sister and me from 
community school because he could not afford three sets of fees. He told me that as 
my brother had passed the hurdle of the grade 6 exam and had a place in high school, 
he would back the winning horse, but my brother would compensate m1 .;ister and 
me when he got a job in town. 
I was so angry at being taken away from school I ran away to my uncle in another 
part of the Unggai. I stayed there doing nothing in particular for many years. I did 
not have access to ground to commence a coffee garden of my own, but I helped my 
relatives in their garden from time to time. 
I got a job for six months at Linupa Motors and was very satisfied with the 
fortnightly wage of K75, but Linupa Motors ran into financial difficulties and I was 
laid off. 
I found a second job selling eggs for K22 a fortnight, but this only lasted for two 
months when I was laid off again. Neither time was I sacked for misconduct. 
Meanwhile my brother got a job in Lae, but in two years he made no effort to 
compensate me for my loss of education. I was so frustrated at the bad luck I was 
having, I formed a gang and broke into the Kamaliki abbatoir. I later stole a car 
parked close to a house and I was arrested for this offence, but at the time the police 
were not aware that I had also broken into the abbatoir. This was my first time in 
prison and in October 1981 I escaped before completing my time. 
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The same themes - a smattering of education, withdrawal from school because of school fees, the 
general economic recession making employment elusive, and relative poverty at home - pervaded 
the other interviews. 
Between the March surrender and the National Court sitting in April, the EHPRC was able to obtain 
short-term contract work for sixty of the remaining seventy-seven youths who had indicated they 
wanted work. Money from the contracts enabled many of them to buy some seed potatoes. The 
EHPRC held a training course for them on growing English potatoes, and potatoes became the most 
successful of all Unggai projects. 
In April 1982 several members of the EHPRC attended the National Court sitting over three days to 
hear the cases against the eight Unggai youths. The EHPRC told the court about the work of the 
EHPRC, the voluntary surrender of the young people, and its concern that the eight youths in court 
did not become scapegoats for the dozens of Unggai youths who were not arrested and charged. 
The EHPRC recommended that the people be sentenced to jail, but that the bulk of the sentence be 
suspended with the EHPRC being a guarantor for their good behaviour. 
The court in its wisdom passed sentences of three years of which eight months were to be served in 
gaol and the remainder was suspended. The suspended sentence expired on 19 April 1985. During 
the three years, seven of the eight responded to rehabilitation. The eighth, who appears to be 
unbalanced with no psychiatric assistance available for him, has been rearrested for being in 
possession of a pair of police handcuffs. 
In assessing the problems which predispose young people to get into trouble with the law, the 
EHPRC found that quite often the problems were as much with the parents as with the children. 
Many parents did not seem to understand that their young people could not find work in 
town. The parents' expectations had been that if they sent children to school, the children would 
send money back to the village when they found a job, a certain security for the parents in 
their old age. The young people claimed that their parents 'punished' them for not finding work 
withholding access to land. The parents explained it differently by saying 'It is not traditional to 
give land to people before they are married' . 
Most young people claimed that they were humiliated in front of the community by their parents 
when they returned home, and in some instances even beaten. The EHPRC realized that 
communities need help to understand the school-leaver problem, to realize that it is a world-wide 
problem, and to b e  persuaded to be more flexible with their customs and tradition. If custom can 
adjust to the introduction of beer, it can surely make adjustment for its youth to have access to land. 
The overriding problem as viewed by the Unggai people was an economic one. They saw their area 
as depressed and lacking the development of surrounding areas. Because of the higher altitude of 
the Unggai, their coffee trees took longer to bear fruit, and did not bear in the same abundance as 
the trees of the fertile Asaro valley. Most income for the people came from vegetable growing: 
selling cabbage, potato, sweet potato and sugar cane. There were difficulties here, too, as much of 
their soil is clay, and when they do produce good quality food and carry it to the market, frequently 
it is not sold by the end of the day and is thrown away. While there were cattle projects in the 
foothills of the Unggai, cattle have not been successful in the higher country. The Department of 
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Primary Industry has not encouraged livestock projects there because of poor roads and 
inaccessibility. Chickens and goats had their own different problems, and trade stores are not viable 
when people do not have much money. 
The next concern most often expressed by the people was for more and better roads. Most roads are 
only dry-weather roads and are neither safe nor serviceable during the wet season. 
A third concern was education and the rise in school fees. Education remains a high priority, but 
school fees have been very difficult for families to raise. Parents have experienced real hardship in 
this area, and many of the young people are taken out of school because of it. The aggressive 
attacks against the high school may well have been related to this factor. 
A fourth concern was the violent and pornographic films which are allowed into Papua New Guinea 
and are shown at the town cinemas. Most parents link unsuitable films and comics with the 
escalation of the law and order situation. Some ask, 'Why, when schools set a good example, does 
the government allow that example to be undone by a lax censorship board?' .  
The EHPRC was assured b y  th e  Unggai parents that they were trying t o  b e  responsible. They said 
they gave many lectures to their children and the young troublemakers. The parents laid the blame 
almost entirely at the feet of the young people saying that education diminished their respect for 
illiterate elders. The young people would only learn through the bitter experience of going to gaol. 
The elders felt they had no 'weapons' at their disposal to control young people, make them work, or 
bring sanctions to bear upon them. When asked if they could not withhold brideprice from the 
troublemakers, they said it was not a good idea as marriag� settled them down. There was a feeling 
of real helplessness in looking for solutions to their problems. 
Village councillors have become less active as they have seen their influence waning. It has 
become a vicious circle with loss of prestige and strength producing inactivity, lack of confidence 
and further lack of respect The lack of traditional community sanctions and powerful, active 
leaders has led young people to believe they have little to fear from their home communities. 
There was a feeling that the government no longer comes to the people. People have to come to 
town to find government. Then when they do, they seldom receive s atisfactory replies, but are 
referred from one department to the next. 
Their own answer to the problem was that rural areas should be made more attractive for young 
people. Young people are looking for the 'good life' which they believe can only be found in town: 
they desire picture shows, live bands, socials and liquor outlets, and in particular, sporting events. 
Many young people said, 'We do not care if we live or die' . Whether this is mere bravado or the 
actual truth, it is a sad indictment on the present state of affairs (or, maybe, affairs of state!). It 
does, however, reflect the general feeling of helplessness and hopelessness among both young and 
old. 
The EHPRC presented a report to the provincial government drawing its attention to some of the 
grievances' of the people and making some general recommendations. The report suggested that the 
governipent should create short-term employment for young people and guard against unnecessarily 
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replacing men by machines, investing less in heavy equipment and more in tractors and trailers 
which could be sent out to rural areas to assist youth to repair their own roads. Too often bulldozers 
repair roads while teenagers sit on the side of the road playing cards. The landscaping of the new 
provincial government building was given as ' another case in point. An Unggai group had 
landscaped the gardens at the side of Yanepa House for K300 for two weeks' work, while the front 
was contracted out to a company for K50,000 and incorporated a sealed car park and decorative 
fountain which could be regarded as luxuries in a small town. 
• 
Second the report recommended that people should be made aware of the value of supporting local 
products to assist the country to minimize its import of goods, and so create employment at home. 
Stores in Papua New Guinea have 'Made in Britain' weeks, 'Made in Australia' and 'Made in New 
Zealand' weeks, but we never see a 'Made in Papua New Guinea' week. Imports such as honey, 
biscuits, toilet rolls and frozen vegetables should be banned when there is an abundance of these 
products in the country. It was suggested that feasibility studies be done on snap-freezing our own 
fresh vegetables and bottling our own fruits. 
Third, the report pointed out that there was a genuine feeling by both young and old in rural areas 
that they had been neglected and forgotten. They had to start a tribal fight before any notice was 
taken of them. It was a sad indictment of the independent state of Papua New Guinea that some 
people felt nostalgic for the colonial days. It was recommended that government departments re­
establish a link with villages by patrolling rural areas more frequently and camping out in the 
villages, building up people' s  confidence in the services offered. 
Three years later the Unggai is probably the quietest part of the Eastern Highlands Province. The 
more remote areas which are not causing rascal trouble are pursuing traditional tribal fights. The 
courts in Goroka tell the EHPRC that hardly ever does an Unggai person pass through the courts 
even on a minor offence. When one does, it is usually for a traffic offence. In 1982, the 
Department of Public Health offered a contract to thirty-six Unggai youths to spray the villages of 
the province as a malaria control measure. Other than that there has been no obvious improvement 
in job opportunities in the district. Bulldozers still grade and level Unggai roads while young 
people remain idle, and the stores continue to stock their freezers with frozen peas, beans, broccoli 
and corn. Stores have had another 'New Zealand Week',  another 'Made in Britain Week' and have 
continued to import luxury items from America, the Philippines and Japan. We can buy anything 
from boiled bracken and seaweed jelly from Asia to pure maple syrup from Canada. 
Meanwhile, the Unggai District has shown that it is highly suitable for growing English potatoes. 
The extra altitude reduces disease. The potato projects have been so successful that the provincial 
government and the EHPRC has set up a marketing cooperative with a Swiss volunteer supervising 
it. The cooperative employs an urban youth group without access to land to sell the potatoes from 
wheelbarrows around the town. The national government has made an effort to ban some 
competitive items. Imported honey has been banned and there is a promise of a ban on imported 
fresh vegetables from Australia in 1986. Meanwhile the peanut butter factory has gone broke, 
while a s triped of peanut butter interlaced with guava jelly from America is available in the 
stores ! 
Probation and its possibilities 
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One of the aims of the EHPRC was to assist first off enders to keep out of gaol and support them in 
their rehabilitation. The EHPRC saw the need for a formal probation service. 
Probation is a system which allows some offenders to serve their sentence, either in part or full, in 
their community. It does not apply to people who have committed a serious offence such as 
mqrder, rape or armed robbery. It . applies rather to people who have committed a petty offence, 
particularly first offenders or people who cannot afford to pay a fine and would otherwise go to gaol 
in default. Nevertheless, it must not be forgotten that probation is a sentence, and any restrictions 
the court may lay down as conditions of a probation order must be obeyed. 
Initially the courts in Goroka did not want to take up the offer of the EHPRC to assist with first 
offenders as we had no official recognition. Also, owing to the poor standard of police records it 
was difficult to determine who was a genuine first offender: the vast majority of people passing 
through the courts would appear from police information to be fust offenders. Only criminals with 
outstanding criminal records are well-known to the police under their various aliases. 
Official gazettal for a probation service was received in January 1983 after fifteen months of 
discouraging response from government. During the first year the courts made cautious use of the 
service in Goroka. Fifty-four people were referred to the probation office either on probation or 
under a good behaviour bond. 
Impetus for the service came from the introduction of the mandatory minimum scatences legislation 
in July 1983. AlUiough the EHPRC opposed this legislation as causing unnecessary suffering and 
hardship, ironically the legislation gave the spur the probation service was seeking. Magistrates 
were unhappy at the minimum sentences which frequently affected ordinary people such as married 
women who, when assaulting their husband's girlfriend in a public place (a traditional response to a 
marital problem), were facing a minimum gaol sentence of six months.  Six months in gaol only 
ensured that the marriage was ruined as the husband and girlfriend were not similarly imprisoned. 
The children' s  court in Goroka showed, like children' s  courts around the world, that broken homes 
breed the next generation of criminals . .  With this dilemma confronting them, the courts in Goroka 
were indeed grateful to have a probation service in the wings. 
However, the Probation Act 1979, Written before the introduction of the new minimum penalties 
legislation, precludes the offering of probation if a minimum penalty applies . When the act was 
written, the only minimum penalties were for murder, rape and treason, offences for which 
probation was unsuitable iq any case. To overcome the new dilemma, the courts in Goroka used 
S . 138 (now S . 132) of the District Courts Act which permits the court, where the case is for an 
indictable offence triable summarily, to release the offender 'conditionally on his entering into a 
recognizance, with or without sureties, to be of good behaviour . . .  ' .  Offenders, particularly married 
women, have been offered a good behaviour bond on the condition that they submit to the services 
of the Probation Office. In effect they receive the same service from the office as people placed on 
probation under the Probation Act. With the successful passing of Sir B arry Holloway' s  private 
member's bill to repeal the minimum sentences on the Summary Offences Act, this back-door 
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approach will be no longer necessary after November 1985. Table 10. 1 provides figures on the 
numbers of people placed on bonds and probation. 
Table 10.1 
Probation and good behaviour bonds in the Eastern Highlands Province 
1 9 8 2  
Good behaviour bonds 
males 0 
fema l e s  0 
t o t a l  0 
P roba t i o n  
ma l e s  2 
femal e s  0 
t o t a l  2 
All c a s e s  2 
Yea r  
1 9 8 3  
1 7  
6 
2 3  
2 6  
5 
3 1  
5 4  
o f  commencement 
1 9 8 4  1 9 8 5 
( t o  3 0  June ) 
2 2 0  6 5  
1 7 0  5 0  
3 9 0  1 1 5  
4 7  7 0  
1 3  2 7  
6 0  9 7  
4 5 0  2 1 2 
Source: Eastern Highlands Provincial Rehabilitation Committee records. 
Al l 
yea r s  
3 0 2  
2 2 6 
5 2 8 
1 4 5 
4 5  
1 9 0  
7 1 8  
To ensure that probationers comply with court orders, to support them through their test of good 
conduct, and to encourage a positive attitude rather than merely 'keeping out of trouble' for the 
duration of the probationary period, the probationers are instructed to report on a regular basis to a 
probation officer, or are visited in their homes and communities. To assist a probation officer with 
this task, a team of voluntary probation officers (VPOs) is essential. The members of the EHPRC 
became that pool of VPOs, thus involving grass-roots support for the service. This support should 
not be underestimated. Law and order is a community responsibility and requires a community 
response. 
Among the many advantages of a probation service, four stand out as being most significant: 
financial viability, social viability, equity, and the importance of reconciliation. 
Financially, a no-frills probation service with community participation has much to offer 
government. Probation must reduce the spending of the Corrective Institutions Service. Prisons in 
this country are full of petty off enders or people unable to pay fines, and these people are being 
detained at great cost to the government. It appears to cost approximately K6-K8 per day for each 
prisoner in gaol. In 1984, the Goroka Probation Service dealt with 450 probationers. Most of these 
people would otherwise have had prison sentence of between six months to one year. The 
Probation Service in 1 984 saved government at least half a million kina. 
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The probation service appears to be what could be termed ' socially viable' .  In 1982 and 1983 
nobody on a bond or on probation was re-arrested. In 1984 only eleven were re-arrested out of 
several hundred in the care of the EHPRC, and by June 30 1985 only another seven had been re­
arrested. 
Although most referrals to the service have not been high-risk people to date, the low number of 
recidivists indicates that the vast majority of petty offenders will respond positively to the interest 
and attention of a probation officer. Whereas violence will often create more violence, goodwill 
will generate goodwill. It is therefore important that a probation service picks up the first off enders, 
for whom j ail is still an unknown quantity and an intimidating deterrent, so that they can· be 
encouraged to reject anti-social behaviour before crime becomes a habit. When a person is put on 
probation, families and communities are alerted to the problem and become involved in the 
rehabilitation process.  Probation then becomes an educating experience for the entire community. 
Whereas a prison sentence may often provoke a desire for revenge, probation can invoke a sense of 
obligation for the friendship and attention the probationer has received during the period of 
probation. 
A probation service increases equity before the law. In Papua New Guinea many poor people have 
been going to gaol because they cannot afford fines for minor offences, that people with more 
money can pay easily. Many married women are also gaoled because they cannot pay fines. Of the 
105 women on probation in Goroka in 1984, one was sentenced for prostitution, one for stealing 
clothes ;  the rest were women either directly or indirectly involved with a marital problem. The 
probation service provides a more appropriate alternative to fines than gaol in such cases. It is more 
equitable because it does not exacerbate the poor offender' s  problems by removing him or her from 
his livelihood and family.  
In his book, Sana, Michael Somare extolled the value of reconciliation above that of retribution in 
those halcyon days of optimism preceding independence (Somare 1 975). O f  all the sentencing 
options open to the district court in its criminal jurisdiction, probation seems to be the one most 
suited to reconciling people with one another. A sentence which allows reconciliation through 
compensation to or work orders in favour of the victim can only have a positive influence towards 
peace and social stability. For the majority of people, justice is seen to be done and relatio�shfps 
are restored when compensation is made, and thus reconciliation comes about. 
An example of this was a case heard in the Goroka District Court in 1984. A young tradesman, who 
was a family man, was the victim of a minor motor accident. His children were shaken and 
frightened but otherwise unhurt. He assaulted the offending driver in the heat of the moment and his 
conduct encouraged some of his fellow clansmen to come to his support;. 
The offending driver in the accident, a professional worker from another province, was bruised and 
shaken. The tradesman was charged with assault, which at that time carried a minimum penalty of 
six months in gaol. He made it known to the court that he was willing to compensate the 
complainant and the court allowed him the opportunity to do so. Upon compensation being paid, 
the accused was placed on probation through the use of a good behaviour bond. The accused was 
grateful that he was not committed to gaol which would have caused hardship to his family and 
probably cost him his job. The complainant was gratified that the wrong done to him had been 
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appropriately adjusted and that he could continue to live and work in the same neighbourhood as the 
accused without risking retribution and ostricism from the accused's clansmen. Examples such as 
this highlight the flexibility of probation and its v,aiue in having the punishment fit the crime. 
At the time the Probation Act 1979 was passed, government could be accused of 'playing' with the 
concept. Only two public service positions were created and funding was totally inadequate. A 
chief probation officer was placed in Port Moresby and a senior probation officer in Lae. Without 
adequate funding, and with no vehicle in Lae to supervise the probationers, the courts ignored the 
service and did not take it seriously. As the EHPRC was asking for a probation service for Goroka 
in 198 1-82, the government was trying to bury probation. The chief probation officer returned to 
his old position in Magisterial Services, and the senior probation officer was transferred to the 
Welfare Department. The EHPRC was told there were no funds to establish a service. 
Through the assistance of the Eastern Highlands provincial government a rent-free office was 
obtained with telephone, and an Austrian volunteer social worker was employed as the first 
probation officer. - Tue EHPRC raised money elsewhere. Of the seven posts in the Goroka office in 
1985, three are funded by the national government, one by the provincial government, and.one each 
by funds for non-government organizations (from within the country), the Lutheran Church of West 
Germany, and a Canadian volunteer organization, Canadian University Service Overseas. 
Meanwhile Madang and Lae have become interested in opening probation service.s in their 
provinces,  and once again they have had to find private funding for their work. The Goroka office 
has trained probation officers for Madang, and their office opened in August this year. An office is 
expected to open in Lae in 1986. A proposal was before government in 1985 for a five-year plan to 
cover the country with a probation service by 1 990. The future of probation now rests entirely with 
the acceptance or rejection of this proposal. 
Simple and inexpensive solutions: lessons from the Eastern Highlands 
The membership of the EHPRC has grown from seventy inaugural members to 170 scattered 
throughout the Eastern Highlands Province. Approximately sixty are from Goroka town, with the 
remainder coming from the rural areas. The EHPRC has extended its work far beyond the Unggai 
and beyond the probation service. But wherever it has worked, it has shown that law and order is 
dependent not on injections of money, but rather on injections of time and effort. 
Although the EHPRC has assisted with projects, taken information to the people, provided training 
in agriculture and bookkeeping and helped youth to find short contract work, we believe the one 
overriding factor in our success has been the relationships we have built with people and their 
communities .  By building relationships rather than putting up barriers, by showing youth they have 
a place in their community and a role to play in our society, we have demonstrated that the 
prospects for law and order need not be as dismal as our dai:ly newspapers would have us believe. 
Traditionally Papua New Guineans had a great respect for strength. Today too the strong man not 
the gentle saint is the bigman. The bigman can be generous but there is a day of reckoning when 
debts are recalled. The EHPRC has followed in the steps of the bigman. On the one hand we work 
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with a spirit of generosity; but on the other hand we have our day of reckoning. If we did not work 
from a position of strength, we would receive no respect. We are dealing with hard-headed people, 
people who will pressure and push for their own ends. When the wheeling and dealing is over and a 
dignified relationship is established, the hardest part of the work is over. We call our approach 'the 
strong arm and the hand shake' ,  or 'firmness with kindness ' .  
B uilding relationships i s  not a n  expensive exercise. The resources are already present i n  the 
community. It is true that an inertia has struck down many people, particularly public servants. 
And many expatriates, who would have the competence and vitality to take the reins in their hands, 
are suffering from post-independence reticence to ' throw their weight around' .  Others are looking 
over their shoulders at the political consequences of standing up for integrity: the visa and work 
permit cloud their vision. But the resources are here; what is needed is remotivation and a little 
courage. 
Government and church have the resources, but these resources need a change in emphasis and 
redirection. There are so many simple issues with which people need help: issues such as learning 
to handle alcohol in a responsible way, saving this year's coffee money for next year's school fees, 
understanding that parents are responsible for their young people beyond the mere raising of school 
fees, and deciding which 'noble traditions' to strengthen and which to adapt to the changing times. 
Government extension officers and church workers could be addressing these problems at a 
minimum of cost, j ust  by a redirection of their duty statements. 
The experience of our committee has been that the majority of young people who come in conflict 
with the law do respond if they see some hope. Young people are seeking an identity and when 
society denies them that inevitably a small proportion of them find it as members of a gang. 
Amongst the various tatoos on young people one sees stars on foreheads and two links of a chain on 
arms. There is something symbolic in these motifs. They seem to say: 'We want to be a star, to be 
somebody, we want to be linked with something else ' .  The towns push young people out with 'Sori 
no gat wok' signs, and their communities push them out by denying them land. Both sections of 
society are pushing the young people of the nation down a one-way road to a life of crime. The 
challenge is to give these people an identity and purpose in their youth, and to link them with people 
and resources who can provide that purpose. 
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